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A society's culture . . . consists of whatever it is one 
has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner 
acceptable to its members. 
-- Clifford Geertz (An Interpretation of Cultures 11) 
Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. 
Knowledge is truth. The truth is everywhere the same. 
Hence education should be everywhere the same. 
-- Robert Hutchlns ("General Education 90) 
Every relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily an 
educational relationship. 
-- Antonio Gramscl (350) 
Universality is when we take shit forever, with smiles on 
our faces. 
-- Sam Greenlee ("Strategies for Change") 
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INTRODUCTION 
Repeatedly throughout this decade the message has been 
announced: the humanities are In crisis. The discourse or rhetoric 
of crisis has come from a variety of diverse sources, from the 
political Left as well as the Right, from academic humanists, 
administrators, bureaucrats, and the popular press.^  For students of 
twentieth century educational history, much of the discourse seems 
reminiscent of the 1930s, when John Dewey and Robert Hutchlns and 
their respective disciples debated in often heated terms the 
appropriate content and character of liberal education! But anyone 
with even passing familiarity with the views of these two giant North 
American educational philosophers recognizes that neither man won the 
day. On one hand, the growing emphasis on science has resulted in 
academic programs in which the humanities--the core of Hutchlns' 
liberal arts vision--are Increasingly marginalized. On the other 
hand, charges of ethnocentricism, racism, and sexism haunt the 
traditional liberal arts curriculum, which is castigated for its DEWH 
(Dead European White Male) bias (Bill Moyers). Thus it appears that 
the "barriers of class, race, and national territory" which Dewey 
F^or perhaps the most recent and representative example of this 
discourse, please see the Summer 1989 (LXIX:3) edition of the Phi 
Kappa Phi Journal, National Forum. The summer Issue Includes essays 
by several Individuals discussed in my dissertation and is devoted in 
Its entirety to the debates surrounding national culture, cultural 
literacy, and literary canons. 
wanted broken down in the interest of genuine democracy are still 
firmly entrenched (Democracy and Education 87). For the humanities, 
this means having been nudged from a central position in the 
undergraduate general education curricula while also being torn from 
within by radical disagreements over their content and character. 
Perceived in this light, what Hutchins described in 1953 as "the 
conflict in education" seems bound to have developed into "crisis" 
sooner or later. 
One need not search at great length to gather documentary 
evidence of the humanities' crisis. Controversial attempts abound 
nationwide to revise and reform undergraduate curricula. A multitude 
of committees, commissions, and free-lance experts have devoted 
endless hours and issued scores of reports for the purpose of defining 
what's wrong with liberal education. And most of these reports point 
to the "lack [of] meaningful coherence, cohesion, and continuity" in 
the humanities (West, Hermeneutics. "Introduction" 67). The crisis is 
even reflected in the financial community. For example, in 1988 came 
the bewildering news that Citibank officials had Instituted a policy 
(deemed altogether legal by their attorneys) which denied credit to 
humanities majors strictly on the basis of their "field of study" 
(Chang, The National College Newspaper. September 1988, 14). This 
despite the claim of many business leaders that the humanities prepare 
students for lucrative careers in the commercial world. 
A recent indication of the status of the humanities at land grant 
universities is Iowa State University's Public Policy Education 
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Project, a program Implemented to "put Iowa leaders in touch with the 
most current, relevant, and understandable information regarding the 
major issues" facing the state (FPEP Pamphlet). While a campus-wide 
committee of directors was established for the project, not a single 
humanities scholar, not even a philosopher or historian, was among 
them. When queried as to the reason for this omission, project 
coordinator Mark Edelman (Economics) replied with, I believe, genuine 
regret, that it had to do with "historical institutional barriers" 
(Telephone conversation, July 21, 1989). 
I submit that in all of the above examples, radical doubts are 
apparent as to not only what the humanities are, but also what they 
are for and what they are good for in the social and political world 
of the late twentieth century. This, in turn, points to a problematic 
popular image and professional self-image of the humanist 
intellectual. As literary critic Frank Lentricchia puts it, 
The popular conception of the humanist ... is that bs is 
the sort of male who is not now, nor ever will be, in danger 
of penetrating the social texture of his time. His ideas 
are not now, nor ever will be, in danger of inseminating 
everyday life. ("The 'Life' ..." 27) 
Gerald Graff and Jerry Herron concur with Lentricchia. As Graff 
observes in the foreword to Herron's 1988 book. Universities and the 
Mvth of Cultural Decline. 
In a society which classifies [the humanities] under the 
Sunday supplement category "Arts and Leisure," there is no 
need to worry about [humanistic] intellectual culture 
becoming subordinated to Instrumental ends. It Is not 
thought to have any. (9) 
Both Graff and Herron argue that the contemporary humanities are 
reaping the confusion sowed throughout their history. On one hand, 
the humanities were represented, by Cardinal Newman for example, as an 
end in themselves: humanities for humanities' (or in some rather 
va(^ e sense, humanity's) sake. Any notion of vulgar utility was--and 
for the most part, continues to be--abhorrent. On the other hand, as 
Graff and Herron argue, at the very moment of this representation 
(mid-nineteenth century), humanistic education was a "prerequisite to 
the professions and to positions of national leadership" (10). Thus, 
the humanities actually "owe their inherited educational and social 
prestige to the fact that they have not existed in a disinterested 
realm, but have directly contributed to the middle class world of work 
and success" (10). But this world has changed. In an age of 
"technocratic capitalism," familiarity with humanistic intellectual 
culture is not needed to assure or legitimate social success and, in 
fact, may work against it. 
One key question thus becomes apparent: What authority do the 
humanities command in relation to the social and political world of 
the late twentieth century? Many thinkers--those of a conservative or 
reactionary bent--look with nostalgia to a time when humanistic 
intellectual culture commanded prestige and exercised social 
authority. The thesis advocated by Graff and Herron supports this 
perspective. The difference is that conservative thinkers, such as 
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William Bennett and Allan Bloom, resist the notion that the 
humanities' prestige and authority waned as a consequence of social 
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and economic developments outside of academic humanities departments. 
They maintain that the deterioration of the humanities' authority in 
contemporary society has been self-induced by humanist intellectuals 
who have forsaken their own tradition and now languish in a swamp of 
relativism and nihilism. Furthermore, conservative thinkers concur 
that the contemporary crisis of the humanities is intrinsically 
related to the falling health of liberal democracy, which needs the 
philosophical authority of Truth and Reason to survive. 
The first two chapters.of this study will be devoted to an 
analysis of the conservative discourse of crisis, especially that of 
Allan Bloom, and to a critique of this discourse. These chapters thus 
set the stage for my study and manifest the dialectical approach which 
I take throughout to the Issues at hand. For example, the ideas of 
neo-pragmatlst philosopher Richard Rorty, whose critique of the 
conservative view is discussed in Chapter Two, are explored far more 
fully in Chapter Three. 
Rorty, it should be noted, does not articulate a discourse of 
crisis, although he does argue that his liberal-pragmatic conception 
of the humanities is more conducive to democracy than is the 
conservative conception. Rorty believes that a rejection of 
philosophical realism (which Bloom sees as the only genuine 
philosophy) is necessary for genuine democratic solidarity. The task 
for the humanities, he argues, Is to help create a language (and thus 
a culture) in which "our finite and contingent sense of human 
community" would replace the authority of God and/or Reason 
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("Hermeneutlcs" 6). This Is essential for liberal democracy because 
Inculcating a sense of community entails charging that community with 
the responsibility of "choosing its own destiny" (6). Thus, for 
Rorty, the humanities do- or should--serve a social purpose, but 
Importantly, this purpose has only poetic, not philosophically-
authoritative, grounds. From Rorty's perspective, this is no denial 
of the humanities' importance. In fact, Rorty's controversial project 
throughout this decade has been to show that all Intellectual 
endeavor, including science, is historically and linguistically 
contingent. Like Dewey, then, Rorty advocates erasing the traditional 
lines separating the "two cultures" and viewing all intellectual 
endeavor as a creation of metaphors for reality, not as a discovery of 
reality. 
As might be expected, Rorty has managed to provoke criticism from 
both his political left and right. Having already explored the views 
of his conservative rivals, I will continue my dialectical study in 
Chapter Four by examining the general critique of Rorty which emanates 
from his political left. In the final chapter, I will analyze in more 
detail the ideas of one of Rorty's radical critics. Cornel West. 
Interestingly, West's radical discourse of crisis shares some 
common ground with that articulated by political conservatives. Like 
the latter. West laments the isolation, self-doubt, and diminished 
authority of the humanities ; but, unlike the conservatives, West does 
not attribute the humanities crisis to the philosophical and cultural 
relativism of contemporary academic humanists. Rather, West affirms 
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with Rorty the historical and linguistic contingency of all 
intellectual endeavor, and he is unwilling to exchange his own 
intellectual integrity for metaphysically-grounded cultural authority. 
But unlike Rorty, West maintains that one cannot historicize 
humanistic intellectual culture without politicizing it. The upshot, 
then, is that West situates the humanities crisis in both historical 
and political context. He argues that without a critical awareness of 
the social injustice and political brutality which surround and even 
permeate the academy, one cannot substantively critique the "debased 
and debilitating isolation . . . professionalization, and 
specialization" which characterize the academic humanities, and which 
define their contemporary crisis. 
Like Bloom and Rorty, West maintains that his approach to 
humanistic intellectual culture is vital to the future of democracy. 
Thus the meaning of democracy becomes itself a central issue in the 
controversy surrounding the humanities, at least as exemplified by 
these three scholars. West's conception differs radically from that 
of either Bloom or Rorty and prompts him to Incorporate the elements 
of "Afro-American critical thought" (the prophetic tradition, 
pragmatism, and progressive Marxism) into "prophetic pragmatism," a 
form of cultural criticism aimed at "promoting . . . creative 
democracy by means of critical intelligence and social action" 
(Evasion 212). This despite West's sharing Rorty's rejection of the 
"epistemological myth of the given." 
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Having now outlined the content of my study and the dialectical 
method I take to Its topic, I want to clarify my own objectives and 
suppositions. My purpose In this dissertation Is not to arrive at 
decisive solutions to what promises to become an even more complex set 
of problems In the remaining years of this century. Rather, I Intend 
to situate the humanities crisis in cultural context, to unravel the 
discourse of crisis in order to analyze its philosophical roots and 
social/political implications. I will demonstrate that although all 
of the thinkers discussed in my study claim allegiance to the values 
of truth, Justice and freedom, values central to humanities education, 
broad disagreement exists as to what these terms signify for 
democratic social relations. An Important objective, then, is to 
indicate that because "democracy" itself is an abstraction, the term 
must be fleshed out by analyzing the concrete political ends endorsed 
by various contemporary thinkers. This means translating the abstract 
phrase "education for democracy" into its many and diverse meanings. 
My approach to these central objectives will be by way of Herbert 
Spencer's classic question, "What knowledge is of most worth?" I hope 
to draw out the sociopolitical assumptions and consequences of a range 
of contemporary responses to this question, and by so doing to unveil 
various diverse presuppositions about the character of democracy. My 
approach and my objectives reflect my belief that we are past the 
stage when the inherently political nature of Spencer's question can 
- or should--be ignored or denied, as it has been by platonlsts and 
other metaphysicians, perhaps most blatantly by technocratic 
t 
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rationalists. My perspective on this issue points to my ultimate 
rejection of both Bloom and Rorty. Therefore, I cannot claim to have 
taken an "objective, value-free" approach to my topic, although I have 
conscientiously endeavored to present the conservative and liberal 
views as honestly and positively as possible. 
As suggested above, ny Insistence on the political character of 
Spencer's question is also a deliberate attempt to combat the 
"technocratic rationality"^  which has dominated educational philosophy 
in recent years. The domination of this rationality has been 
identified by and analyzed by social philosophers such as Jûrgén 
Habermas and Paulo Frelre, and in turn by their Interpreters, 
Including Stanley Aronowltz and Henry Giroux; traced by "revisionist" 
historians of education, such as Edgar Gumbert and Joel Spring; and 
condemned most heartily of all by Holocaust scholars, including Allan 
Berger, Franklin Llttell, John Roth and Richard RubensteIn. While I 
do not Intend to discuss at length the character of this rationality, 
I believe that I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge Its hegemony 
over the cultural stage on which the crisis of the humanities is 
played out. 
Technocratic rationality is an ideological perspective which is 
concerned exclusively with principles of certainty and control, and 
characterized by an interest solely in means, as opposed to ends, 
F^or a helpful and fully accessible discussion of the history of 
this phenomenon, I suggest Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of 
Science, especially Robert Hollinger's Introductions to Parts 5 (319-
326) and 6 (377-383), and his essay "From Weber to Habermas" (416-
426), 
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which are simply Ignored or assumed to be objectively given. As 
sociologist Alvin Gouldner argues, the technocratic rationalist 
assumes that the knowledge claims of science, by virtue of their 
alleged value-neutrality, possess a legitimacy that no other knowledge 
claims can rival. By the same token, science possesses this superior 
authority without the conflict and struggle which has traditionally 
occurred when ideologies contend for dominance (The Dialectic of 
Ideologv and Technoloev 250). 
As indicated earlier in this introduction, both Richard Rorty and 
Cornel West contend against the ideological hegemony of science. 
(This, I believe, is Rorty's chief virtue.) On the other hand, Allan 
Bloom and others of his orientation present a picture of the "human 
sciences" which implicitly accepts and even reinforces technocratic 
ideology in that they claim a perspective on human life and culture 
which is grounded in nature and thus objectively given. Rorty, while 
kicking the props out from under this hegemonic rationality, 
ultimately replaces the "epistemological myth of the given" with an 
"historical myth of the given." By this I mean that he refuses to 
analyze asymmetrical power relations as a determining factor in the 
creation of language and history. Thus, it is left to Gomel West and 
other radical intellectuals, most of whom draw heavily on Antonio 
Gramsci's cultural Marxism, to elucidate the full political character 
of knowledge and culture. 
The radical culture critic calls on humanist Intellectuals to 
make a choice and to act on it. Are the academic humanities cultural 
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or counter-cultural? Can they be both and keep their integrity? To 
what degree can they be counter-cultural within existing academic 
structures? The remarkable tendency of academic humanists to hedge on 
these questions is all too apparent to astute observers. As Graff 
exclaims, "If you study English you will leam how to see through 
corporate capitalism, while qualifying for a job at IBM" (Foreword to 
Herron, 13)! But can those who do not hedge, who opt for critical 
counter-cultural humanities education in the Interest of creative 
democracy, remain in good conscience within existing academic 
structures? Can they hope to effect any genuine social and cultural 
change within the confines of such structures? These are the 
troubling questions with which my study ends. 
I have embarked on this project as one who reveres the value 
claims of humanistic intellectual culture and who is simultaneously 
(perhaps consequently) deeply concerned with the structure of social 
power. It is my belief that the interaction between the two is 
ignored by academic humanists not only at their own peril, but also at 
that of their students, who will inherit the social realities of the 
next century. I thus dedicate this study to all those who do not feel 
at home in the academy, who desperately wish that they did, and who 
continue to yearn and work for a time when the university fulfills its 
potential as a genuine community of critically-conscious, morally-
engaged scholars. 
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1. THE CONSERVATIVE DISCOURSE OF CRISIS IN THE 1980S 
1.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will examine the "crisis of the humanities" as 
it has been defined in this decade by four conservative thinkers whose 
views have been widely accessible in the public arena: Harvard 
Professor of English, W. Jackson Bate; former Secretary of Education 
William Bennett; Chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities, 
Lynne Cheney; and University of Chicago social philosopher, Allan 
Bloom. Because the crisis as perceived by these scholars is largely 
or even exclusively internal to the academic humanities, i.e., 
concerned with the content and character of undergraduate humanities 
curricula, it is this issue that will be addressed most fully. 
In 1982, writing in Harvard Magazine. Walter Jackson Bate 
announced, "The humanities are not merely entering, they are plunging 
into their worst state of crisis since the modem university was 
formed a century ago" (46). Since its publication. Bate's article has 
been widely quoted, both by those who strongly agree with its message 
(e.g., Bennett and Cheney) and by those who--for various reasons--
strongly disagree (de Man, Derrida, Fish) (Jeffords 108). His essay 
has been called upon to reinforce the arguments of Bennett and Cheney, 
both of whom have held positions of visibility and authority in 
relation to humanities education in this decade. Therefore, it is to 
Bate's article that I turn first. 
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1.2. Walter Jackson Bate 
Bate traces the crisis of the humanities to changes In the 
university brought about by the new scientific paradigm which 
originated In late nineteenth-century Germany.^  This change from a 
classical curriculum which took for granted the unity of knowledge to 
one committed to academic specialization based on the new 
understanding of science was quickly emulated in the United States, 
and resulted in fragmented and regimented departments which were soon 
accepted as the norm for university structure. The consequences of 
this transition were dire for the humanities, which traditionally 
prided themselves for their concern with the holistic experience of 
human beings. Furthermore, specialization led to the construction of 
esoteric vocabularies, each associated with a particular "expert" 
knowledge, whereas the language of the humanities from ancient Greece 
onward has been accessible to all readers. 
According to Bate, as the humanities accommodated themselves to 
the principle of specialization, they lost their authority, identity, 
and purpose. Their claim of nurturing a valuable way of knowing, 
their ideal of trusting the "moral and educative effect . . .of 
knowledge" in relation to human character, their dedication to 
synthesizing an "interplay of mind and experience": all of these have 
been severely undermined by the humanities' submission to the 
F^or thorough discussion of this transition, see Lilge's The 
Abuse of Learning: The Failure of the German University, and 
McClelland's State. Society.and University in Germany. 1700-1914. 
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scientific paradigm. This submission was brought about, in part, by 
the "seduction" of humanist scholars by formalistic theories and 
methods congruent with the dominant scientific paradigm. Bate 
attributes this "seduction" to two "feelings treacherously Important 
to the human psyche: the yearning for importance and the craving for 
safety" (49). In other words, knowing more and more about less and 
less, and camouflaging what one does know in arcane language are 
psychologically appealing in a culture which values only "the 
authority of experts." Aggravating the psychological "seduction" of 
academic humanists were administrators who themselves had been 
indoctrinated by the scientific paradigm, and who thus equated 
"productivity" with the creation of "new" knowledge and publication, 
both of which were measured quantitatively. 
Bate traces the various ills of specialization through the 
twentieth century, concentrating primarily on his own field, English, 
after 1955. From that time onward, he maintains, a growing 
polarization has existed between traditional Renaissance humanists and 
new academic humanists (those "seduced" by specialization). Bate's 
sympathy, of course, is with the former, and he laments the latter 
group's increasing size and stature, as well as its general Ignorance 
of the "legacy of thought and the inheritance of Idealism" which is In 
danger of being forever lost. 
At a certain time--Bates does not specify when--an event occurred 
which accelerated the demise of the humanities; "the bottom fell out 
of the Job-market, with a speed and completeness never before 
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experienced" (50). Bate attributes this event to three causes: 1) 
the vast overproduction of Ph.D.s--particularly at state universities 
which were especially guilty of turning out students who viewed 
"literature as a private preserve, and [who] were . . . Innocent of 
history, of philology, of 'ideas' generally"; 2) inflation; and 3) 
public disillusionment with higher education. Furthermore, many of 
the Ph.D.s who had emerged from state universities now had tenured 
teaching positions. The result was that humanities departments were 
paralyzed by inflation and public disillusion at the precise moment in 
which they were held in the tenured grip of those academics most 
likely to be "innocent of ideas," in other words, those state-
university-educated Ph.D.s who simply had not been "trained" to 
preserve the "civilization of the Logos." 
When forced to Justify the existence of their departments to 
administrations hard pressed for funding, the "new academic humanists" 
developed scores of new courses with the goal of attracting students 
who might otherwise have shunned the field. Women's Studies, ethnic 
literature and history, film classes. Business English: for Bate all 
of these represent the demise of the humanities. Meanwhile, the felt 
need for intellectual rigor has not completely diminished; 
unfortunately, however, it has led to philosophical and literary 
theories (structuralism, deconstructlon) which tend to create for 
humanities scholarship a "separate preserve, apart from the common 
experience of life" (52). 
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What is left in the humanities is isolation, intellectual 
emptiness, and a "potentially suicidal movement among 'leaders of the 
profession"* (52). Without its traditional center of the Renaissance 
ideal, the humanities flotinder, sprawl in "helpless disarray." Thus, 
the "crisis of the humanities" as defined by W. Jackson Bate. 
1.3. William Bennett 
Anyone familiar with the ideas of William Bennett (and given his 
visibility in the 1980s, it is likely that many persons are familiar 
with his ideas) will readily understand why he has drawn upon Bate's 
Harvard Magazine article to reinforce his own conception of the 
humanities. Bennett's direct use of Bate is found in the 1984 NEH 
Report on Humanities in Education (To Reclaim a Legacy^ , but only two 
months after the publication of Bate's article, Bennett wrote for The 
Wall Street Journal a piece entitled "The Shattered Humanities," in 
which one finds views quite similar to those of Bate. (This is not, 
of course, to suggest that Bate's article was the germ for Bennett's 
sense of the humanities crisis, but only that the two men have related 
understandings.) However, while Bate attempted to locate the 
difficulties surrounding humanities education in at least limited 
historical context, Bennett flatly maintains in The Wall Street 
Journal that "the greatest threat to the humanities lies within." In 
other words, those who practice the academic humanities have "lost 
faith" in their own tradition, their own enterprise. They demonstrate 
what Bennett refers to as a "perverse embarrassment . . . about the 
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achievements of our civilization." Furthermore, within the academic 
humanities, "there seems to be competition for complete unlntelll-
glblllty," as "self-Isolating vocabularies . . . abound within 
subdlsclpllnes." The consequences of this Inner decay Is that the 
humanities have become--or are quickly becoming--"phony and empty," 
repelling potential students who are concerned with "matters of 
enduring Importance . . . courage, fidelity, friendship, honor, love, 
Justice, goodness, ambiguity, time, power, faith." (Note the 
departure from Bate's understanding that the "new humanities" 
developed as the result of the need to pander to a wider range of 
students. In order to justify the existence of humanities departments. 
Of course. It may be that Bennett Is simply lamenting the character of 
the students drawn to the "new humanities," over against the character 
of those somehow repelled.) 
Bennett's major statement on the humanities crisis Is the 
aforementioned 1984 NEH report. To Reclaim a Legacy. Here, he 
maintains that the purpose of the humanities Is to transmit to 
students a "common culture rooted In civilization's lasting vision, 
its highest shared Ideals and aspirations, and its heritage" (17). In 
addition, he rejects the idea that this purpose is problematic in 
relation to developing a core curriculum given the pluralism of United 
States society, but points Instead to what he "suspects" is a 
"consensus on what the great books are" (18). He bases his 
"suspicion" on a "test" which was undertaken to determine "what the 
American public thinks are the most significant works." The "test" 
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consisted of Bennett's Invitation to "several hundred educatldnal and 
cultural leaders," and columnist George Will's Identical Invitation to 
the "general public" to submit lists of "ten books that any high 
school graduate should have read." Out of the "more than five 
hundred" responses to these invitations, over fifty percent agreed on 
four "texts and authors . . . Shakespeare's plays, American historical 
documents . . . The Adventures of Huckleberrv Finn, and the Bible." 
The point to be gathered from this "test" is clear, maintains Bennett; 
there is "broader agreement.on what the [most important] books are 
than many have supposed." Furthermore, he believes that this is as 
true at the college level as it is in secondary schools. . 
As to the drop in the number of humanities majors, Bennett 
returns to the theme of his Wall Street Journal text. The 
"conventional wisdom" which attributes declining student interest to 
the "concemi for finding good-paying Jobs after college" is not 
adequate (18). Rather, the failure is internal to the academy, which 
has failed to "bring the humanities to life and to insist on their 
value." Part of this failure is that of administrators who determine 
the allocation of resources, but named first by Bennett (in terms of 
failure allocation) are those who teach the humanities. The important 
factors contributing to the failure of humanities teachers are 
specialization, the relativism of values, and ideological bias (19). 
Bennett's critique of specialization strpngly resembles that of 
Bate, and thus I will not analyze it here. The other major factors 
contributing to the failure of humanities teachers--relativism and 
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ideological bias--are on opposite ends of the same pole. On one hand, 
"the humanities are declared to have no Inherent meaning because all 
meaning is subjective and relative to one's own perspective" (19). On 
the other hand, "some humanities professors" treat their disciplines 
as if they were "the handmaiden of ideology, subordinated to 
particular prejudices and valued or rejected on the basis of their 
relation to a certain social stance." The consequence is that 
students, put off by both approaches, have "stampeded out of 
humanities departments." 
Bennett's prescription for the humanities is a return to an 
intellectually authoritative core curriculum to offset the relativism 
which now holds sway. He spurns curriculum developed on the basis of 
"political compromise," and proposes humanities classes which offer 
"the best that has been thought and written" to non-majors, as well as 
to majors. These steps, he believes, would put an end to narrow 
specialization, value relativism, and the ideological biases which 
undermine humanities education from within. Furthermore, because 
inheriting the intellectual legacy of Western civilization Is a 
valuable right of every citizen, the humanities must be restored to 
their central place in the undergraduate curriculum (21). 
In 1988--now writing as United States Secretary of Education--
Bennett again picked up the gauntlet, this time to defend his view of 
the humanities in the wake of Stanford University's decision to revise 
its humanities requirements and to Include courses in non-Western 
culture. In his syndicated column, "Collegiate Times," Bennett 
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maintained that at stake in Stanford's decision was "more than the 
fate of a single requirement." Rather, the issue of whether and why 
Western civilization courses should be kept at the core of the 
undergraduate curriculum points to the larger concern of the 
responsibility of education to "nurture and defend" the West (emphasis 
added). To the arguments for strong Western-centered humanities 
programs presented in his earlier NEH texts, Bennett adds two: 1) 
Western civilization "has set the moral, political, economic, and 
social standards for the rest of the world," and 2) "the West is under 
attack," most notably "from within." 
In his strongest language thus far, Bennett (now borrowing 
explicitly from Allan Bloom), describes the Western principles of 
"freedom and equality" as defining "the universal standard of 
legitimacy." He points once again to the "perennial questions" 
debated within Western philosophy and literature, and condemns those 
who "attack Western values and accomplishments." America, he 
maintains, has served and continues to serve as "a beacon to the 
world," and it is those who deny this--claiming "racism, imperialism, 
sexism, capitalism, ethnocentrism, elitism, and a host of other 
'isms,'" who wish to diminish the study of the West in our colleges 
and universities. 
Thus, while repeating many of Bate's arguments, Bennett adds his 
own particular slant, that of patriotism, and importantly, patriotism 
determined by one's conception of the humanities. In Bennett's view, 
to challenge the content and character of the traditional humanities 
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Is to be an enengr of freedom and equality. Furthermore, such 
"enemies" are located primarily "within" colleges and universities. 
1.4. Lynne Cheney 
Bennett's successor as Chair of the National Endowment for the 
Humanities was Lynne Cheney, who has compiled two major reports in her 
tenure. The firat, American Memory, is a study of the "state of the 
humanities" In elementary and secondary schools, which I will not deal 
with here because of my central concern with humanities education in 
colleges and universities. However, while research for American 
Memory was in progress, Cheney spoke to the American Council of 
Learned Societies (Spring 1987), and Included In her text the telling 
claim that "since students are arriving on college campuses without . 
knowing what literature and history are, we shouldn't be surprised 
that they don't think about majoring in them ("Defending," 38). 
In March, 1988, while researching her second major NEH report 
(Humanities in America). Cheney assembled a committee of "professors, 
writers, and publishers" to discuss one of the report's sections, "The 
Scholar and Society" (Heller 4). The central topic addressed by this 
committee was the relationship (or lack thereof) between humanities 
scholarship in the university and society at large. Once again, the 
debate centered on specialization in the context of the humanities' 
traditional mission to speak in accessible language to "common human 
concerns." This topic occupies much of Humanities in America, which 
begins with a celebration of the humanities in American life. In 
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society as a whole, Cheney declares, the humanities are thriving. 
Historical associations, library reading programs, serious book sales, 
PBS series shaped by "world-famed scholars": all of these and more 
point to the "remarkable blossoming" of the humanities In the United 
States. 
The tone of Cheney's report changes, however, when she addresses 
the state of the humanities In colleges and universities. Quoting 
Bate, Cheney refers to the "disarray and Isolation . . . rupture and 
distrust . . . lost sense of meaning" which characterize the academic 
humanities. To the familiar cries of "specialization" and 
"relativism," Cheney adds a third, which is similar to Bennett's 
earlier discussion of patriotism. But rather than explicitly labeling 
those who challenge the traditional humanities' content and character 
as "enemies" of freedom and equality, Cheney speaks disparagingly of 
those who "politicize" the humanities. 
Some scholars reduce the study of the humanities to the 
study of politics, arguing that truth--and beauty and 
excellence--are not timeless matters, but transitory 
notions, devices used by some groups to perpetuate 
"hegemony" over others. These scholars call into question 
all intellectual and aesthetic valuation, conceiving "the 
political perspective," in the words of one ". . .as the 
absolute horizon of all reading and Interpretation" 
(Humanities in America 7). 
This trend toward politiclzatlon detracts from the humanities' 
capacity to speak to "the deepest concerns we all have as human 
beings," to the questions "perennially" given rise by the "human 
condition" (8). Between specialization and politiclzatlon, the 
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humanities are reduced to arcane sub-disciplines which appeal only to 
an elite and isolated corps of academic intellectuals. 
Furthermore, politiclzatlon complicates the already difficult 
task of "determining a substantive and coherent plan of study for 
undergraduates" (12). Cheney, like Bennett, rejects the idea that 
requiring a traditional Western core is equivalent to Imposing an 
oppressive political consensus. Quoting Stanley Hook, who maintains 
that "Western culture has been most critical of Itself," Cheney 
maintains that 
[t]he humanities are about more than politics, about more 
than social power. What gives them their abiding worth are 
truths that pass beyond time and circumstance; truths that, 
transcending accidents of class, race, and gender, speak to 
us all. (14) 
1.5. The Educational Philosophy Shared 
by Bate, Bennett, and Cheney 
An analysis of the texts of Bate, Bennett, and Cheney suggests, I 
believe, the fairly cohesive character of their approach to the 
humanities. Summarized, the views of these three thinkers are as 
follows: The humanities are in a crisis created primarily in the 
colleges and universities. The crisis is characterized by 1) 
specialization, 2) relativism, and 3) politiclzatlon. Excessive 
specialization has resulted in an arcane language unintelligible to 
all but a select few academics and in research, "the significance of 
which moves steadily toward the vanishing point" (Humanities in 
America 9). The overall effect Is a failure to address universally 
accessible human experience and a diminished relationship between 
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academic humanists and the rest of society. Relativism in humanities 
programs has led to a self-destructive lack of purpose and authority. 
If there is no objective truth, why search for it? If one text is as 
good as another, why bother making distinctions? If the humanities do 
not offer a meaningful way of knowing the meaningful, why bother at 
all? The llxik between the humanities and patriotism, made explicit by 
Bennett, is developed in Cheney's charge that to challenge the 
traditional content and character of the humanities is to "politicize" 
them. Politlcization disregards the "self-critiquing" character of 
Western cultural tradition. It undermines the capacity of the 
humanities to address the larger concerns of commonly-shared humanity. 
In practical terms, it complicates the already difficult task of 
developing a core curriculum, and this task is vital to the authority 
(and thus the very survival) of the academic humanities. Charges of 
racism and sexism are not only "irrelevant" in the context of the 
timeless, universal truth available in the humanities, they threaten 
the very survival of Western cultural tradition as preserved in "the 
best that has been thought and said." 
The persistent appeal of this approach to humanities education Is 
apparent in a front-page article in the November 23, 1988 edition of the 
Chronicle of Hiyher Education. The article (written by Carolyn Mooney) 
is an account of "the first major assembly of the National Association 
of Scholars," a conservative group of academics Intent upon "reclaiming" 
the university from its "radical" captivity. Named by Mooney as two 
"most frequently expressed" views at the conference are: 
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A. Many academics have abandoned rational thought and a search 
for the truth, and Instead teach and pursue research with the 
goal of advancing their own political agendas. Feminist 
scholars In particular were accused of such behavior. 
B. Colleges and universities are caving In to demands by 
feminists, minority group members, and other groups that they 
stop teaching classic texts and the values of Western 
culture. While works written by women and blacks are also 
available . . . they should not replace the classics. 
Perhaps the single most Important issue addressed by this conference 
was the necessity of a core curriculum in the humanities. Among those 
supporting this view was Boston University President John Sllber, who 
maintained that the "humanities are the essence of education," and 
spoke nostalgically of nineteenth-century requirements. In terms of 
this study, then, Sllber's nostalgia is for the unchallenged cultural 
authority of the traditional humanities. 
Thus far in this chapter, I have tried to explicate a particular 
educational philosophy which encompasses an interpretive position in 
relation to the humanities. This educational philosophy is a 
traditional one in the United States, and, according to its 
proponents, its authority went unchallenged until the 1960s. Since 
then, the charge goes, disintegration and chaos have reigned and 
democracy itself is threatened. 
However, while it may seem self-evident that this conservative 
philosophy translates into a particular Interpretation of the 
humanities, this very notion would be heartily rejected by the 
conservative philosophers themselves. Their aim is not merely to 
interpret. but to discover and transmit the Intended meanings of 
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classical texts. Furthermore, and consistently, the traditional canon 
itself Is not, to the conservative philosopher, a manifestation of 
certain historical or cultural understandings, but rather of absolute 
and universal truth. This being the case. It Is not only essential 
that the humanities should be retained at the center of general 
education, but that their content and character cohere with the 
conservative reading. This reading Is not perceived as historically 
and linguistically contingent interpretation, but as good eplstemology 
in a platonist sense. The result is what one critic has labeled 
"educational fundamentalism" (Graff, "Teach the Conflicts"). 
Advocates of other educational philosophies may well agree that 
the humanities should be retained in or restored to a central position 
in the undergraduate curricula, while disagreeing not only in terms of 
whv this should be the case, but also in their normative conceptions 
of the humanities' content and character. Importantly, however, all 
of the contending philosophies claim a central dedication to 
democracy. In other words, it seems apparent that one's normative 
concept of democracy determines one's normative concept of humanities 
education. Thus, it is my assumption throughout this study that 
pedagogical debates are Inherently political. 
Before proceeding to other pedagogical and political positions, I 
will discuss at some length this decade's most thoroughly developed 
conservative treatment of the breakdown of cultural authority which is 
the humanities crisis, Allan Bloom's The Closing Of The American Mind. 
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1.6. Analysis: Allan Bloom's 
The Closing Of The American Mind (Part One) 
Allan Bloom's The Closing Of The American Mind was published in 
1987 and enjoyed remarkable success in the market place. To the 
surprise of even Simon and Schuster, whose first printing of the book 
was limited to 10,000 copies. Bloom's critique of higher education in 
the United States ended the year as the tenth best-seller with sales 
of nearly one-half million hard-cover copies (Bowker). The book 
became the focal point of faculty seminars, radio and television talk-
shows and numerous review articles in both scholarly and popular 
publications. Significantly, even those unsympathetic with the 
author's claims recognized them as something to be reckoned with. 
Social philosopher Stanley Aronowltz, e.g., described Bloom's text as 
"the first.elaborated conservative educational manifesto in decades" 
("New Conservative Discourse" 205), and other notable scholars, 
including Richard Rorty and Martha Nussbaum, offered critical 
analyses. Such wide readership and scholarly attention qualify The 
Closing Of The American Mind as one of the most prominent North 
American texts dealing with education in the 1980s, and perhaps even 
in the latter half of the twentieth century. In the remainder of this 
chapter I will review Bloom's book and analyze both his understanding 
of democracy and his critique of humanistic scholarship in the 
university. 
Bloom's text is divided into three parts: 1) a description of 
contemporary college students, 2) a critique of American nihilism and 
its German origins, and 3) a study of the university within the 
context of philosophical tradition (and the break with that 
tradition). The book's subtitle, How Higher Education Has Failed 
Democracy and Inooverlahed the Souls of Today's Students, points 
clearly to Bloom's thesis, but he explains in his Preface that the 
students to which he refers are members of a certain limited group, 
i.e., "the kind of young persons who populate the twenty or thirty 
best universities . . . those who are most likely to take advantage of 
a liberal education and to have the greatest moral and intellectual 
effect on the nation" (22). Bloom's definition of democracy is not 
set forth so explicitly and needs to be gleaned largely by inference; 
the preceding quotation, however, contains a telling clue. The 
democracy of Bloom's vision will be led, morally and intellectually, 
by a select, qualified few. The students whose souls are being 
impoverished by higher education are precisely those who will (or 
should) lead, and it is in this sense that democracy is being failed. 
Bloom's first five chapters are devoted to delineating the 
character of those students who will lead the nation in the future, 
those who are today "materially and spiritually free" enough to enjoy 
a liberal education at a top university. But despite his sub-title. 
Bloom indicates that the souls of such students are diminished long 
before they reach college. Host importantly, they arrive already 
thoroughly convinced that truth is relative, and they perceive this 
relativity as a moral postulate, the essential condition of equality. 
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Higher education reinforces this unfortunate outlook and thereby 
fails to keep faith with the founding principles of democracy, i.e., 
the dedication to natural rights and to the rational quest for the 
good life. Bloom believes that these principles were once basic to 
higher education. Now, however, "openness" is the sole virtue and 
intolerance the only absolute evil recognized by students and 
educators alike. Such moral emptiness precludes shared goals and 
visions of the public good, the very commonality necessary for 
democracy. • 
Supporting the notion that truth is relative, writed Bloom, are 
curricula which promote cultural pluralism and lend themselves to a 
vacuous discourse of "values." Bloom insists that the point of 
requiring college cpurses in non-Westem cultures is *to force 
students to recognize that there are other ways of thinking and that 
the Western ways are not better" (36). In other words, educators have 
abandoned the search for universal truth and now maintain that to 
claim superiority for one's own cultural worldvlew is ethnocentric and 
Intolerant. Bloom's counter to this position is that if students were 
genuinely to learn about other cultures, they would find that "all of 
them think their way is best, and all others inferior" (36). Western 
thought, by virtue of its roots in Greek philosophy, is actually the 
exception; it is only in the West that we are willing to doubt the 
identification of good with our own way. Therefore, in attacking 
ethnocentrlsm, educators are actually asserting the superiority of the 
Western mind and the inferiority of other cultures. Tragically, 
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however, students are not aware of this. They do not realize that 
Plato long ago demonstrated that "culture is a cave," and that the way 
to transcend culture is not by studying other "caves," but rather by 
using reason to seek the good, and to judge our own and others' lives 
solely by the standard of nature. Students cannot know this because 
they are either taught no philosophy at all or they are taught a 
version of philosophy corrupted by modern German thought. The latter 
(to which Bloom devotes a good deal of attention later in his text) 
leaves only cultural relativism and historicism as intellectual 
possibilities. It is this intellectual poverty that diminishes the 
souls of students and corrodes democracy from within. 
Thus cut off from the roots of Western philosophical tradition 
and from the "superior moral significance" which that tradition once 
lent to the lives of Americans (Bloom, it should be noted, uses 
"America" and "Americans" to refer only to the United States and its 
citizens.), young persons are left with a spiritual void that modern 
culture cannot begin to fill. Sadly, however, most students do not 
even feel this void. "The longing for the beyond has been attenuated" 
(61). Part of this attenuation is attributable to the loss of 
interest in classic texts which would provide students with a basis 
for discontent with the present and an awareness of alternatives to 
it. The classics no longer command the interest of students because 
their (the classics') authority has been undermined by relativism: 
"nobody believes that the old books do, or even could, contain the 
truth" (58). 
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Another challenge to the authority of classic texts is feminism, 
which teaches that the classics are not only outdated but morally 
corrupt, sexist and oppressive. This means that certain particularly 
"offensive" authors, "for example, Rousseau," are censored, or are 
included simply to illustrate the "distorting prejudices" and 
injustices of the past (66). 
The diminished authority of classical texts in the lives of 
students is accompanied by a rejection or sheer ignorance of "high 
culture," art, theater, and music. The latter is particularly 
troublesome to Bloom, and he devotes an entire chapter to it. 
Applying Plato's notion that music encompasses that which is Inimical 
to reason. Bloom concludes that rock music has "one appeal only, a 
barbaric appeal to sexual desire" (73). He points out that 
Tocqueviile warned that the "character of democratic art" would be 
"intense, changing, crude and immediate," and suggests that one glance 
at MTV confirms the Frenchman's judgment. "Nothing noble, sublime, 
profound, delicate, tasteful or even decent can find a place in such 
tableaux" (74). Bloom maintains that his primary concern is not with 
the "moral effects" of "this music," but rather with its "effect on 
education" (79). (In li^ t of Bloom's book as a whole, this is a 
rather curious distinction, but one that he makes nonetheless.) And 
its effect on education is devastating, a numbing of the Imagination 
and of passion, so that even after young people "get over" their 
obsession for this medium, their lives are not restored to the point 
of recognizing choices other than between "quick fixes and dull 
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calculation." The effects of "rock addiction" are similar, then, to 
those of drug addiction. For those who are hooked, "anything other 
than technical education is a dead letter" (80). 
In his final chapter dealing with the character of contemporary 
students, Bloom analyzes modern relationships, and here again borrows 
from Tocqueville. The Frenchman recognized, writes Bloom, the 
difficulty of living without tradition, the dangers of stark 
individualism and atomism in a "merely changing continuum" (84). 
Today's students are living illustrations of Tocquevllle's dictum that 
"in democratic societies, each citizen is habitually busy with the 
contemplation of a very petty object, which is himself." This self-
centeredness is now intensified. Bloom maintains, by an "indifference 
to the past and a loss of a national view of the future" (86). 
'%e decline of the family (related to feminism) and an Increase 
in mobility are indicative of the breakdown of meaningful social 
attachments. With no binding past and a completely open future, "the 
souls of young people are In a condition like that of the first men in 
a state of nature--spiritually unclad, unconnected. Isolated, with no 
inherited or unconditional connection with anything or anyone" (87). 
Not surprisingly, then, students feel no civic responsibility, 
recognize no political duty. As opposed to a time when a minority of 
young people inherited the responsibility of public service and 
understood their education as preparation for It, today almost no 
students expect to lead political lives or perceive even a remote 
connection between education and civic virtue. 
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In what may be his book's most controversial section, Bloom 
continues his discussion of modem relationships through a depiction 
of the association between black and white students, and the harmful 
effects of Affirmative Action programs on that association. He argues 
that despite the formal Integration of universities, there Is no 
genuine Interaction between Afro-American and other students. While 
white students "have been willing ... to talk themselves Into 
accepting Affirmative Action" and are "used to propaganda and the 
Imposition of new moralities," they are not really convinced of the 
validity of "preferential treatment of blacks" (92). White students 
"suppress" their real feelings, and black students--angry that whites 
are "In a position to do them favors"--experience shame and 
resentment. The consequence Is that black and white students are more 
separated than ever. The gulf Is one of hypocrisy and underlying 
contempt because both black and white students know that Affirmative 
Action Is a sham. 
Meanwhile, a "little black empire" has developed and retains Its 
legitimacy as a result of the "alleged racism" which still prevails. 
Bloom's Judgment Is that racial discrimination Is "ancient history" 
and that the "black domain" continues to thrive largely because 
Affirmative Action "Institutionalizes the worst aspects of separatism" 
(96). His history of the Afro-American movement on university 
campuses proceeds as follows : In the sixties, the claim was advanced 
that "black students [were] second-class not because they [were] 
academically poor, but because they [were] forced to Imitate white 
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culture" (94). The Black Power movement, supported by "relativism and 
Marxism," insisted on black studies programs. Once black students 
became aware that they had some power in determining "what an 
education is," they demanded more and more "conciliatory arrangements" 
which have progressively undermined the Integrity of the university. 
"Reason," Insists Bloom, "cannot accommodate the claims of any 
kind of power whatever, and democratic society cannot accept any 
principle of achievement other than merit" (96). The refusal of 
blacks to "melt" into the larger society and to honor the "ideal of 
common humanity" sets them at odds with even "their own noblest claims 
and traditions in this country." Rather than accepting the knowledge 
available "to man as man," they claim the "right" to live and study 
the black experience. But Bloom maintains that black studies programs 
have failed because "what was serious in them did not interest 
students." In reality, he argues, blacks "partake in the common 
culture with the same goals and tastes as everyone else," but "they 
continue to have inward sentiments of separateness caused by exclusion 
when it no longer effectively exists" (93). 
Even after black studies programs were abandoned, however, the 
"black domain" reinforced by Affirmative Action remains. The net 
result is a university without integrity, a university which "copped-
out" in the sixties and has still not recovered. Meanwhile, 
separatism has been "institutionalized" by policies which are despised 
equally by blacks and whites, and which are the source of a "long-term 
deterioration" of race relations. 
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The theme of separation permeates the whole of Part One in 
Bloom's text: separation of students from tradition, from reason, 
from nature, from everything, in fact, which supports democracy. The 
section on race relations, described above, is the first in a series 
of discussions dealing with the separation of persons from each other. 
To Bloom, the search for freedom and equality is basic to modernity 
and is legitimated by the principles on which the United States was 
founded. But as with the struggle for racial liberation and equality, 
such striving--if not informed by reason and grounded in nature--can 
and has led to tragic social disintegration, a decay of relations 
among and between persons. 
Bloom's sections on sex, divorce, love and eros are variations on 
this theme. Traditional patterns of social relations have disappeared 
and nothing certain has replaced them. The "psychology of 
separateness," Bloom laments, is the "aptest description . . . for the 
state of students' souls" (117). And obviously, "there is no common 
good" for those who are separated both psychically and socially. Only 
a healthy acceptance of human nature and a dedication to reason can 
provide the basis for common humanity and thus for democracy. When 
both human nature and reason are denied, as they have been especially 
since the sixties, social and moral decay are inevitable. The next 
part of Bloom's book is an analysis of the corruption of philosophy 
and language which led to our situation. 
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1.7. Analysis: The Closing Of The American Mind (Part Two) 
How did It come about that human nature and reason lost their 
philosophical authority In the latter half of the twentieth century? 
Although not articulated explicitly, this Is the central question 
addressed by Bloom In the second part of The Closing Of The American 
Mind, and the title of this section's opening chapter, "The German 
Connection," provides a hint to his answer. According to Bloom, the 
notion of value relativism--which has undermined the entire Western 
philosophical enterprise--originated in modern German philosophy 
(particularly Nietzsche and Heidegger). The traditional philosophical 
endeavor from Socrates forward had been concerned with distinguishing 
the real from the apparent, the true from the false, the good from the 
evil. But as a consequence of widespread academic enthusiasm for the 
philosophy of Nietzsche in the mid-part of this century, a new 
language developed. 
The new language is that of value relativism, and it 
constitutes a change in our view of things moral and 
political as great as the one which took place when 
Christianity replaced Greek and Roman paganism. (141) 
This new language. Bloom explains, began with Nietzsche's declaration 
that "God is dead." Nietzsche's nihilism constitutes more than a 
rejection of theism; it is a denial of philosophy as well, a denial of 
reaâon Itself. Without reason, only subjectivity remains, and the 
term "value" refers precisely to the "radical subjectivity of all 
belief about good and evil" (142). 
Good and evil now for the first time appeared as values, of 
which there have been a thousand and one, none rationally or 
objectively preferable to any other. (143) 
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Bloom maintains that the real target of Nietzsche's philosophical 
attack was modem democracy, but ironically, "the latest models of 
democratic or egalitarian man find much that is attractive in 
Nietzsche's understanding of things" (144). Whereas Nietzsche 
glorified the extraordinary or superior individual who would rise 
above the masses and create new gods, his thought has been coopted by 
the political Left in the United States with unfortunate consequences. 
Chief among them is the ideal of the "inner-directed" value-creating 
individual, an ideal which is not only accessible to all, but also 
required for psychological health and "authenticity." Bloom traces 
this cooptation of Nietzsche from Heidegger through Erich Fromm and 
David Riesman, and thus into popular culture. He offers a lengthy 
critique of Woody Allen's "Zelig" to underscore the point that we have 
"Americanized" nihilism, digested "Continental despair," and given 
them a peculiar "happy ending" (144-146). 
But the grim realities of a world with "nothing determinate, 
nothing that has a referent" are radically at odds with the 
philosophical tradition on which democracy depends. Our "intellectual 
dependency" on German thou^ t has brought us to a critical impasse, 
and it is Bloom's objective to "think through the meaning" of that 
dependency and to challenge it on behalf of democracy and philosophy. 
He maintains that he has followed with particular concern the 
increasing domination of American academic and popular culture by 
German thought. In the forties. Just after the war, German philosophy 
"was still the preserve of earnest intellectuals," most of whom were 
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either German émigrés or Americans who had studied In Germany before 
the Nazi era. At the University of Chicago, for Instance, work In the 
social sciences was dominated by the theories of Freud and Weber, both 
of whom were profoundly Influenced by Nietzsche. While It was evident 
that German thought had taken an "antlratlonal and antlllberal" turn, 
a blind eye was turned to this tendency. To the contrary, the 
psychological and sociological theories which were developed by German 
thinkers were considered "scientific," and American Intellectuals 
believed that "scientific progress would be related to social and 
political progress." (Bloom claims that "all" of his professors at 
the University of Chicago "were either Marxists or New Deal Liberals" 
[149].) 
It Is not an exceedingly rare event In history, writes Bloom, for 
one nation with a powerful Intellectual life to Influence profoundly a 
less Intellectually developed nation. The Influence of Greece on Rome 
and that of France on Russia and Germany are cases In point. But the 
Influence of Germany on the United States In this century Is 
remarkable for Its difference from those earlier examples, and this 
difference Is precisely what renders our situation so problematic. 
Unlike thé Greeks or the French who appealed to the natural relation 
of "man to man" and proposed the rational search for the "good life," 
regardless of gender, race, or nation, modern German philosophy taught 
that "the mind Is essentially related to history or culture" (153). 
German thought tended not toward liberation from one's own 
culture, as did earlier thought, but toward reconstituting 
the rootedness In one's own, which has been shattered by 
cosmopolitanism philosophical and political, (153) 
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Ironically, then, Americans have been seduced by a system of 
thought which "could never be ours and had as Its starting point 
dislike of us and our goals" (153). Bloom maintains that the crucial 
question of whether the value relativism and historiclsm of modem 
German philosophy is "harmonious" with democracy is never considered 
by American academics. But he Insists that the notion of value-
creation is obviously contradictory to democratic rationalism. The 
individual rights of American citizens are grounded in Nature and 
Reason. Conversely, cultural "values" are simply that--products of 
culture--and to endure, they must be imposed by force. "Rational 
persuasion cannot make them believed, so struggle is necessary" (201). 
Liberal democracies do not fight wars with one another 
because they see the same human nature and the same rights 
applicable to everywhere and everyone. Cultures fight wars 
with one another. They must do so because values can only be 
asserted or posited by overcoming others, not by reasoning 
with them. . . . Therefore, a cultural relativist must care 
for culture more than truth and fight for culture while 
knowing it is not true. (202) 
Nietzsche, Bloom argues, was fully aware of this, and was willing 
to follow the implications of his philosophical speculations to their 
bitter end, the will to power, which stands In stark contrast to the 
dedication to truth for which Socrates died. While "hardly anyone [in 
the modem West] swallowed what Nietzsche prescribed whole," his 
argument was infectious, even more so when brewed with Marxism into a 
strange new concoction of Left-wing politics, particularly In France 
and the United States. Sartre's existential Marxism, Bloom suggests, 
is a prime example of the "Nletzscheanizatlon of the Left." 
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Sartre . . . had all those wonderful experiences of 
nothingness, the abyss, nausea, commitment without ground--
• the result of which was, almost without fall, support of the 
party line. (219) 
When translated Into popular language and culture, the self-
created values of "commitment, caring and determination," which 
resulted from the "Nietzscheanlzation of the Left," thoroughly 
pervaded American democratic life and were responsible for the 
Intellectual disintegration and political chaos on university campuses 
in the sixties. Thus it is that the democratic underpinnings of 
higher education were "corrupted by [the] alien views" of German 
philosophy. Bloom maintains that an understanding of this part of our 
intellectual history is vital If we are to "provide ourselves with 
real alternatives" to the "Intellectual, moral and political" 
consequences of German thought, which "broke with and then buried the 
philosophical tradition" (147). But since the sixties, the academy 
has been reaping what it sowed earlier in this century. At risk Is 
the survival of democracy, for those students who will provide 
leadership in the future can find no moral sustenance while the great 
philosophical tradition remains burled under the debris of the 
university. 
1.8. Analysis: The Closing Of The American Mind (Part Three) 
Bloom often appeals to Tocqueville's classic Democracy in 
America, but nowhere more fully than in the opening chapter of Part 
Three. Tocqueville's "Intellectual Life of the Americans" is, Bloom 
believes, "the mirror in which we can see ourselves," and he begins 
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his own history of the university by confirming the Frenchman's 
understanding that democracy's "particular intellectual bent" will, if 
not corrected, "distort[s] the mind's vision" (246). 
The danger which democracy poses to intellectual life is 
"enslavement to public opinion," and for Bloom, as well as for 
Tocqueville, the role of the university within a democracy is to 
counteract that danger. Fulfilling this role means "opposing the 
emergent, the changing and the ephemeral," maintaining "intransigently 
high standards," and concentrating on the "heroic" rather than on the 
"commonplace." In other words, the university must "compensate for 
what individuals lack" and "preserve what is most likely to be 
neglected" (253-254). This is best accomplished. Bloom maintains, by 
concentrating on "philosophy, theology, the literary classics and on 
those scientists ... who have the most comprehensive vision ... of 
. . . the order of the whole of things" (254). Universities never 
fulfilled this role very well. Bloom laments, but "now they have 
practically ceased trying" (256). 
Tracing the modern university to its Enlightenment roots. Bloom 
proposes that today's "crisis of the university" is intrinsically 
related to the "crisis of liberal democracy." The Enlightenment was 
not only a scientific project; it was a political one as well. "The 
right to freedom of thought is a political right, and for it to exist, 
there must be a political order that accepts that right" (258). 
Liberal democracy, the "best of the modern regimes," is a product of 
the Enlightenment project; it is a regime of reason. But "a society 
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based on reason needs those who reason best," those, who--In effect--
take "the place of kings and prelates" (258). 
The true Intention of the Enlightenment, Bloom argues, was the 
freedom of "rare theoretical men to engage In rational Inquiry In the 
small number of disciplines that treat the first principles of all 
things" (261). These disciplines Include not only the natural 
sciences, but "the sciences of man, meaning a political science that 
discerns the nature of man and the ends of government" (261). In 
short, the Enlightenment project Intended freedom for philosophers (at 
least In the classic sensé of the word). Such freedom would both 
reform society and secure theoretical life. These two purposes were 
complementary, if not identical. 
Although the very term Enlightenment is connected with Plato's 
Allegory of the Cave, there is one Important difference between the 
two philosophical orientations. Socrates never believed that the 
nature of those in the cave--the demos--could be altered. In other 
words, the unwise could never become wise, even to the extent of 
recognizing the wisdom of the philosopher. On the other hand, 
Enlightenment thinkers "meant to shine the light of being in the cave 
and forever to dim the Images on the wall." The proper relation 
between the philosopher and society hinges on whether or not the cave 
is intractable, and the Enlightenment project intended to do in deed 
what Socrates believed could be created only "in speech." 
The university, writes Bloom, is the Enlightenment 
institutionalization of Socrates' way of life. "The tiny band of men 
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who participate fully In this way of life are the soul of the 
university," which In turn exists to preserve the freedom of this 
minority. Whereas classical philosophers never would have depended on 
such protection or risked being confined to the university, post-
Enlightenment philosophers Inhabit the university exclusively. This 
difference is crucial and marks a harmful change In the relation of 
philosophy to politics. 
Genuine philosophers, writes Bloom, must engage in a "gentle art 
of deception." This is necessary for their very survival; "there is 
no moral order . . . ensuring that truth will win out in the long, or 
the short, run" (279). Obviously, if truth cannot be expected to win 
out, neither can philosophy. For philosophy even to be tolerated, it 
must be "thought to serve powerful elements in society without 
actually becoming their servant" (282). This is why ancient 
philosophers' were proponents of aristocratic politics. The wealthy, 
who are drawn to the beautiful and useless, are more likely to indulge 
philosophy as an end in Itself, even if they cannot grasp its truth. 
But the Enlightenment project ended that traditional relationship. 
Philosophy, in its classic sense, teaches "men how to die." 
Enlightenment science, on the other hand, promises to enhance and 
prolong life. When the two were merged in the modern university, 
philosophy began to serve society as society actually wanted to be 
served. The notion of education changed from the aristocratic 
experience of things beautiful and useless to the enlightened self-
interest of democracy. Of course, genuine philosophers "had no 
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Illusions about democracy" (289). They were aware of simply 
substituting one kind of deception for another. As long as they were 
free to pursue truth in the university, they were willing to "live 
with" the general vulgarity of modem society. 
But the Enli^ tenment relegated classical philosophy to the realm 
of culture, a demotion which radically altered the popular and even 
scholarly perception of its truth claims. This perception was 
especially dominant in Gexnnany. For example, the objective of German 
Romantic thinkers was to understand Greek culture in the interest of 
"founding a German culture." Plato was admired for his insights, but 
his intellectual activity was not perceived as qualitatively different 
from that of Greek poets. All were "subjective creators" of Greece's 
superior culture. This "discovery of Greek 'culture' was contrary to 
Greek philosophy," and to Bloom, the upshot was the demise of reason 
itself. 
While this demise was hastened by Nietzsche, his project was 
primarily to draw out and take seriously the logical consequences of 
German Romanticism. In so doing, he turned the Enlightenment upon 
itself, and precipitated the reconstitution of the German university. 
Nietzsche's . . . rigorous drawing of the consequences of 
what German humane scholarship really believed had a stunning 
effect on German university life and on the German respect 
for reason altogether. Artists received a new license, and 
even philosophy began to interpret itself as a form of art. 
The poets won the old war between philosophy and poetry, in 
which Socrates had been philosophy's champion. Nietzsche's 
war on the university led in two directions--either to an 
abandonment of the university by serious men or to its reform 
to make it play a role in the creation of culture. 
46 
Nietzsche's philosophical heir was Heidegger, whose teachings 
"are the most powerful intellectual force in our times" (311-312). 
They are also, in Bloom's estimation, the most destructive. Following 
Nietzsche, Heidegger rejected Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who were 
situated by the pair of German philosophers at the root of both 
Christianity and modern science. This rejection marks the ultimate 
denial of reason by philosophy Itself. With it, "the common thread of 
the whole tradition . . . and the raison d'etre of the university as 
we know it" was destroyed (311). 
Bloom's assertion is that Heidegger's philosophy was directly and 
causally linked to his early support of National Socialism. This 
assertion is vital to Bloom's entire thesis and encapsulates his 
history of the university's decline within modernity. 
The university began in spirit from Socrates' contemptuous 
and Insolent distancing of himself from the Athenian people, 
his refusal to accept any command from them . . . and in his 
serious game (In the Republic) of trying to Impose the rule 
of philosophers on an unwilling people without respect for 
their "culture." The university may have come near its death 
when Heidegger Joined the German people--especially the 
youngest part of that people, which he said had already made 
an Irreversible commitment to the future--and put philosophy 
at the service of German culture. If I am right in believing 
that Heidegger's teachings are the most powerful intellectual 
force in our times, then the crisis of the German university, 
which everyone saw, is the crisis of the university 
everywhere. (311-312) 
For Bloom, the blight on German universities in the thirties has 
not been alleviated in the fifty-six years since Heidegger delivered 
his famous Rectoral Address. Furthermore, what happened in Germany is 
happening everywhere today. The essence of the crisis of the 
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university in this century "is not social, political, psychological, 
or economic, but philosophic" (312). In the United States, the 
"dismantling" of rational inquiry came to a head in the sixties, but 
the fact that American universities "are no longer in convulsions does 
not mean that they have regained their health" (314). 
What is called "critical philosophy" (that peculiar blend of 
Nietzsche and Marx described earlier), caters to "democracy's most 
dangerous and vulgar temptations" (319). The cultural authority 
necessarily commanded and exercised by the university in a democracy, 
where there is no "living class of men" comparable to aristocrats or 
priests, those "natural bearers of Intellectual tradition," was 
abandoned in the sixties and has never been reclaimed. Public 
opinion, as personified by "the natives, in the guise of students," 
rules, encouraged by "critical philosophers," who continue to urge the 
university's "radicalIzatlon and pollticlzatlon" (324). The 
consequence is an anarchical institution which of course cannot begin 
to command and exercise cultural authority, and which has thus failed 
democracy. 
Bloom's "solution" to the breakdown of authority and the Impasse 
which faces higher education is "one that is almost universally 
rejected," the "good old Great Books approach" (344). Importantly, 
this does not mean treating classical texts as "historical products," 
but "trying to read them as their authors wished them to be read." 
The greatest obstacle to this approach is neither students nor 
administrators, nor anything external to the university. Rather, "It 
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is getting [classic texts] accepted by the faculty" (345). While this 
is regrettable enough among professors of the natural and social 
sciences, it is most lamentable and inexplicable when it comes to 
humanists, who might be expected to be active proponents of Great 
Books education. 
Why has Great Books education diminished in humanities programs? 
Bloom lists three reasons; 1) some humanities disciplines are eager 
to Join the sciences and to transcend their own roots in the now-
overcome mythic past; 2) the Jealously and narrowness of speciali­
zation results in a tendency to defend only certain recent inter­
pretations of the classics rather than to seek vital, authentic 
understandings; 3) finally, there is the general debilitation of the 
humanities, which is both symptom and cause of our present condition. 
While Bloom maintains that "it is the humanities that have 
suffered most as a result of the sixties," he also declares that this 
suffering was altogether self-induced. The most "hysterical 
supporters of the revolution" were in humanities departments, where 
"passion and commitment, as opposed to coolness, reason, and 
objectivity, found their home" (354). Thus the old order, wherein the 
place of the humanities was assured, was not destroyed by outside 
forces ; it was overturned from within. The humanities "have gotten 
what they deserved, but we have unfortunately all lost" (352). 
Bloom writes that this behavior on the part of many humanists 
"constitutes the theme" of his entire text. Today's humanist 
Intellectuals "do not believe in themselves or what they do." Their 
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"democratic inclinations and guilt," together with the decadent 
influence of modem continental philosophy, are at odds with their 
vocation, which by Its very definition is concerned with "the always 
and the contemplative . . . the rare, the refined and the superior" 
(353). By rejecting tradition, by transforming it into the repository 
of elitism, sexism, and national prejudice, humanist Intellectuals 
have succeeded only in rendering their vocations sterile and absurd. 
"Like it or not," Bloom declares, the humanities attain their cultural 
authority from the great Western philosophical tradition. Without it, 
they are meaningless. 
Not surprisingly. Bloom's primary concern is with the discipline 
of philosophy itself, whose situation within modern university 
humanities departments "defines . . . our whole problem" (377). 
Having been "dethroned by political and theoretical democracy," 
philosophy has lost its "passion or . . . capacity to rule." It has 
succumbed to the pressures and temptations of modernity, and "probably 
could disappear without being much noticed. " As with all of the 
humanities, philosophy's demise has been self-induced. The latest 
scene in this suicidal drama is Deconstructlonlsm, but Bloom predicts 
that as long as philosophy seeks to "flatter popular democratic 
tastes," there will be other acts equally as degenerate. 
The conclusion of Bloom's text is an appeal to the few "potential 
knowers" to rid themselves of the albatross of history and culture. 
He challenges "those who seek the truth" to rise up for the "American 
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moment in world history, the one for which we shall be forever Judged" 
(382). 
Just as in politics the responsibility for the fate of 
freedom in the world has devolved upon our regime, so the 
fate of philosophy in the world has devolved upon our 
universities, and the two are related as they never have been 
before. (382) 
1.9. What Does Allan Bloom Want? 
Despite the popular appeal of Bloom's text, it is not as easily 
read as might be expected, or--to put it another way--its important 
ideas and themes are not readily gleaned. The close reading required 
for the type of review Just completed reveals the need to reconstruct 
many of Bloom's arguments, to piece them together, if one would 
present them in the most favorable light possible. This is due partly 
to Bloom's tone, which often is shrill and.occasionally borders 
annoyingly on hysteria. (His section on rock music is a case in 
point.) But it also has to do with what one begins to suspect may be 
a studied obscurity, a deliberate attempt to engage in the 
philosopher's "gentle art of deception." For example. Bloom's 
subtitle speaks of democracy, but he never defines the term. He 
appears to pit democracy and philosophy against one another, but 
claims that he means to defend both. He decries moral relativism, 
academic narrowness, and social disintegration, but makes no effort to 
enter into dialogue with other contemporary thinkers who are concerned 
with those same themes (e.g., Robert Bellah, Alasdair Mclntyre, or 
Noam Chomsky). He laments that students feel no public responsibility 
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or political duty, but Ignores the politics of the classroom and 
condemns those who "politicize" the university. He champions the 
authority of both pure reason and cultural tradition. Meanwhile, The 
Closing Of The American Mind is praised in a variety of popular 
publications, one of which (Reader's Digest) claims that Bloom's book 
provides a "decisive answer" to the question, "What's wrong with 
American education?" (quoted in Barber, "The Philosopher Despot" 61). 
Small wonder, then, that at least one critic is prompted to query, 
"What on earth is going on here?" (Barber 61). 
In one sense, however. Bloom does offer a "decisive answer" to 
the Reader's Digest question, as well as to the one which I have posed 
in the heading above. What Allan Bloom wants is Great Books education 
and the cultural authority such education exercises, the absence of 
which is "what's wrong" with today's colleges and universities. Bloom 
believes that the authority of the Great Books tradition is a 
necessary counterweight to the intellectual and spiritual decadence of 
modern mass culture. He maintains that the university's responsi­
bility in a democracy is to transmit Truth to those few Individuals 
who can appreciate it and who will provide the nation's future 
Intellectual and moral leadership. If the Great Books are lost, he 
warns, democracy is lost. More specifically, if philosophy is lost, 
democracy is lost. Even more specifically, if Platonic Realism is 
lost, democracy is lost. In other words, for Bloom, the concept of 
democracy is necessarily grounded in human nature, which is in turn 
comprehensible to "those who reason best." The Great Books hold the 
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key to both--human nature and reason»-and thus to the success of the 
democratic experiment. 
But to accept this "decisive answer" (which certainly is not new) 
is to over-simplify Bloom's book, which, as mentioned earlier, has 
been critiqued by several notable scholars in the past two years. In 
the following chapter I will review four such critiques, those of 
Martha Nussbaum, Richard Rorty, Benjamin Barber, and Stanley 
Aronowitz. I will also include some of my own observations and 
responses both to Bloom and to his critics. My purpose is to locate 
Bloom's voice in a conversation with others who are also committed to 
"education for democracy." I believe that this conversation contains 
no "decisive answers," but does point toward questions which promise 
to become ever morô pressing in the next decade. 
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2. "WHAT ON EARTH IS GOING ON HERE?" SOME 
RESPONSES TO ALLAN BLOOM'S DISCOURSE OF CRISIS 
2.1. Martha Nussbaum 
As noted in the last chapter, Bloom links the future of democracy 
with the moral and intellectual leadership of "those who reason best," 
those who know, primarily throu^  a process of discovery, the true 
nature of human beings and thus the best political arrangements. The 
important epistemological connection here is between knowledge and 
discovery, as opposed to between knowledge and creation, or knowledge 
and interpretation. The image of Socrates as a seeker of Truth (the 
image that Bloom claims has informed "the substance of his being") 
corresponds with the image of reasoning as a process of discovery. 
But classical philosopher Martha Nùssbaum argues that while Bloom's 
"official" allegiance is to Socrates and his way of knowing, he 
(Bloom) is actually drawn to a far more "dogmatic and religious 
conception of philosophy." 
In her analysis of The Closing Of The American Mind (The New York 
Review of Books. November 5, 1987), Nussbaum supports the thesis that 
Bloom is decidedly non- or even anti-Socratic. Socrates, she 
maintains, was interested in the "needs of different souls," and 
demanded "ceaseless self-questioning." Bloom, on the other hand, is 
"dogmatically complacent," and develops a case marked by "singleness 
and simplicity." Bloom's prescriptive orientation sets him apart from 
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his self proclaimed role model. "Bloom knows that he knows; Socrates 
knew that he didn't" (21). 
Nussbaum also points to the tension between Bloom's frequent 
appeals to the "authority" of the ancients and his insistence upon the 
primacy of pure reason. The implication of her argument is that in 
order to keep faith with the spirit of the ancients, one must 
constantly question their authority. For Bloom to argue for both 
traditional authority and pure reason, he must appeal to the letter of 
ancient philosophy, Just as a Çhristian fundamentalist appeals to the 
letter of the Bible. But to claim unquestioning allegiance even to 
the authority of Socrates himself is thoroughly non-Socratic. Thus 
Nussbaum disputes Bloom's understanding of the very thinker he honors 
most. 
Central to Nussbaum's critique of Bloom's reading of ancient 
philosophy is the issue of sexual equality in the Republic. Bloom 
suggests that Plato's Socrates demands the sacrifice of sexual modesty 
and then develops the social and political consequences of that 
sacrifice (the "absolute liberation of women") In order to Illustrate 
the impossibility of creating a good society without taking nature 
into account. Such an Interpretation, writes Nussbaum, is "both 
bizarre and not accepted by any major non-StraussIan Interpreter of 
the text, beginning with Aristotle" (23). The latter, Nussbaum 
argues, studied with Plato for over twenty years, and took his 
teacher's Ideas about sexual equality seriously enough to dispute 
them. Bloom, however, neither mentions this, nor the fact that Plato 
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"took the radical step of teaching women In his philosophical school," 
a fact that Nussbavim believes sheds a telling light on the intentions 
of the Republic.* 
Congruent with Bloom's rejection of feminism and feminist 
scholarship Is his condemnation of academic programs which concentrate 
on nonWestem cultures. Here again, Nussbaum accuses Bloom of "a most 
unSocratlc unwillingness to suspect one's own Ignorance" and argues 
that his "startling" benlghtedness In relation to nonWestem thought 
serves as a "cogent, though Inadvertent argument for making the study 
of nonWestem civilization an Important part of the university 
curriculum" (22). Thus Nussbaum challenges Bloom as both a 
philosopher and a scholar. 
While I wish neither to defend nor dispute Nussbaum's 
' determination to rescue Plato from Strausslan Interpretation (my own 
reading of the Republic diverges from both hers and Bloom's, but I am 
far from a classical scholar), I share her vexation with Bloom's claim 
that "only in the Western nations, i.e., those Influenced by Greek 
philosophy, is there some willingness to doubt the identification of 
the good with one's own way." In her rejection of this notion, 
Nussbaum points specifically to classical Indian and Chinese thought. 
But my awareness of Eastern Intellectual humility has come primarily 
I^nterestingly, Harvey Mansfield, a defender of Bloom, lambasts 
Nussbaum for "feminizing" the ancients "so that they repeat her 
views," a move which has the awkward disadvantage of forcing her to 
"admit that even white males can tell the truth if it is put into 
their mouths" (Mansfield 34). 
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from studying the work of the Japanese scholar, Kosuke Koyama, whose 
books serve as an effective refutation of Bloom's argument. 
2.2. A Confirmation of Nussbaum's Critique: 
The Work of Kosuke Koyama 
A good example of Koyama's scholarship Is his 1984 Mount Fu^ l 
and Mount Slnal. which I find helpful when teaching Introductory 
philosophy courses. One chapter that comes readily to mind Is "The 
Coming of Universal Civilization," which tells of the historic 
• encounter In Japan between Eastern and Western religious thought, 
particularly Buddhism and Catholicism. This chapter works well for 
facilitating discussions regarding differences In reasoning, and the 
problems associated with both moral absolutism and relativism. I will 
describe It briefly here to underscore Nussbaum's critique of Bloom's 
"startling Ignorance" In relation to nonWestem thought. 
The most telling differences between Buddhism and Catholicism are 
Illustrated In Koyama's text by excerpts from Japan's first 
constitution, composed by the Buddhist prince, Shotoku (574-622), and 
from letters written from Japan by the Jesuit missionary, Francis 
Xavier, an early Western visitor. Significantly, Buddhism had been 
Introduced to Japan only thirty-six years before Shotoku was bom; 
thus he approached the task of writing the constitution from the 
perspective of one whose religious and philosophical beliefs were 
shared by only.part of the population. (Shinto and Confucianism, for 
example, were developed earlier.) Shotoku, then, faced the necessity 
of describing Judicious public Interaction and discourse for a 
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pluralistic society, and importantly, two key themes are fundamental 
throughout the entire constitution: and llhi. harmony and mercy. 
Article Ten is typical. 
Let us cease from wrath, and refrain from angry looks. Nor 
let us be resentful when others differ from us. For all men 
have hearts, and each heart has its own leanings. Their 
right is our wrong, and our right is their wrong. We are 
not unquestionably sages, nor are they unquestionably fools. 
Both of us are simply ordinary men. How. can anyone lay down 
a rule by which to distinguish right from wrong? For we are 
all, one with another, wise and foolish, like a ring which 
has no end. Therefore, although others give way to anger, 
let us on the contrary dread our own faults, and though we 
alone may be in the right, let us follow the multitude and 
act like them. (152) 
Koyama maintains that the philosophical virtues of and llhi are 
central to the "art of Japanese government." But these values are not 
theological or "real" in a Platonic sense. They are not posited as 
absolute givens which exist apart from concrete human situations. It 
may, in fact, be argued that they are thoroughly pragmatic. Further­
more, the idea that all persons are both "wise and foolish," and that 
none has special insight into right and wrong indicates what Koyama 
calls an "anthropology of humility," a perspective which disqualifies 
Bloom's claim that all cultures--save Western--see themselves as 
superior. Most Important for Shotoku is not the ability or need to 
prove intellectual or moral superiority, but rather the desire to live 
harmoniously and mercifully with others. (Shotoku may indeed believe 
that this way of life is "best," but not in a sense which is 
commensurable with Bloom's usé of the word.) 
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Shotoku'à Injunction to "follow the multitude and act like them" 
for the sake of harmony is certainly problematic when it comes to 
ethical life from a Western perspective. It suggests an attitude 
which is appalling not only to Allan Bloom, but probably to most other 
Westerners as well (this despite Bloom's claim that "openness" has 
become the sole Western virtue). Shotoku's attitude is rooted in the 
Buddhist negation of individual selfhood (or consciousness), and a 
basic understanding of life as a transitory experience to be endured 
with patience and serenity, while awaiting the emancipation which 
accompanies the total eradication of self. 
Such an ontology was undoubtedly appalling to an early and 
notable Western visitor to Japan, Francis Xavier. Koyama draws from 
the Jesuit missionary's correspondence to paint a picture of the man 
credited with bringing Christianity to Japan. Central to Xavier's 
message was the idea of the Infinite value of the individual soul, and 
its immortality either in heaven or hell. Xavier's God (like Bloom's 
Reason) was certainly not--in his own eyes--a product of his culture. 
Furthermore, the values of ga and jlhl (as understood by Shotoku) were 
not hl^  on Xavier's philosophical priority list, let alone on his 
social agenda. "For Xavier," Koyama explains, "the basis of his 
theology of mission was firm and clear." Xavier himself put it this 
way: 
One of the things that most of all pains and torments these 
Japanese is, that we teach them that the prison of hell is 
Irrevocably shut, so that there Is no egress therefrom. For 
they grieve over the fate of their departed children, of 
their parents and relatives, and they often show their grief 
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by their tears. So they ask us if there is any hope, any 
way to free them by prayer from that eternal misery, and I 
am obliged to answer that there is absolutely none. Their 
grief at this affects them and torments them wonderfully; 
they almost pine away with sorrow. . . . They often ask if 
God cannot take their fathers out of hell, and why their 
punishment must never have an end. We gave them a 
satisfactory answer, but they did not cease to grieve over 
the misfortune of their relatives; and I can hardly restrain 
my tears sometimes at seeing men so dear to ny heart suffer 
such intense pain about a thing which is already done with 
and can never be undone. (169-170) 
Xavier worries that this "painful thought" keeps the Japanese from the 
true religion. In the same letter, he recounts his "satisfactory 
answer" to their questions. 
We began by proving to them that the divine law is the most 
ancient of all. Before receiving their institutions from 
the Chinese, the Japanese knew by the teaching of nature 
that it was wicked to . . . commit the . . . sins enumerated 
in the ten commandments. . ... We showed them that reason 
itself teaches us to avoid evil and to do good, and that 
this is so deeply implanted in the hearts of men, that all 
have the knowledge of the divine law from nature, and from 
God the Author of nature, before they receive any external 
Instruction on the subject. (170) 
In other words, Xavier's "satisfactory answer" is that because nature 
demonstrates the laws of God, and because human reason is thoroughly 
capable of knowing these laws, the Japanese have no excuse. 
Consequently, those who had the poor timing to die before Xavier 
arrived with the Truth revealed in Christian doctrine were eternally 
damned to (the Christian-conceived) hell. The Japanese, however, 
found it "difficult to understand" how this God could be so cruel as 
to leave whole generations of people ignorant of the true doctrine and 
also damn them to hell forever. To the mind of the "heathen" 
Japanese, this God had no "Integrity." 
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When I use this chapter from Koyama's book In introductory 
philosophy courses, I ask students which of the two men--Shotoku or 
Xavier--is most "reasonable" in his approach to ethical life, as they 
(the students) define it. While my teaching experiences in philosophy 
have been exclusively at the community college level (and certainly 
not at any of the nation's "twenty or thirty best universities" as are 
Bloom's), the students with whom I am familiar are nevertheless (like 
Bloom's) generally supportive of tolerance and "getting along." In 
their view, again generally, Shotoku is an admirable figure and Xavier 
is not. On the other hand, most students are tremendously uneasy when 
it comes to abandoning the idea of absolute truth. Although they 
disapprove of Xavier's severity and have some budding indignation when 
it comes to cultural imperialism, they are certainly not willing to 
agree fully with Shotoku that no one can "lay down a rule by which to 
distinguish right from wrong." In a word, the students are 
ambivalent. Like Delmore Schwartz's "True-Blue American," they want 
"both." This, I repeat, is a general description. Some students are 
willing to agree fully with Shotoku; others lend complete support to 
Xavier. The vast majority, however, are somewhere in the middle. 
Significantly, Koyama himself points to the historical 
"complexity" and "confusion" surrounding the issues raised in this 
chapter of his book. 
In both civilizations, Buddhist East and Christian West, wa 
and ilhi have not been practiced as they should have been. 
It is the civilization of "no other gods" that produced the 
[most deadly] bombs and actually dropped them on the cities 
fully inhabited by human beings, [Koyama, as a young man of 
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fifteen years, experienced the saturation bombing of Tolqro. ] 
and It Is the civilization of "any gods welcome" of Japan 
that engaged in one of the most brutal killings of people 
during the war. (158) 
I digress into this discussion of Koyama's book and ny classroom 
experience with it for various reasons. First, I believe that Koyama 
substantiates Nussbaum's argument that Bloom's statements regarding 
the Intellectual and moral superiority claimed by all cultures except 
the West are misinformed and misleading. Second, in my admittedly 
limited experience, today's college students--despite their 
understanding of tolerance as a democratic virtue--are also deeply 
influenced by objectivist philosophical and religious traditions, and 
therefore are not as willing to abandon absolute truth as Bloom 
claims. Finally, my reading of Plato's Republic. Xavier's letters 
from Japan, and Bloom's The Closing Of The American Mind indicates a 
common lack of qualities which may be typically absent from 
objectivist philosophies, i.e., compassion and solidarity. 
Thus, while I do not fully share Nussbaum's interpretation of 
Plato, I endorse her conclusion that Bloom's philosophy is "not 
practical, alive and broadly distributed, but contemplative and quasi-
religious, removed from ethical and social concerns, and the preserve 
of a narrow elite" (24). This description is strengthened by the 
similarities apparent between Xavier's orthodox Platonic Christianity 
and Bloom's philosophical realism. From this it follows that, despite 
his book's subtitle. Bloom's real anguish is not for democracy, but 
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for his own conception of philosophy which died, as he himself 
laments, along with God. 
2.3. Richard Rorty 
Another critic of Bloom, philosopher Richard Rorty, agrees with 
Nussbaum that Bloom is more concerned with his own rigid conception of 
philosophy than with democracy (New Republic April 4, 1988). Rorty 
suggests, In fact, that a more exact subtitle for Bloom's book would 
have been How Democracy has Failed Philosophy and Made it Difficult 
for Students to Take Plato Seriously (31). He also concurs that 
Bloom's orientation Is dogmatic and prescriptive but this tendency, he 
asserts, is the legacy of Platonism, inherited not only by 
Strausslans, but by Marxists and Catholics alike. Rorty has no 
quarrel, then, with Bloom's interpretation of Plato, but argues that 
Plato himself has been rendered "obsolete" by the general success of 
liberal democracy. 
The title of Rorty's review, "That Old-Time Philosophy," and its 
play on the well-known gospel song, point not only to his thesis, but 
also to his controversial positioning of the discipline of philosophy 
within the post-modern academic humanities. The latter will be 
explored more fully in the next chapter; for now I will limit my 
discussion to Rorty's review of Bloom. 
Rorty, who typically writes In first-person plural, identifies 
himself in this essay with "Deweyan hlstorlclsm" and contrasts this 
perspective with Bloom's Strausslanlsm. The latter orientation, Rorty 
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maintains, "gives one a good conscience" about one's distrust of 
democracy. While Bloom's mentor, the German émigré political 
philosopher Leo Strauss, was generally "coy" and "guarded" In his own 
expressions of misgiving, his students have become increasingly open, 
and Bloom's text is "admirably frank" in this regard. Bloom's 
declaration that philosophers have "always" engaged In the "gentle art 
of deception" points nicely to the irony of writing a book which 
claims to defend democracy while actually disparaging it. 
But Bloom's real disgust, writes Rorty, is not with the masses 
but with those ("us") hlstoriclst Intellectuals "who, following 
Emerson and Dewey, assume that the success of our 'democratic 
experiment' has made us contemporary Americans wiser than the Greeks" 
(28). Such notions as "timeless Truth" and "the nature of the Good," 
which Straussians still take seriously, are viewed as "obsolete" by 
Deweyan hlstoricists, and this difference--not surprisingly--
contributes to a generally "rancorous" relation between the two 
groups. Complicating the philosophical disagreement is the refusal of 
Straussians to participate in a "free and open forum in which [they] 
might argue Socratically with their opponents" (30). Straussians 
believe that without an essential agreement on first principles such 
dialogues are pointless exercises in sophistry, while hlstoricists 
disavow the very concept of first principles, except as historical 
sediments. To the latter, then, the "Strausslan remnant looks like 
another Intolerant and self-obsessed sect" (30). 
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For Bloom, the health of the democratic university and of society 
in general must be measured against Platonic, i.e., timeless and 
universal, standards. Without such "higher" standards, critical 
judgment is simply not possible. Deweyans, on the other hand, believe 
that by comparing the "detailed advantages and disadvantages" of 
certain existing institutions and modes of life with certain other 
real or imaginary alternatives, individuals and societies can 
ascertain which is preferable here and now. This type of Judgment Is 
not only sufficient, it is desirable from the democratic perspective, 
and furthermore, it marks the confines of the possible. Rorty 
maintains that Dewey "did not believe that there was such a thing as 
'nature' to serve as the standard," but rather that humans are "self-
creating beings" (31). 
Interestingly, "both Flatonlsts and Deweyans take Socrates as 
their hero" although, as might be expected, their understandings of 
the ancient philosopher are diverse. According to Rorty, for Plato, 
Socrates' objective was the Idea of the Good; for Dewey, Socrates 
epitomizes curiosity and the open-ended experimentation of the 
scientist. Perhaps this helps to explain why the "Deweyan 
hlstorlcist," Rorty, joins with Bloom in advocating Great Books 
education, at least for the first two undergraduate years. But while 
the philosophical (or educative) process endorsed by both men appears 
similar, it is undertaken in an altogether different spirit. For 
example, Rorty splits decisively with Bloom when it comes to the 
notion of eplstemological unity and institutional consensus. The 
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humanities department as "flea market"--an image which scandalizes 
Bloom--is perfectly acceptable to Rorty, "once the defects of our high 
schools have been made up for by a couple of year's worth of Great 
Books" (32). 
In response to Bloom's charge that Nazism resulted from the 
demise of genuine philosophy (Platonic Realism), Rorty counters that 
the character of German intellectual life in the thirties led to 
fascism no more than North American intellectual life in that same 
decade led away from it. Philosophical disagreements "are just not 
that important in deciding how elections go, or how much resistance 
fascist takeovers encounter" (33). By the same token, the "spiritual 
malaise" which Bloom attributes in large part to the failure of 
American higher education, is more accurately described as a national 
"unease" resulting from some unpleasant historical realities. 
For example: that this has not turned out to be the 
American Century, that the "American moment in world 
history" may have passed, that democracy may not spread 
around the world, that we do not know how to mitigate the 
misery and hopelessness in which half of our fellow-humans 
(including a fifth of our fellow-citizens) live. (33) 
In other words, North Americans are not suffering from anything more 
"spiritual" than having some of the "naive" hopes "on which we were 
raised" dashed against the rocks of time. 
From a Deweyan perspective, philosophy's task is neither to 
denigrate such hopes as "silly" or "elitist," nor to inherit and 
transmit them unquestioningly and/or abstractly. The task is to 
identify the most pressing practical issues and problems of here and 
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now, and to debate them in a spirit of progress and reform. The task 
is to help create more genuinely democratic institutions, rather than 
to mourn the passing of "that old-time philosophy." 
2.4. Benjamin Barber 
Rorty's commitment to progressive democracy is shared by 
political philosopher Benjamin Barber, whose critique of The Closing 
Of The American Mind ("The Philosopher Despot") was published in the 
January 1988 edition of Harper's. Unlike Rorty, however, Barber's 
chief concern is with Bloom's book as a social phenomenon, the mystery 
of its remarkable popular reception. "Why are Americans so anxious to 
welcome a book that claims they can't read," he wonders, "so willing 
to accept a polemic that excoriates their literary intelligence" (61)? 
[Bloom] claims the country has deserted the university and 
blames democracy for the debacle, so the country adopts him 
as its favorite democratic educator. (61) 
And what of educators themselves? Why are so many "beside themselves 
with admiration" for Bloom's "elitist agenda," his "assault on liberal 
tolerance and democratic education?" 
Barber's attempt to "unravel" these mysteries is colored by his 
provocative understanding of philosophy and democracy. While I will 
not discuss his theories at length in this study, it may be helpful to 
keep in mind that in his book Strony Democracy. Barber raises the 
possibility that the story of Socrates has another side, a side little 
publicized because the "publicists have all been philosophers" (96). 
The relationship between Socrates and the demos is thus central for 
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Barber as indeed it is for Bloom as well. Furthermore--and 
importantly--Barber's critique of Bloom makes neither the distinction 
between Socrates and Plato that Rorty suggests, nor claims with 
Nussbaum that Bloom has misinterpreted Plato. Rather, Barber 
identifies Socrates' quarrel with Athens as the quarrel between 
philosophy and democracy, a quarrel which is updated in Bloom's text, 
and made more complex by its conjunction with the uniquely modern 
quarrel between the humanist intellectual and both "European 
decadence" and "American phili«tinism." 
Barber sees Bloom as àn ambivalent participant in the modern 
quarrel. While Bloom is suspicious of European relativism and 
cynicism, he is even more suspicious of America's "self-righteous 
innocence" and anti-intellectualism. While he is a loyal American and 
would protect his homeland from the corruption of European nihilism, 
still he cherishes Europe and disdains America's "spirited 
practicality." From Bloom's belief that America has no intellectual 
life apart from that imported from Europe, and his equally strong 
conviction that European intellectual life is tainted, it follows that 
he recognizes no option except for a renewed appeal to the ancients. 
But Barber spots a fly in Bloom's back-to-the-ancients ointment. 
"As a modem. Bloom cannot really deny that the credentials for both 
Absolute Truth and a Supreme Being have become philosophically 
suspect" ("Despot" 63). (Of course, it could be argued that Plato's 
Socrates also noticed the same fly; hence the Noble Lie.) Thus, 
Barber compares Bloom to Voltaire, ("who urges gentlemen to send their 
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servants out of the room" before debating God's existence), and argues 
that Bloom actually worries not so much about the character of modem 
philosophical speculation, as about what the "barbarians" may make of 
It. 
In other words. Bloom's real concern Is that mass America--which 
has a "penchant for the vulgar, the novel, and the experimental"--
should certainly not be exposed to such "grim tidings" as the death of 
God and philosophical relativism. "Because the masses are unfit for 
philosophy, the Truth leaves them defenseless and renders them 
dangerous" (63). Deprived of traditional philosophical authority, the 
barbarians will revolt. Barber thus paraphrases Bloom's Implied 
message: "If God Is dead, don't tell the Americans!" (64). This 
message Illustrates Bloom's understanding of the correct relationship 
between philosophy and democracy. His solution to the Ills of 
modernity Is to initiate the few into the privileged domain of 
philosophy, and to placate the many with "a diet of noble lies such as 
may be required to insulate the university from mediocrity and 
democratic taste" (64). 
The grand irony is that Bloom's book has been so well received. 
What is to be made of such a paradox? Barber offers some engaging 
possibilities in answer to this question. He maintains that those who 
are sympathetic with Bloom are not "mere conservatives, but . . . 
zealots" (65). They require and demand Truth, Certainty, Comfort. 
This apparently means that such readers do not grasp Bloom's real, 
albeit implied, message as it is understood by Barber, I.e., that only 
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a select few are Intellectually capable of living the philosophical 
life, of bearing up under the "grim tidings" of the death of God. 
Thus, Barber suggests that those who are persuaded by Bloom are In 
fact receiving his explicit, but false, message, that which offers 
"certainty to the confused and comfort to the fearful." 
The picture painted by Barber, then, is of a book which claims to 
support democracy while undermining It, championed by readers who 
claim to cherish democracy while despising It. In this reading, Bloom 
appeals most to the very masses he denigrates, those who should not be 
allowed Into the sacred halls of philosophy departments. In an Ironic 
sense, this would square with Bloom's Insistence that philosophers 
have "always" engaged In the "gentle art of deception," an activity 
necessitated by the Inability of the masses to perceive or endure 
Truth. Those who are "deceived" by Bloom's book need what it only 
pretends to offer, a return to the authority of those who know the 
Truth. Furthermore, according to Barber, the only "rival" to such 
deception, now as In Socrates' Athens, is democracy. 
2.5. Barber's Concept of Democracy and 
Contemporary French Philosophy: Some Common Themes 
Regardless of whether or not such deception Is the Intention of 
Bloom's book, Barber's essay presents a plausible, provocative, and 
disturbing explanation for the remarkable success of The Closing Of 
The American Mind. Furthermore, Barber's analysis of Bloom's text Is 
congruous with the attacks on "totalizing reason" and "continuous 
history" launched by contemporary French philosophers, such as 
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Foucault and Lyotard. While Bloom maintains (in his denouncement of 
Affirmative Action) that "[rjeason cannot accommodate the claims of 
any kind of power, and democratic society cannot accept any principle 
of achievement other than merit" (96), Lyotard contends, "Reason and 
power are one and the same. You can dress up the first with prognosis 
and/or the dialectic, but you will still have the other dished up 
intact" (Descombes 171). Foucault's analysis of Western "continuous 
history," which functions as myth to "give meaning to the senseless, 
to rationalize the incongruous; in short, to translate the other into 
the language of the gana" (Descombes 108), is also a critical wedge 
into Bloom's thesis. The letter's portrayal of North American history 
as "the unbroken ineluctable progress of freedom and equality" with 
"no disputes" regarding the "essence of Justice" (55), and again, "the 
majestic and triumphant march of the principles of freedom and 
equality" (97), reads almost as a caricature of the "continuous 
history" condemned by Foucault, and the now empty "metanarratives" 
identified by Lyotard. 
Bloom's insistence upon the radical separation of reason and 
power and the connection of achievement and merit are of a single 
piece. It is related to his rejection of critical philosophy and 
history, the methods of which "deconstruct" the foundationalist 
metaphysics upon which his view depends, as appropriate objects of 
study in humanities departments. Nowhere are the implications of 
Bloom's view more blatant than in his discussion of Afro-American 
studies. In this section, the inherent dangers associated with 
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grounding reason exclusively In nature, thereby excluding the forces 
of history, becomes readily apparent. The chief danger of such a 
metaphysics is that it offers "rational" justification for racism, 
patriarchy, and a host of other historical evils.^  
In the language of Critical Theory (the critical philosophy which 
he detests so much), Bloom is guilty of transforming history into 
nature, the very action endorsed by Socrates (although not without 
some trepidation) in the concept of the Noble Lie. The purpose of 
this deception Is to maintain the authority of "those who know," be 
they philosopher-kings or any twentieth-century version thereof 
(including university professors). 
"Those who know" in Bloom's (and Plato's) scheme are "those who 
reason best." In theory, such individuals rise to positions of 
authority by virtue of natural merit. But what if this is not, in 
historical practice, the way things work? Is this "failure" to be 
charged against higher education, or more specifically--from Bloom's 
perspective--against the Left's appropriation and radicalization of 
Nietzsche which has corrupted higher education? What exactly needs to 
be considered when one's object is the appropriate character of 
cultural authority in a democracy? What if "the masses" come to 
believe that cultural authority does not, in practice, proceed out of 
the best reasoning? Is democracy really threatened by such a belief? 
William Bennett's notion of "moral equality," developed, in his 
1979 Counting bv Race (coauthored by Terry Eastland), is another prime 
example of such metaphysical justification. 
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2.6. Stanley Aronowltz 
Such questions are suggested by Rorty, Barber, and perhaps most 
forcefully by the final voice to be located In this conversation, 
Stanley Aronowltz, whose essay, "The New Conservative Discourse" 
/Education and the American Dream). was part of a 1988 symposium on 
education held at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Aronowltz's 
essay situates Bloom's book within the conservative discourse of 
crisis so prevalent in this decade. Furthermore, Aronowitz alludes to 
the theories of Antonio Gramscl, whose work, I believe, is vital to 
any discussion of the social function of intellectuals and the issue 
of cultural authority. 
According to Aronowitz, in the seventies and early eighties, "the 
conservative position on education reform was in sync with the revival 
of big business as a normative ethical institution" (203). The drive 
was to "techhlclze" education; a "back-to-basics" literacy was linked 
to higher productivity; computers were Introduced into classrooms on a 
massive scale in order that students could be prepared for the 
workplace in the most direct way possible; and schools in general 
became "direct adjuncts of the corporate-driven labor market" (204-
205). 
A second wave of conservative reform rhetoric began during the 
second term of the Reagan administration. While "excellence" was 
still the "buzz-word," the emphasis shifted to a more philosophical, 
high-cultural attack on modernity, with the political Right portrayed 
as the savior of Western civilization itself, a civilization crumbling 
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under the weight of humanism, relativism, and antl-lntellectuallsm. 
While William Bennett was the "official" architect of this 
conservative strategy, It was Allan Bloom who provided the movement's 
philosophical substance in The Closing Of The American Mind, which 
Aronowltz describes as "the first elaborated conservative educational 
manifesto in years" (205). 
Aronowltz's description of the content of Bloom's text is 
straightforward, but he recognizes and discusses Issues not addressed 
by other reviewers discussed here. Those who are familiar with 
Aronowltz's work are aware of his political sensibilities. (His 
earlier books Include 60s Without APO IOBV and Working Class Hero, as 
well as the more recent Science as Power.) Thus it is of marked 
importance that he begins his analysis of Bloom's book with 
. . .  a  s o b e r  r e m i n d e r  t h a t  t h e  c r i t i q u e  o f  a d v a n c e d  
industrial societies that have identified themselves with 
modernity is a powerful weapon of the Right as much as the 
Left, (emphasis added) (205) 
Aronowltz contends, in other words, that Bloom's denunciation of 
liberal educational practice and modern philosophy contains "all the 
elements of the anti-bourgeois sensibility: abhorrence for mass 
culture, a rejection of experience as the arbiter of both taste and 
pedagogy, and a sweeping attack on what is called 'cultural 
relativism'" (205-206). The moral chaos and decay which Bloom 
perceives at the heart of contemporary society are also discerned by 
many thinkers on the Left. In short, then, cultural criticism cuts at 
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least two ways. (The final chapter of my study Is an Illustration of 
this analysis.) 
An important difference, of course, is that for Bloom "the 
sources [of cultural decadence and moral rot] are rarely economic and 
political." Certainly there is no criticism of capitalism, and Marx 
is scarcely mentioned, apart from the claim that he is no longer 
"taken seriously" by any "thinking person." As mentioned earlier. 
Bloom recognizes only one source of cultural decay, the corruption of 
philosophy, from which all historical evils flow. 
While this difference is indeed crucial and should not be 
underestimated, and while Bloom's elitist agenda Is obviously 
repugnant to democratic plurallsts, Aronowltz maintains that there is 
much "common ground" between Left and Right. The commonality to which 
he points involves shared understandings regarding the character and 
social function of Intellectuals. Referring specifically to another 
1987 publication, The Last Intellectuals, by Russell Jacoby (who Is 
politically antagonistic to Bloom), Aronowltz declares that the two 
men demonstrate similar "impulses," i.e., "they share the traditional 
Intellectual's hostility to the twentieth century, its cultural and 
social pluralism, and its loss of tradition" (209). 
Although he does not mention Antonio Gramsci by name in this 
essay, Aronowltz evokes the theories of the Italian Marxist. 
Therefore, before proceeding with this discussion of Aronowltz's 
review, it may be valuable to refer briefly to the ideas of Gramsci, 
an acquaintance with which is helpful for fully appreciating 
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Aronowitz's thesis. Gramscl, a founder of the Italian Communist 
Party, was Imprisoned In 1926 after the party was outlawed by the 
Fascists. He remained In prison for eleven years, was released only 
after his health had been destroyed, and died shortly thereafter In 
Rome. Most of his philosophy is contained In letters and notebooks 
written during his Incarceration. 
By the time of his imprisonment, Gramscl had already decided that 
much of what is commonly referred to as "vulgar Marxism" (what Bloom 
calls the only Marxism) was untenable. It was apparent that there was 
no "of course" about history, and Gramscl devoted much of his 
Intellectual life to an analysis of why not. His theories are often 
drawn upon by contemporary Left-wing thinkers, and they bear relation 
to the issue of education and cultural authority. Of special import 
is Gramscl's idea of cultural hegemony and his work dealing with the 
nature and social function of Intellectuals. 
Stated briefly, cultural hegemony is "the entire complex of 
practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not 
only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the 
active consent of those over whom it rules" (Gramscl 244). In this 
scheme, cultural institutions such as schools, the mass media, 
churches, etc., form a "powerful system of fortresses and earthworks" 
which support the "sturdy structure" of civil society (238). These 
institutions, particularly in the West, form the ways in which 
individuals think, believe, and behave, just as much, as if not more 
than, material circumstances. Furthermore, many of these institutions 
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are the homes of Intellectuals, who are usually portrayed as free-
floating and detached, "decontextuallzed" from issues of class, power, 
and politics. In schools, for example, academic objectivity is viewed 
as not only desirable, but necessary. "Traditional intellectuals" 
thoroughly embody this apolitical role; they revel in the world of the 
"eternal forms" and resist any notion that their ideas are 
significantly connected to the political realities of everyday life. 
On the other hand, "organic intellectuals" take the life of the mind 
seriously enough to relate their ideas to the here and now. Such 
intellectuals may be either conservative or radical in political 
persuasion. The former provides the dominant class with moral and 
intellectual leadership; the latter serves in a similar capacity for 
the working class; In each case, this means appropriating the 
histories, experiences, and culture of the respective class served by 
the conservative or radical organic intellectual for the purpose of 
serving the Interests of that class. 
I hope that this brief digression will help to clarify 
Aronowitz's discussion of the similar "impulses" shared by Bloom and 
many Left-wing intellectuals (specifically Russell Jacoby). Both 
Bloom and Jacoby perceive the proper role of the intellectual (Bloom 
would say "philosopher") as counter-cultural, i.e., adverse to mass 
culture. But today's academic intellectual "orients students to 
careers" rather than criticizing existing culture. He/She appears to 
have lost all authority in relation to public or political life, a 
fact which is deplored by both Bloom and Jacoby. Furthermore, for 
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both men, "the past plays a crucial part in proposals to reconstruct 
possible future" ("Conservative Discourse" 209). The conservative 
Bloom and the radical Jacoby Join in appealing to a time "when at 
least a minority was able to search for the Good and the True 
unhampered by temporal considerations such as making a living" (209). 
They both lament contemporary intellectual and moral decay, and they 
both blame "mass culture, bureaucratically-wrought degraded 
institutions, and anti-intellectualism" for our collective woes (209) 
In Gramsci's terms, then, both Bloom and Jacoby experience the 
organic intellectual's sense of political responsibility and 
authority, while at the same time appealing to the notion of an 
"integrated past" in which society supported traditional 
intellectuals. It is in the latter sense that they share "the 
traditional intellectual's hostility to the twentieth century." 
Furthermore,' Âronowltz suggests that the tension between the 
traditional and organic impulses—or, put another way--between the 
timeless Truth served by traditional Intellectuals and the timely 
political assertion and action required of organic intellectuals, 
"plagues all who are seriously concerned with education" (210). 
Aronowitz maintains that "beyond scapegoating," Bloom's book 
fails to address why and how classical tradition and its gatekeepers 
(traditional intellectuals) lost their privileged position in the 
twentieth century. The notion that philosophical relativism is the 
chief culprit is not historically adequate, Aronowitz argues. 
Furthermore, it is not the case that all relativists "want to destroy 
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the absolute spirit or eternal forms'* (210). It is rather that those 
who appeal to the absolute and eternal have too often employed Truth 
as a weapon against others who have challenged existing power 
structures. Moreover, the "claims of high culture to humanism" find 
» 
little historical legitimation. 
Every achievement of civilization--the pyramids., great works 
of Greek philosophy and science, the wonderful representa­
tions of the human body and soul of the Renaissance--are 
built on the backs of slaves, on a faraway peasantry; in 
short, these achievements are built on a material foundation 
that is nothing but the antithesis of claims of high culture 
to humanism. As Walter Benjamin reminds us, [forgetting 
this reality] is necessary to sustain "culture". . . . What 
the oppressed understand better than most is that 
Intellectuals are typically servants of the mighty; they 
provide the legitimacy for deeds of state and private 
violence and exploitation, which is the meaning of the 
argument that every achievement of high culture is preceded 
by the blood of those who make it possible. 
While this argument Indicates that the social function of the tradi­
tional Intellectual is often synonymous with that of the conservative 
organic intellectual (insofar as both employ cultural tradition to 
support, implicitly or explicitly, existing power structures), 
Aronowltz suggests that the radical organic Intellectual often faces 
an ambivalent relation with cultural tradition. This is witnessed not 
only by Jacoby's book, but most eloquently by the tension-filled 
debates during the early years of Bolshevik power in the Soviet Union. 
According to Aronowltz, in the early 1920s, members of a strong 
proletarian movement called for a radical break with bourgeois 
tradition in literature and art, and for the creation of an official 
socialist canon--one without Tolstoy and Gogol, let alone Shakespeare 
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and Moliere. But Lenin, Trotsl^ , and Bukharin all opposed this 
movement. 
For Lenin, the best of the bourgeois past constituted the 
legacy from which socialist culture would proceed. And 
Trotsky reminded his enthusiastic adversaries that one 
cannot create culture overnight or by edict. Even a short­
lived movement for change cannot erase the past or produce 
new literary and other artistic forms. Tradition lingers 
because it satisfies the human need to make sense of life. 
even in the midst of epochal changes, (emphasis added) 
(211) 
Thus, radical organic intellectuals--from the opposite side of the 
political fence--experience conflicts regarding cultural tradition and 
its authority in the lives of persons. Importantly, this authority 
exists by virtue of "the human need to make sense of life," a 
universal human quality. In somewhat different terms, it is apparent 
that the roots of "prophetic" (radical/ethical) authority are entwined 
in the garden of tradition with those of "priestly" 
(conservative/metaphysical) authority, and one cannot bulldoze the 
deep soil of that garden without destroying both. This was precisely 
the reality recognized by Lenin, Trotsky, and Bukharin. 
But today's primary issue, as Aronowitz sees it, is not political 
in the traditional sense Just described. Rather, contemporary 
Intellectuals, radical and conservative, face a common enemy: 
technocratic rationality, in terms of which anv appeal to cultural 
tradition is meaningless. Despite the "reactionary content" of 
Bloom's text, "it reminds us of what has been lost in the drive for 
rationalization, of the supremacy of science over philosophy, of 
history over eternal essences" (211). On the other hand. 
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intellectuals must take responsibility for the current state of 
affairs. Aronowitz "absolutely" agrees with Bloom that "philosophy 
after Hegel abandons the search for truth and becomes the servant of 
technical knowledge" (212). It is this "historical legacy" of 
technicization, also rooted deeply in Western philosophical tradition 
(Platonism itself bears some responsibility), that has turned 
universities into training grounds which create few spaces for genuine 
seekers of wisdom. 
Thus, for Aronowitz, Bloom's book contains a half-truth. Anti-
intellectualism is indeed rampant in American education, but the true 
enemy of those who desire "broadly-based, philosophically-informed 
scholarship and dialogue concerning burning questions of politics and 
culture" is not philosophical relativism or the "Nietzscheanized 
Left." The true enemy Is the ideological hegemony of technology, the 
overwhelming drive to dominate all of nature--including humans--
through the application of scientific techniques.* It is this enemy, 
particularly when united with industrial capitalism and a form of 
nationalism that Bloom's philosophy appears to support, that obstructs 
the search for and dedication to wisdom in higher education. 
Interestingly, Aronowitz's understanding coincides with a major 
component in the argument advanced by W. Jackson Bate, who traces the 
humanities crisis to late nineteenth-century Germany and the "new 
scientific paradigm" which originated, he believes, in that setting. 
*For a more thorough discussion of this topic, I recommend 
Aronowitz's 1988 Science as Power. 
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(Aronowltz, as I shall Indicate later, Is Influenced by Critical 
Theory, which traces this "paradigm" to the very roots of Western 
philosophy.) Bate links this "paradigm" with the evil of specializa­
tion which has undermined the authority, purpose, and Identity of the 
humanities, and although Aronowltz does not make an Identical charge, 
his essay suggests agreement with Bate on this score. On the other 
hand, Aronowltz would radically disagree with Bate's contention that 
programs such as women's and ethnic studies are symptomatic of the 
humanities' decline. This Is apparent In his claim that Bloom's anti­
democratic call for reform aggravates rather than alleviates the Ills 
produced by the Ideological hegemony of technology. From Aronowltz's 
perspective, both Bate and Bloom overlook the narrow "specialization" 
Inherent In a canon produced exclusively by white male Europeans and 
transmitted as "the best which has been thought and said," regardless 
of whether this canon Is prescribed for everyone (as Bate, following 
Hutchlnswould have it), or restricted as the legacy of an elite few 
(as Bloom suggests). 
For what Bloom means by reform Is nothing less than an 
effort to make explicit what women, blacks, and working-
class students have always known: the precincts of the 
higher learning are not for them and the educational system 
Is meant to train a new mandarin class. Their fate Is tied 
to technical knowledge. (212) 
Thus, Bloom's exclusive agenda, his call for higher education to 
reproduce an elite community of scholars, his failure to recognize and 
feel compassion for the historical victims of Truth, and his apparent 
obliviousness (or even complicity) when It comes to the Ideological 
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hegemony of technology: all of these point to the unacceptabillty of 
his thesis from the perspective of Aronowitz. 
On the other hand, Aronowitz warns those intellectuals "who 
boldly pronounce that the search for truth and the good life is not 
the exclusive property of the Right," that if cultural tradition is to 
regain any significance in the lives of students, "it will have to 
justify itself either by its claim to pertinence or as a sociological 
and historical trace of the culture against which the present 
contends" (213). 
The key issue here has to do with ways of knowing and with the 
character of knowledge which is perceived as most desirable. Natural 
and even social scientists, for example, generally do not appeal to 
the authority of a literary canon, because they are interested only in 
"knowledge that can be derived from mathematics and experiment" (214). 
They are primarily concerned with explanation and prediction, and 
discourage any focus on meaning. But Aronowitz contends that unless 
we are willing to agree with Henry Ford that "history is bunk," we are 
obliged to "take a historical perspective on the present and the 
future. " 
Aronowitz's support of historical knowledge points to tensions 
and ambiguities in Bloom's text (also noted by Nussbaum). On one 
hand. Bloom calls for an escape from the "cave" of culture and history 
into the sunlight of pure reason grounded in nature. On the other, he 
maintains that the authority of the humanities is based exclusively on 
tradition, and laments its loss. While Bloom never addresses this 
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apparent contradiction, Aronowltz makes It clear that his own 
philosophical orientation Is dialectical. "What we know Is 
conditioned by precedents and our social world Is naturally and 
historically constituted" (214). Bloom's dominant tendency to 
transform the social and historical Into the natural Is thus 
unacceptable ; but to critique this tendency Is not to "dissolve 
everything Into Intersubjective relations, since our relation to what 
Is taken as nature. Including our own 'nature,' is part of human 
formation" (214). The history of this "double relation" is embodied 
In literature (including folk narratives) and philosophy. In short, 
then, the humanities offer historical and social knowledge, but not--
as Bloom would have it--objective knowledge. The historical and 
social knowledge available within the humanities (Aronowltz Includes 
popular as well as classical texts) is "a part of the truth about 
ourselves," a truth which needs to be "appropriated rather than 
revered, and with this appropriation, transformed" (215). 
Such an understanding, of course, preserves precisely what Bloom 
abhors--the historicity of our lives and of our knowledge. It also 
presses the humanities into the service of human transformation, as 
opposed to simple transmission of cultural authority. Furthermore, it 
challenges the ideological hegemony of scientific knowledge, because 
the latter is unveiled as historically and culturally situated, a 
"human formation." Unlike Bloom, who casts the humanities into a 
normative role which complements the sciences by objectively studying 
human nature, Aronowltz softens (if not eliminates) the contrast 
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between the "two cultures" by showing their common embeddedness In 
history and culture. (In this sense, he resembles Dewey, whose 
Insistence that science and art are of a kind as ways of knowing irked 
positlvlsts and perhaps some artistes as well.) 
2.7. A Critique of Technocratic Rationality 
While Aronowltz does not address Bloom's charge that the German 
corruption of philosophy was causally linked to Nazism (of the four 
reviewers discussed here, only Rorty deals explicitly with this 
particular issue), it is significant that the former's critique of 
technocratic rationality corresponds with the analysis of many 
Holocaust scholars (spanning multiple disciplines) who also identify 
and implicate this rationality in their studies of Nazi atrocities and 
German complicity. For example, the origins of this Intellectual 
orientation are explored by Frederic Lilge in his 1948 publication, 
Th? AWg? 9f Lfftgntng; The Failure of the German University. 
(especially in Chapter 3, "The Idolatry of Science"), and the role of 
German technocrats has been delineated by several since Lilge (e.g., 
Berger, Hughes, Lifton, Littell, Kren and Rappoport, Roth and 
Rubenstein). Indeed, my research indicates that technocratic 
rationality is indicted most consistently by those who engage in 
Holocaust studies. 
The general critique of technocratic rationality goes something 
like this; In Nazi Germany, the well-educated corps of scientists and 
bureaucrats carried on "business as usual," adhering to the problem 
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solving methodology nurtured by their professional training (Roth and 
Rubensteln 231). These "technocrats" were not ideologically committed; 
on the contrary, they tended to view social and political issues as 
meaningless, having been rendered obsolete by modem science (Thomas 
Hu^ es 167). Such individuals, then, recognized only practical issues, 
which they approached exclusively from the perspective of technological 
expertise, with an eye toward cost-effectiveness and career advancement. 
Many critical theorists (including Aronowitz) understand tech­
nocratic rationality as an outgrowth of Enlightenment reason. 
Therefore,'modem philosophy is perceived as partially culpable for 
contemporary social ills. At the same time, however, much of Critical 
Theory is consistent with the work of Heidegger, who traces the desire 
to rationalize "and thus control everything on earth" to Socrates and 
Plato (Hollinger, "The Holocaust, Technology and Cultural Pluralism" 
4). Thus, modem technological civilization is related to certain 
strains of ancient as well as modem philosophy, and it is this 
element within our intellectual heritage--this quest for certainty and 
control--which is problematic, not (as Bloom would have it) 
philosophical relativism.? 
i^n religious language, this element would be labeled "idolatry," 
which may or may not be significantly related to the fact that many 
(particularly Frankfurt School) philosophers who critique modern 
Western culture and technocratic rationality are Jewish. I believe 
that this connection is valid and significant--a valuable example of 
the power of cultural tradition even in the lives of culture critics. 
This is, however, obviously quite complex and ambiguous; Heidegger, 
for example, was certainly not Jewish and even Joined the Nazi Party. 
Leo Strauss was Jewish, but also a rabid Platonlst. 
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2.8. What Knowledge Is of Most Worth? 
The Multiplicity of Modem Consciousness 
Aronowitz's essay on Bloom and the conservative discourse of 
crisis brings vital Issues to the foreground, and serves as an eloquent 
reminder that modem cultural criticism and a profound commitment to 
democracy are not exclusive to political conservatives. Furthermore, 
those who fully support humanities education and perceive a crisis 
surrounding it may disagree radically on the sources and character of 
the crisis. While it may be true that the cultural authority of the 
humanities depends upon the authority of historical knowledge, it is 
almost a truism that Western civilization does not provide a single, 
unified history from which to draw. Any attempt to reduce tradition to 
such a single homogeneous authority (which speaks to "man as man") is 
antithetical to democracy, and, moreover, flies in the face of the 
"enormous multiplicity" of modem consciousness. As Clifford Geertz 
puts it: 
The hallmark of modern consciousness ... Is its enormous 
multiplicity. For our time and forward, the image of a 
general orientation, perspective, Weltanschauung. growing out 
of humanistic studies (or, for that matter, out of scientific 
ones) and shaping the direction of culture is a chimera. Not 
only is the class basis for such a unitary "humanism" 
completely absent, gone with a lot of other things like 
adequate bathtubs and comfortable taxis, but, even more 
important, the agreement on the foundations of scholarly 
authority, old books and old manners, has disappeared. . . . 
The conception of a "new humanism," of forging some general 
"the best that is being thought and said" ideology and working 
it into the curriculum [seems] not merely implausible but 
Utopian altogether. Possibly, indeed, a bit worrisome. 
(Local Knowledge 161) 
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It la this "enormous multiplicity" of consciousness that 
challenges our traditional notions of higher education, not only, as 
Geertz indicates, humanistic studies, but scientific ones as well. 
The question asked by Herbert Spencer over a century ago, "What 
knowledge is of most worth?" has been rendered Increasingly complex by 
the immensity and diversity of modem thought, which has expanded both 
temporally and spatially. How are we to decide which sources of 
modern consciousness are most vital as we approach a new century? 
What criteria are we to use in making this Judgment? While all of the 
thinkers discussed thus far speak of "education for democracy," is 
there any common normative vision of what that phrase means? And if 
there isn't, does it portend the moral confusion and decay that Bloom 
(as well as Bennett and Cheney) fear? 
Having raised these questions, I should quickly add that I harbor 
no illusions about arriving at "decisive answers" to what promises to 
become an even more complex set of issues in the decades ahead, and 
which may well drastically alter the shape of education. In this 
scenario, the humanities crisis is simply the first stage in a much 
larger upheaval Involving knowledge, education, and democratic 
society. However, if the notion of "education for democracy" is to be 
anything other than an empty platitude, the profound problems 
surrounding it deserve close attention and thoughtful debate. (In one 
Important sense, this process is more vital than any solution.) One 
can at least thank Allan Bloom--or at least some powerful media 
"hype"--for propelling these issues into the mainstream. Furthermore, 
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the responses to his book indicate active concern on the parts of 
several other thinkers. 
The next chapter of this study will be a more thorough 
consideration of Richard Rorty, whose review of The Closing Of The 
American Mind has already been discussed. Rorty's neopragmatlc 
liberalism is a significant alternative to the philosophical and 
political views endorsed by Bloom; but Rorty, too, has generated a 
good deal of controversy. After reviewing Rorty's work In this 
decade, I will devote a chapter to several thinkers whose normative 
visions of education and democracy conflict with Rorty's, and point to 
still another context in which to consider the discourse of crisis and 
the struggle for cultural authority. 
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There is beauty and there are the humiliated. Whatever 
difficulties the enterprise may present, I would like never 
to be unfaithful to the one or the other. 
-- Albert Camus fLvrlcal and Critical 169-170) 
I am not a philosopher. I do not believe in reason enough 
to believe in a system. What I am interested in is knowing 
how to behave and, more precisely, how to behave when one . 
does not believe either in God or in reason. 
-- Albert Camus (In Melancon 85) 
I think that philosophy is still rude and elementary; It 
will one day be taught by poets. 
-- Ralph Waldo Emerson (American Evasion 73) 
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3. THE CRISIS OF THE HUMANITIES: A CONSEQUENCE OF PRAGMATISM? 
3.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, I discussed Benjamin Barber's claim 
that Bloom's appeal to the ancients presupposes that North America has 
no Intellectual life apart from that imported from Europe, and that 
modem European intellectual life is tainted. One need only scan the 
index of The Closing Of The American Mind to confirm Bloom's lack of 
regard for nonEuropean thought. Such a search quickly reveals, for 
example, that he devotes more space to American entertainers (Woody 
Allen, Michael Jackson, Benny Goodman) than to American philosophers. 
Of notable absence, given the topic of Bloom's text, is any mention of 
John Dewey's classic study of democracy and education. Furthermore, 
while Dewey himself at least rates three references in Bloom's book, 
not a single reference is made to William James, George Herbert Mead, 
or Charles Sanders Fierce. Apparently, for Bloom, the American "home­
grown" philosophical school of Pragmatism is simply not worth 
discussing, either in terms of praise or condemnation. 
In this chapter, I intend to present the neo-pragmatism of 
philosopher Richard Rorty as a significant alternative to Bloom's 
Platonic Realism In relation to education for democracy. Central to 
my discussion will be the notion of cultural authority as understood 
from Rorty's perspective. 
91 
3.2. Rorty's Revival of Pragmatism 
Among these North American philosophers who have attempted to revive 
Pragmatism in this decade, none has been more prolific or more controver­
sial than Richard Rorty. Since 1979, he has published three books and a 
multitude of essays, most of which are devoted to challenging and 
debunking traditional understandings of philosophy as "an ahistorical 
foundational discipline and tribunal of reason for the rest of culture" 
(Hiley 145). While Bloom laments that philosophy could fade from the 
modem cultural scene without anyone noticing and believes that the 
crisis of liberal democracy is a consequence of this diminished author­
ity, Rorty understands foundational philosophy as a now outworn "sub­
stitute for religion," a sort of cultural pinch-hitter which itself has 
grown patched, shabby, and ready for retirement. Its replacement, in 
Rorty's scheme, is a blend of Pragmatism and hermeneutics, a philosophi­
cal orientation which he believes is far more conducive to the values of 
liberal democracy than that "old-time philosophy." This distinction 
between Bloom and Rorty makes the latter's vision a significant alterna­
tive to that of the former. And, not surprisingly, the differences 
between the two men are reflected in their normative conceptions of 
education. 
Although substantially influenced by the analytic tradition, Rorty's 
work in this decade (as well as in the 1970s) has been largely in the 
areas of Continental Theory--especially Nietzsche., Heidegger, and 
Foucault--and American Pragmatism, especially Dewey. Furthermore, Rorty 
sees these two philosophical orientations as thoroughly compatible, 
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differing perhaps In tone and emphasis, but remarkably similar In 
doctrine ("Hermeneutlcs" 2). Both philosophical schools are vital for a 
world which has come of age, a world In which "traditional, Platonic, 
eplstemologically-centered philosophy" is obsolete. What Dewey 
disparagingly called "the spectator theory of knowledge," the theory that 
Truth is correspondence to Reality, and that Reason Is the means of 
discovering Truth, is equally unacceptable to Rorty. Moreover, he 
maintains that the intellectual movements inspired largely by Nietzsche 
(loosely referred to as "hermeneutlcs") are of a piece with Dewey's 
pragmatic rejection of Platonic eplstemology. Thus, Rorty weaves 
Continental hermeneutlcs and American Pragmatism into an understanding of 
philosophy which concurs with Wilfred Seller's definition: "an attempt 
to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang 
together, in the broadest possible sense of the term" (Consequences xlv). 
Rorty distinguishes, then, between (large-P) Philosophy, which seeks 
timeless truth and goodness through a universal human faculty called 
reason, and (small-p) philosophy, which is concerned with timely truths 
and situational goodness. In the latter sense, poets, historians, and 
literary critics "do" philosophy, just as much as professional phil­
osophers do. In this hermeneutlcal-pragmatic scheme, reason is not 
linked with discovery--as Bloom and other objectivist philosopher would 
would have it--but with both interpretation and creation.& 
R^orty's own career. It should be noted, has evolved along with 
his philosophy. In the early 1980s, he left Princeton's Philosophy 
Department to become Kenan Professor of Humanities at the University 
of Virginia. And his most recent book, Contlnyencv. ironv. and 
solidarity, contains in-depth discussions of two [small-p] 
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3.3. Analysis: "Hermeneutlcs, General Studies, and Teaching" 
Rorty's most direct discussion of the Implications of his phil­
osophy for education Is his 1982 essay, "Hermeneutlcs, General Studies 
Studies, and Teaching" fSvneryos Seminars Fall 1982). Appealing to 
Dewey's pragmatism and Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutlcs, Rorty maintains 
that "what both men put In the place of Reason--the Platonic organ for 
detecting Truth--Is a sense of tradition, of community, of human 
solidarity" (2-3). This sense, then. Is what education, at Its best, 
Instills In students. Furthermore, while there may be dangers associated 
with "Inculcating antl-Platonic views" In young persons, the sense of 
tradition and solidarity Is an adequate defense against what Is usually 
feared most of all, value relativism. 
The similarities between Dewey and Gadamer are apparent, Rorty 
claims, in their commonly held understanding that experience is 
essentially "linguistic" and "historical." Both men believed that the 
goal of inquiry and Indeed of life itself is not "getting in touch with 
something which exists Independently of ourselves," regardless of whether 
that something is perceived as Truth, God, or Reality. Rather, the goal 
is Blldunip. self-formation, which is synonymous with Dewey's concept of 
growth. In this scheme, language is not a medium for expressing pre- or 
nonllnguistic reality (as Plato and Locke would have it). To make sense 
of such a notion, one would have to "get outside" of language and then 
examine reality in order to see if the two "match." But, first, one 
philosophers, Orwell and Nabokov. 
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would have to determine what the "match" would "amount to," and neither 
Dewey nor Gadamer acknowledges the possibility of this determination (4). 
To say that experience Is essentially linguistic, Rorty maintains, 
is to concur with Wittgenstein that language cannot be escaped and that 
truth Is contingent upon shared linguistic practice (or "language 
games"). This means that within a common language the possibility of 
consensus exists, but outside of this consensus there Is no appeal to 
"truth" recognized as valid by either Dewey or Gadamer. In other words, 
to posit the existence of an objective reality and then define truth as 
correspondence to that reality Is no more meaningful than to assert that 
"God Is on our side." Unless we have some way to determine the 
correspondence or the "divine approval," nothing Is gained by either 
assertion. 
The controversial upshot of this approach is that certain ugly 
claims advanced within particular linguistic practices, such as that 
created by the Nazis, are "true" from the hermeneutlcal-pragmatic 
perspective. Neither Dewey nor Gadamer offers any defense against this, 
Rorty believes, apart from that provided by alternative language systems 
which oppose Nazi "truth." Neither the Nazi nor the opposing linguistic 
practice, however, can claim correspondence with an objective moral 
reality. Rather, the moral consensus possible within a shared language 
is all we have as "backup. " As Gadamer puts it, "The validity of morals 
is based on tradition" (in Rorty 5). By the same token, Dewey's 
assertion that growth is the only moral end suggests that the goal of 
growth is toward "realization of the potentialities already sketched out 
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in the language we are now using." To say more than this requires 
"postulating some philosophical substitute for God and some special 
faculty called 'Reason' which will put us in touch with this God-
surrogate" (5). While Plato and his inheritors are willing to make 
this postulation, neither Dewey nor Gadamer recognizes such a claim as 
warrantable. 
Related to the Idea that experience is essentially linguistic is 
the Hegelian claim--embraced in a somewhat modified form by both Dewey 
and Gadamer--that existence is essentially historical. Just as there 
is no escaping language, there is "ho way out of our historical 
situation to an ahistorical view of our nature or situation or goal" 
(5). Thus, Rorty's version of pragmatism centers on the contingency 
of both language and history for the formulation of truth. This, of 
course, sets him at radical odds with Bloom, who perceives value 
relativism aa the unavoidable consequence of such contingency, and who 
links the demise of both the cultural authority of the philosophical 
tradition and democracy Itself to this relativism. 
Rorty acknowledges that students, too, respond to hermeneutlcal-
pragmatic claims with the charge of relativism. This, he maintains, 
is because "even in this latter age," students still want to be 
Flatonlsts. (This squares with ny own experience as described In the 
previous chapter.) The objectlvist philosophies and religions which 
have dominated Western culture render students largely unable to 
recognize any alternative besides the either/or of objectivity or 
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relativism. But Rorty maintains that hermeneutlcal pragmatism offers 
a third--and superior--option. 
The difference between vulgar relativism and pragmatism Is 
that pragmatism says the fact that a view Is ours--our 
language's, our tradition's, our culture's. Is an excellent 
BEIBUI facl* reason for holding it. It is not, of course, a 
knock-down argument against competing views. But it does 
put the burden of proof on such views. It says that 
rationality consists in a decent respect for the opinions--
or in Gadamer's deliberately shocking terms, the prejudices 
--of mankind. With Pierce and Habermas, it sees objectivity 
in terms of consensus rather than correspondence. (6) 
The challenge to education, then, as Rorty sees it, is to help 
students break out of their "either/or" mentality. This, he believes, 
is precisely what Dewey spent a great deal of his life trying to 
accomplish, i.e., ridding our culture of those "simple-minded 
dualisms" which exist as remnants of an outworn Platonism. This 
philosophical missioni Rorty maintains, is shared by Heidegger and 
Foucault, as well as Gadamer. The task recognized by all of these 
thinkers is that of creating a language--and thus a culture--in which 
"our finite and contingent sense of human community" would replace the 
authority of God and Reason. This is essential, Rorty suggests, for 
liberal democracy, because inculcating a sense of community entails 
charging that community with the responsibility of "choosing its own 
destiny." 
What type of education can contribute to such a culture and thus 
to democracy? Rorty believes that addressing this question means 
first freeing ourselves from another dualism, the one which is 
generally perceived between hermeneutics and pragmatism themselves--
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or, put another way--between Gadamer's "historicity" and Dewey's 
"scientific method." This split, which is often characterized as an 
opposition between "two cultures," is not legitimate, according to 
Rorty, who insists that one must consider the spirit in which both 
humanistic education (with its Renaissance roots) and scientific 
education (with its nineteenth-century roots) began. Both traditions 
grew out of the common need to break through "established notions of 
Intellectual authority" (7). Both were created with the goal of 
liberation in mind. But, importantly, in neither case should 
liberation be perceived as an escape from language or history into 
"something different." Rather, both traditions represent "successive 
stages in the attempt of the human race to solve its problems--
successive attempts to create a sense of communal purpose" (7). 
Thus, Rorty maintains that the hlstoricism of Continental 
hermeneutlcs' and the scientific method of Deweyan pragmatism share a 
set of "moral virtues": 
. . . willingness to accept experimental disconfirmation, 
willingness to listen to alternative theories, willingness 
to scrap an old paradigm and begin again with a new. (8) 
What is rejected in both cases is the notion of Truth associated with 
Platonlsm (and Philosophy). This means, especially, that Dewey's 
emphasis on scientific method should not be perceived as a drive to 
discover the Nature of Things, for such a perception--in addition to 
being a misreading of Dewey--is as much a "relic of Platonlsm" as 
Robert Hutchins' famous syllogism, 
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Education Implies teaching. Teaching Implies knowledge. 
Knowledge Is truth. The truth Is everywhere the same. 
Hence education should be everywhere the same. (In Rorty 8) 
Rorty's central theme Is captured In his reply to Hutchlns: 
"Truth Is not everywhere the same, because language Is not everywhere 
the same, and . . . human existence Is essentially linguistic and 
essentially historical" (8). In other words, there Is no way of 
knowing, no linguistic practice, which lifts us out of history. The 
educational task, then, is to present both science and the humanities 
as attempts by human beings to solve human problems, as opposed to the 
Platonic understanding that one or the other offers special Insight 
into the Nature of Things. (While it seems self-evident that Rorty's 
stance is more controversial in relation to the sciences. Bloom's book 
and its popular success indicate that a Platonlst conception of the 
humanities is alive and well in the 1980s.) 
For Rorty, the sense of human community upon which democracy 
depends is supported by neither God nor Reason. It is supported 
solely by an essentially foundatlonless hope.^  And yet, while 
rejecting any foundations for hope, Rorty sees a sort of progress In 
history, progress "toward new [but never final] possibilities for 
humanity." It is in this spirit that he approaches the humanities, 
which he understands as offering "accounts of man's attempt to solve 
problems, to work out the potentialities of the language and 
T^his attitude, Rorty explains in another essay, "Method, Social 
Science, Social Hope," (Consequences of Pragmatism. 191-210), makes 
him prefer Dewey to Foucault. 
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activities available to them" (9). The "heroes" of the humanities are 
those who "Invented new forms of communal life by inventing new songs, 
new discourses, new polities." The goal of the humanities, then, is 
to Inspire "intellectual hero-worship," a task which Rorty claims is 
thorou^ ly compatible with nurturing a sense of community. In his 
scheme, an individual does not rise above one's community by appealing 
to something "higher." Rather, one confirms one's solidarity within 
community by "taking on" the problems of that community. Intellectual 
greatness is thus greatness at overcoming social problems, and the 
goal of inspiring Intellectual hero worship is linked with the larger 
goal of helping students to see themselves "as part of the human 
species, as part of the adventure of the race" (11). 
Borrowing from Whitehead, Rorty advances the notion of "Romance" 
as the educational theme into which intellectual hero worship and 
solidarity merge. Students, he declares, should be Introduced to the 
"romance of learning," should be encouraged to "fall in love" with 
their heroes, and to experience solidarity not only with others who 
share the same "love affairs," but also with those who choose other 
"lovers." Moreover, Rorty believes that educators who advocate a core 
curriculum generally base their Judgments not on some objective 
standard, but on memories of their own "love affairs" and the hope 
that students will enter into a romance with the same authors and 
heroes. From this it follows that Rorty has nothing against and in 
fact endorses core curricula, as long as individual faculties are 
allowed to develop them freely. (In practice, it should be noted, 
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this translates into the decisions of the "most influential members" 
of individual faculties.) 
Teachers whose sense of participation in the community--and 
thus whose sense of their own lives--is somehow bound up 
with reading the books . . . which they have picked for the 
core" are those who will be able to nurture a sense of 
community and tradition in their students. Unless this 
erotic element is present in humanities education, "nothing 
happens at all. 
Beyond this moderate prescription, Rorty believes that little can be 
said about what humanities education should be. 
Because there is nothing general and philosophical to be 
said about love, there is nothing general and philosophical 
to be said about general studies. The truth about both lies 
in the details. (13) 
What can be said, however, is something concrete about the 
particular community of which Rorty feels a member, i.e., the 
community of American intellectuals, especially those who practice 
hermeneutlcs. Host of this community, Rorty believes, is "more 
skeptical about America than American thought has ever allowed itself 
to be." Many of his philosopher colleagues, e.g., see America as 
"rich, vulgar, cruel, and blind," and they appeal increasingly often 
to those thinkers who are radically critical of American liberal 
social thought. This has led, Rorty maintains, to a "new orthodoxy" 
which is beginning to spill over into undergraduate education with 
disturbing consequences. Deconstruction, for example, is taught as if 
it were the "true conceptual scheme which underlies all others." For 
Rorty, such developments fly in the face of what hermeneutlcs should 
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stand for, not a new orthodoxy, but a healthy suspicion of all 
orthodoxy. 
The danger associated with the tendency toward new methodological 
orthodoxy is that hermeneutics may eventually grow "as sterile as the 
tradition of positivistic science has become" (14). It may even 
contribute to a diminished, rather than an enhanced, sense of communal 
purpose by deteriorating into what its enemies (such as Allan Bloom) 
believe it to be, "an irrationalist expression of resentful despair." 
This is apparently why Rorty believes it necessary to temper 
hermeneutics with Deweyan pragmatism. If thé former is taught as 
"just one more attempt to figure out what the problems are, an attempt 
no more privileged than any other," it can revitalize and deepen the 
Deweyan strain in American thought. If not, "hermeneutics" will be 
the name of a "cultural disaster." The purpose of hermeneutics, then, 
from Rorty's perspective, is to contribute to pragmatic liberalism, to 
encourage "the ability of American intellectuals to see their country 
as still theirs, by letting us fall back in love with the tradition 
which shaped us" (15). 
3.4. Analysis: "Solidarity or Objectivity?" 
Rorty's 1982 essay (reviewed above) offers a significant critique 
of the philosophical orientation manifested in Bloom's book. Indeed, 
Rorty's essay seems to anticipate Bloom's central argument against 
"openness" and relativism. While both men are concerned with commu­
nity and democracy, their philosophical agendas are quite diverse. 
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The differences between the two views--Rorty's neo-pragmatism and 
Bloom's Platonic realism--are framed in another and somewhat more 
theoretical essay by Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?", published in 
1985 fPoat-Analvtic Philosophy). The title of this essay points to 
its author's thesis, i.e., "there are two principal ways in which 
reflective human beings try, by placing their lives in a larger con­
text, to give sense to those lives" (3). The first is in relation to 
a community, either historical or literary. The second is in relation 
to a "non-hupan reality," a reality that can be described without 
reference to other human beings. In the former case, an individual 
seeks solidarity; in the latter, the desire is for objectivity. 
The dominant Western philosophical urge has been in the direction 
of objectivity. The idea of truth in this tradition is posited as 
something to be pursued for Its own sake, a goal which promises to . 
free its seeker from cultural parochialism. In this scheme, the 
intellectual is portrayed as someone who is in touch with the Nature 
of Things, and not as simply one who embraces and articulates the 
"opinions" of his/her community. According to Rorty, both "Socratlc 
alienation" and "Platonic hope" are reflected in this view. 
The Platonic distinctions between appearance and reality, opinion 
and truth, permeated Western culture and gave rise, Rorty believes, to 
the Enlightenment image of the intellectual as scientist. This image 
is the primary one inherited by modern thinkers, with the consequence 
that not only physical scientists but social philosophers employ 
objectivlst rhetoric. Liberal social thought, for example, centers 
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around social reform made possible by objective knowledge of 
ahistorical human nature. In this instance, the desire for community 
is also apparent, but the character of that community is transcendent 
and ultimate. 
Rorty refers to those who wish to ground solidarity in 
objectivity as "realists." Such thinkers understand truth as 
correspondence to reality, from which it follows that they must 
construct both a metaphysics and an epistemology. The former provides 
a "special relation between beliefs and objects which will 
differentiate true from false beliefs" (5). The latter provides 
procedures for justifying beliefs, procedures which are perceived as 
not merely social, but natural. Realist epistemology, then, requires 
an account of natural cognitive abilities which link reason with 
nature. 
In contrast to philosophical realists are those thinkers who 
pursue solidarity, but not objectivity. These thinkers, in Rorty's 
scheme, are "pragmatists." Because pragmatists view truth as (in 
William James' phrase) "what is good for us to believe," they need 
neither a metaphysics nor an epistemology. Pragmatists 
see the gap between truth and justification not as something 
to be bridged by isolating a natural and transcultural sort 
of rationality which can be used to criticize certain 
cultures and praise others, but simply as the gap between 
the actual good and the possible better. (5) 
While realists seek solidarity through objectivity, pragmatists seek 
objectivity through solidarity. In other words, pragmatic objectivity 
is achieved through dialogue and greater Intersubjective agreement. 
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Truth, then, for the pragmatlst, Is a product of consensus; and the 
distinction between truth and opinion Is simply the distinction 
between topics on which consensus Is easily achieved and other topics 
on which It Is not. 
This being the case, pragmatlsts are often accused of 
"relativism" by realists. Rorty distinguishes among three separate 
views which are commonly lumped together under that epithet. 
The first is the view that every belief is as good as every 
other.. The second is the view that "true" is an equivocal 
term, having as many meanings as there are procedures of 
Justification. The third is the view that there Is nothing 
to be said about either truth or rationality apart from 
descriptions of the familiar procedures of Justification 
which a given society--ours--uses in one or another area of 
inquiry. (5-6) 
The pragmatlst, Rorty maintains, holds only the third of these views, 
which means that the realist's charge of relativism is problematic. 
At the crux of the issue is the fact that pragmatlsts have no theory 
of truth apart from consensus. From this it follows that the 
pragmatic account of truth has only an ethical base, not the 
epistemologlcal and metaphysical one constructed by the realist. 
Realists, however, simply "cannot believe that anyone would seriously 
deny that truth has an Intrinsic nature," and consequently, they 
misconstrue the pragmatlst's purely negative point as another positive 
theory (6). 
The pragmatic understanding of truth as an ethical concept rather 
than a metaphysical or epistemologlcal one leads away from the notion 
of Reason as "a transcultural human ability to correspond to Reality, 
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a faculty whose possession and use is demonstrated by obedience to 
explicit criteria" (11). In this sense, pragmatism is the 
philosophical orientation best-suited to democracy, for the central 
concern for pragmatists is not how to define words such as "truth" or 
"rationality," but is rather how to improve our social self-image. 
If we could ever be moved solely by the desire for 
solidarity, setting aside the desire for objectivity 
altogether, then we should think of human progress as making 
it possible for human beings to do more interesting things 
and be more interesting people, not as heading towards a 
place which has somehow been prepared for humanity in 
advance. Our self-image would employ images of making 
rather than finding, the images used by the Romantics to 
praise poets, rather than the images used by the Greeks to 
praise mathematicians. (10) 
The pragmatic orientation, then, lends itself to the values and 
habits which Rorty associates with liberal democracy: "toleration, 
free inquiry, and the quest for undistorted communication" (11). 
While the pragmatist acknowledges that he/she has no ahistorical or 
transcultural justification for these values, it is also the case that 
such justification is not perceived as necessary from the pragmatist 
perspective. Rather, the sole justification required is that gained 
from comparison and consensus. It is "exemplified by Winston 
Churchill's defense of democracy as the worst form of government 
imaginable except for all the others which have been tried so far" 
(11). 
The fact that the pragmatist's justification for democracy is 
ethnocentric is readily admitted by Rorty. But ethnocentrism and 
relativism are not one and the same. Only by "projecting his own 
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habits of thou^ t upon the pragmatlst" does the realist perceive the 
two as synonymous. The latter, who sees the whole point of 
philosophical thought as detachment from one's particular community, 
simply cannot comprehend the pragmatlst's desire for attachment to 
one's own, and the corresponding repudiation of a "universal" 
standpoint. 
Moreover, Rorty argues that the realist, too. Is ethnocentric, 
"no matter how much . . . rhetoric about objectivity he produces in 
his study." To be ethnocentric, he contends, means dividing the human 
race into the "people to whom one must Justify one's beliefs and 
others." The former group is made up of those "who share enough of 
one's beliefs to make fruitful conversation possible." On the other 
hand, there are many views which simply cannot be taken seriously by 
"Western liberal Intellectuals," pragmatic or realist in philosophical 
orientation. The pragmatlst accepts this limitation and the need "to 
start from where we are." The realist, bound by the same limitation, 
must necessarily be ethnocentric in rejecting the views that he/she 
cannot justify within the framework of his/her objectivist theory of 
truth. Thus, at the very moment of condemning and denying 
ethnocentrlclty, the realist inevitably practices it (13). 
In conjunction with the above argument, Rorty contends that it is 
not actually the pragmatlst's relativism which disturbs realists. 
Rather, it is that pragmatism threatens two sorts of "metaphysical 
comfort" to which Western philosophical tradition is accustomed. One 
is the notion of natural, i.e., "biologically transmitted," rights; 
107 
the other is the assurance of immortality.^  ^ The first comfort, Rorty 
claims, makes no sense unless our biological species is linked to a 
"non-human reality [which] gives the species moral dignity." The 
second comfort is related to the notion of human nature as an "inner 
structure" which will somehow prevail over space and time. 
[E]ven if our civilization is destroyed, even if all memory 
of our political or intellectual or artistic community is 
erased, the race is fated to recapture the values and the 
insights and the achievements which [are our] glory. (13) 
These two aspects of the realist's comfortable metaphysics underscore 
the inevitable ethnocentrism "to which we are all condemned" (14). 
Thus, with Nietzsche, Rorty charges that "the philosophical tradition 
which stems from Plato is an attempt to avoid facing up to contin­
gency, to escape time and chance" (14). 
Along with this significant.Westeni tradition, however, Rorty 
identifies another competing philosophical perspective which is 
characterized by "social faith." The roots of this latter tradition 
are apparent in 
Socrates' turn away from the gods, Christianity's turn 
from an omnipotent Creator to the man who suffered on the 
cross, and the Baconian turn from science as contemplation 
of eternal truth to science as an instrument of social 
progress. ... (15) 
Pragmatism, in Rorty's view, is the twentieth century inheritor of 
this historical Western philosophical orientation, àn orientation 
l^ Robert J. Lifton discusses this human need in terms of 
"immortality symbolism." Please see Chapter 4 of my study for further 
discussion of Rorty's treatment of this point and his need to take 
Lifton more seriously. 
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which offers only the comfort of solidarity while also rejecting 
despair. It Is this alternative philosophical perspective which Is 
needed to support liberal democracy In a world come of age. 
Philosophical realism has simply run Its course. It Is no longer 
Intellectually or morally tenable, having become "as transparent a 
device as the postulation of deities who turn out, by à happy 
coincidence, to have chosen us as their people" (15). 
Furthermore, and Importantly, Rorty also recommends the tradition 
characterized by "social faith" as a counter to "the bad side of 
Nietzsche," the resentment which now characterizes much of hl^  
culture. This resentment, he maintains, has led to attacks on liberal 
social thought as an "Ideological superstructure" that "obscures the 
realities of our situation and represses attempts to change that 
situation" (16). While the objectlvlst Justification for liberal 
Institutions and practices has "gone sour," this does not mean that 
those Institutions and practices are corrupt or need to be abandoned. 
Rorty believes that Oeweyan pragmatism provides an alternative 
Justification for liberal democracy, and he sees his own philosophical 
task as the revival of pragmatism In the Interest of reaffirming that 
Justification. In other words, Rorty hopes to save the Enll^ tenment 
baby from being thrown out with the objectlvlst bathwater. 
3.5. Analysis: "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy" 
A key Issue raised but not fully addressed In the two essays Just 
reviewed Is the connection between the "self-formation" which is the 
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goal of education and the pragmatic solidarity required for democracy. 
In other words, while it seems clear that he sees rejection of 
philosophical realism as a desirable--perhaps even necessary--
condition for genuinely democratic solidarity, does Rorty also mean to 
say that it is a sufficient condition? What precisely is the 
connection between the fully-developed "selves" who emerge from 
education (in Rorty's normative scheme) and democratic community? 
What is the relationship between philosophy after God and Reason, and 
democracy after God and Reason? 
In a 1988 essay, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy" (The 
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom: Its EYPlWtlPn an* 
Consequences in American History), Rorty suggests answers to these 
questions. He begins this essay with a reference to Thomas Jefferson, 
who "set the tone for American liberal politics when he said, 'it does 
no injury for ny neighbor to say that there are twenty Gods or no 
God'" (257). While many Enlightenment intellectuals went further than 
Jefferson by contending that traditional religion should be discarded 
completely and perhaps replaced by an "explicitly secular political 
faith," the early American thinker sought only to "privatize" 
religion. Personal beliefs, then, were viewed by Jefferson as simply 
that--individual expressions of meaning. Such beliefs, although 
perhaps essential for "individual perfection," were conceived as 
"irrelevant" to democratic social order. However, should those 
beliefs be practiced in any fashion that could not be justified to a 
majority of the believer's fellow-citizens, they would become 
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pertinent Issues. Furthermore, at that point, in Jefferson's view, 
the individual conscience became subordinate to "public expediency" 
(257-258). 
There is, of course, another dimension of the Jeffersonlan 
compromise between private and public in addition to the politically 
pragmatic side described above. The other--or "absolutist"--side 
maintains that "a universal human faculty," conscience, supplies "all 
the beliefs necessary for civic virtue," and needs to be vigilantly 
guarded as the locus of human dignity and rights. The potential 
tension between the absolutist and pragmatic sides of Jefferson's 
legacy is resolved, Rorty maintains, in a theory of truth based on 
consensus. "Such a theory," he explains, "guarantees that a moral 
belief that cannot be Justified to a mass of mankind is 
'irrational,'", i.e., not really a product of its proponent's 
universal moral faculty, but rather a "prejudice," which does not 
"share in the sanctity of conscience" (257-258). 
Philosophy in this century, writes Rorty, has tended to erase the 
"picture of the self" central to Jefferson's democratic social 
compromise. In other words, the notion of a universal moral faculty 
that is possessed equally and Independently by all persons has been 
discredited by contemporary Intellectuals working in a variety of 
disciplines. The effect of this philosophical development has been a 
break in the link between truth and consensus and, in turn, a 
destruction of the Jeffersonlan compromise. Liberal social theory has 
thus been largely polarized into absolutist and pragmatic camps (the 
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former represented, in Rorty's reading, by Ronald Dworkin; the latter, 
by John Dewey and John Rawls). 
In addition, however, a third type of social theory--"communi-
tarianism"--has developed. Within this theory (represented by Robert 
Bellah and Alasdair Naclntyre, among others), both poles of 
Jefferson's compromise are rejected. The upshot of this rejection is 
that liberal institutions and culture are viewed as entities which 
"either should not or cannot survive the collapse of Enlightenment 
philosophical justification" (258-259). 
While Rorty identifies three "strands" of communitarianism, he 
deals primarily with only one, that which claims 
. . . that political institutions "presuppose" a doctrine 
about the nature of human beings, and that such a doctrine 
must, unlike Enlightenment rationalism, make clear the 
- essentially historical character of the self. (260) 
In relation to this claim, Rorty poses two questions: 1) Is there any 
sense in which liberal democracy needs philosophical Justification? 
2) Does a conception of the self which--in Charles Taylor's phrase--
makes "the community constitutive of the individual," comport better 
with liberal democracy than does the Enlightenment conception? 
Rorty argues for a thoroughly negative answer to the first of the 
above questions and for a qualified positive response to the second. 
He contends that Dewey and Rawls have adequately demonstrated "how ' 
liberal democracy can get along without philosophical presuppo­
sitions," but that "if we want ... a philosophical view of the 
self," then Taylor's theory is best (261). However, such a theory is 
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not as vital as communitarians believe; democracy can flourish without 
it. 
Rorty's argument against the need for a philosophical 
Justification for democracy Is similar to his case for Inevitable 
ethnocentrism developed in "Solidarity or Objectivity?". Dewey and 
Rawls, he maintains, have illustrated how philosophy can be bracketed 
from democratic social relations, Just as Jefferson bracketed 
religion. Philosophy, in this context, means "disputes about the 
nature of human beings and even about whether there is such a thing as 
human nature" (263). For both Dewey and Rawls, no such Intellectual 
enterprise is required as a preface to politics. What is required is 
a sense of history and an awareness of social relations. As opposed 
to debates over whether human beings have natural rights, democracy 
requires only discussions aimed at preserving and protecting the 
rights already established. In other words, the cultural authority of 
philosophy is simply not needed for democratic social relations. The 
sole authority necessary is "successful accommodation among individuals, 
individuals who find themselves heir to the same historical traditions 
and faced with the same problems" (264). In this scheme, philosophy is, 
at worst, "mumbo-jumbo," and, at best, "a private search for perfection." 
It should thus go the way of religion when the issue at stake is one of 
social policy. One might paraphrase Rorty's argument, then, as 
advocating the separation of Philosophy and State. 
This reading of philosophy and democracy points to a theory of the 
self as "a centerless web of historically conditioned beliefs and 
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desires," as opposed to a locus of innate dignity and natural rights. 
But Rorty asserts that even the former theory is not necessary for 
democracy. 
Such a theory does not offer liberal social theory a basis. 
If one gantg a model of the human self, then this picture of 
a centerless web will fill the need. But for purposes of 
liberal social theory, one can do without such a model. One 
can get along with common sense and social science, areas of 
discourse in which the term "the self" rarely occurs. (270) 
Given this separation between theories of self and social theory, 
what connection remains between the role of the humanist, intellectual 
and democracy? Rorty suggests that since philosophy should now be 
perceived as the social equivalent of religion, i.e., "a private 
pursuit of perfection," then there may be as many philosophical 
theories of self as there are religious theories. Because such 
theories are "irrelevant" to democracy, the "moral identities" of 
individuals simply do not matter in the larger political arena. The 
individual, in this scheme, is free "to rig up a model of the self to 
suit oneself . . . , one's private sense of the meaning of one's life" 
(271). 
Having said this, however, Rorty recognizes the need to "offset 
the air of light-minded aestheticism" which appears to color his 
attitude toward traditional philosophical questions. There is, he 
explains, a "moral purpose" behind his argument. 
The encouragement of light-mindedness about traditional 
philosophical topics serves the same purpose as does the 
encouragement of light-mindedness about theological topics. 
. . . [S]uch philosophical superficiality . . . helps make 
the world's inhabitants more pragmatic, more tolerant, more 
liberal. . . (272) 
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In other words, Rorty has serious reasons for prescribing 
philosophical play. The "disenchantment of the world" Is vital for 
liberal tolerance. Against the communitarian critics of modernity, 
Rorty argues that should democracy fall, It will not teach our 
descendents a philosophical truth. Rather, they will simply get some 
hints about what to watch out for when setting up their next social 
order. Perhaps they might remember that social arrangements can be 
viewed as cooperative experiments, rather than as attempts to "embody 
a universal and ahlstorlcal order." This memory alone, Rorty 
contends, would be worthwhile. 
3.6. Analysis: Contingency. Ironv. and solidarity 
The separation between private perfection and social solidarity, 
between philosophy and democracy. Is confirmed most recently by Rorty 
in his 1989 book, Contlnyencv. ironv. and solidarity. In this text, 
he argues again that contemporary liberal society "already contains 
the institutions for its own improvement" and that Western social and 
political philosophy needs no further conceptual development (63). 
Rorty points to J. S. Mill's proposal that "governments devote 
themselves to optimizing the balance between leaving people's private 
lives alone and preventing suffering" as "pretty much the last word" 
when it comes to philosophizing about democratic social life (63). 
In implicit contrast to Bloom, who believes that modern society 
is corrupt and needs to be redeemed by a return to the authority of 
ancient philosophy and "those who reason best," and in explicit 
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contrast to Foucault, who also identifies the grim aspects of modern 
society but sees any appeal to the authority of reason as synonymous 
with an exercise of power, Rorty asserts that the ills of modem 
society can be alleviated by keeping faith with the best social image 
already developed and articulated in liberal social philosophy and 
manifested in modern institutions, such as the free press, public 
universities, etc. 
In Rorty's scheme, liberal conscience and culture are the 
accidental products of such historical developments as Christianity, 
Newtonian science, and Romanticism. Progress is thus identified only 
in retrospect, from which it follows that there is no absolute future 
goal toward which we move. Rather, there is only the recognition that 
this is who we are and, in terms of how we came to be, this is what is 
good. Modern society, then, is judged as either moral or immoral 
within the confines of shared history and language. 
Importantly, Rorty understands the identity of the above "we" as 
grounded in poetic rather than philosophical foundations. The 
traditional epistemological/metaphysical problem involving the 
character of the relation between subject and object is one which 
simply needs to be abandoned. The Enlightenment concepts of 
universalism and rationalism need not to be updated (as thinkers such 
as Habermas would have it) but "dissolved" and "replaced with 
something else" (67). This "something else" is 
. . .  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  s e n s e  o f  t h e  r a d i c a l  d i v e r s i t y  o f  
private purposes . . . the radically poetic character of 
individual lives and . . . the merely poetic foundations of 
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the "we-consclousness" which lies behind our social 
institutions. (67-68) 
As indicated earlier, Rorty argues that the social institutions 
created by the poetically-grounded "us" are morally adequate. Not 
only are philosophical or theoretical foundations unnecessary, but 
attempts to establish such foundations lead generally to a political 
attitude which Rorty finds at best counter-productive and at worst 
malignant, i.e., "one which will lead you to think that there is some 
social goal more important than [the liberal goal of] avoiding 
cruelty" (65). Behind such attempts lies a "yearning for autonomy" 
which should be reserved, in Rorty's view, for private life. 
Autonomy, he explains, "is not something which all human beings have 
within them and which society can release by ceasing to repress . . ." 
(65). Rather, it is something "which certain particular human beings 
hope to attain by self-creation, and which a few actually do" (65). 
Thus, the sort of autonomy sought by such thinkers as Nietzsche, 
Sartre, and Foucault could never be embodied in liberal social 
institutions. It is a private longing, a quest for personal 
authenticity and purity, and should be understood as such among 
citizens of liberal democracies. 
The significant task for philosophy, then, is to distinguish 
between the poetic character of private life and the equally poetic, 
but morally-binding, character of public life. This is the task 
undertaken by Rorty in his 1989 book. His approach entails 
distinguishing between two kinds of Intellectuals: the ironist and 
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the metaphysician. The former Is one who recognizes the contingency 
of both history and language, and thus of his/her very sense of self. 
Such individuals live In a state of "metastablllty" (a term borrowed 
from Sartre), which means being "never quite able to take themselves 
seriously" in view of an awareness "that the terms in which they 
describe themselves are subject to change" (73-74). The 
metaphysician, on the other hand, is one who assumes the existence of 
"a single permanent reality . . . behind the many temporary 
appearances" and sees his/her Intellectual endeavor as a quest for 
that eternal reality. The metaphysician thus takes him/herself very 
seriously. He/She assumes that "the presence of a term in [his/her] 
final vocabulary [the vocabulary in which we each tell "the story of 
our lives"] ensures that it refers to something which has a real 
essence" (74). In Rorty's scheme, the metaphysician is still attached 
to "common sense" in that he/she takes for granted that "statements 
formulated in [his/her] final vocabulary suffice to describe and judge 
the beliefs, actions, and lives of those who employ alternative final 
vocabularies" (74). 
Rorty draws out his initial distinction between the ironist and 
the metaphysician through a discussion of their different attitudes 
toward books and academic compartmentalization. For example, whereas 
metaphysicians see libraries "as divided according to disciplines" 
which correspond to different objects of knowledge. Ironists see them 
as divided only according to tradition. Whereas the metaphysician 
needs to distinguish among poets, philosophers, and scientists in 
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order to Judge the value of their knowledge claims, the ironist reads 
to discover "the writings of all the people with poetic gifts, all the 
original minds who had a talent for redescription," a genius for 
creating new metaphors and thus new forms of cultural life (76). 
A similar distinction is apparent in relation to academic 
compartmentalization. For instance, the metaphysician understands 
philosophy as "an attempt to know about certain things--quite general 
and important things" (76). Its study entails reference to a certain 
canonical final vocabulary which describes "the way the world is." 
For the ironist, all final vocabularies, including that of Western 
philosophy, are "poetic achievements" (77). Thus, philosophy is a 
literary genre, and the skills required for it are literary in 
character.' This understanding corresponds with the ironist's approach 
to books, because the term "literature" refers to "every sort of book 
which might conceivably have moral relevance--might conceivably alter 
one's sense of what is possible and Important" (82). This being the 
case, the lines of demarcation between and among academic disciplines 
are, for the ironist, consequences of "accidental historical reasons, 
having to do with the way in which intellectuals got Jobs in 
universities by pretending to pursue academic specialties" (81). 
Rorty contends that literary criticism--the activity of playing 
off one final vocabulary against others--has gradually and perhaps 
semiconsciously assumed the cultural status claimed in the past by 
religion, science, and philosophy. This development "has paralleled 
the rise in the proportion of ironists to metaphysicians among 
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Intellectuals" (82). (In fact, he maintains that "the ironist is the 
typical modern intellectual" [89].) As a consequence, an increasingly 
wider gap exists between intellectuals and the public, because 
"metaphysics is woven into the public rhetoric of modern liberal 
societies" (82). This situation, Rorty believes, has led to charges 
of elitism or social irresponsibility against ironist intellectuals by 
both serious thinkers and "know-nothings" whose orientation is toward 
metaphysics. Rorty is largely willing to disregard the latter group--
religious fundamentalists, for example--who "are just instinctively 
defending their own traditional roles" (82). The former group, 
however, includes such thoughtful social philosophers as Jûrgen 
Habermas, to whose polemics Rorty responds in this 1989 publication. 
Rorty's answer to Habermas echoes his thesis in "The Priority of 
Democracy to Philosophy," reviewed above. Political freedom, not 
metaphysical truth, is the sole requirement for democracy. While 
Rorty concurs with Habermas that "undistorted communication" is vital 
for both freedom and truth, the former maintains that there is not 
much "to be said about what counts as 'undistorted' except 'the sort 
you get when you have democratic political institutions and the 
conditions for making these institutions free'" (84). This issue 
turns largely on one's understanding of ideology. Whereas Habermas 
and other liberal metaphysicians locate Ideoloflekritlk at the heart 
of their philosophical enterprise, Rorty argues that the word 
"ideology" means nothing more significant than "bad idea" (Footnote 6, 
84). As far as Rorty is concerned, then, the standard "bourgeois 
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freedoms" based on "nothing more profound" than Western history are 
adequate for the health of liberal democracy. 
In his response to Habermas, Rorty concentrates on two critiques 
of "liberal irony" which emanate from the German philosopher's 
arguments. The first is that liberal democracies need the "social 
glue" of a consensus about what is "universally human." In other 
words, the continuation of free institutions depends upon a 
metaphysical rhetoric which supports public life. The second is that 
it is at least psychologically inconsistent to be both an ironist (one 
who maintains the contingency of all moral positions) and a liberal 
(one who maintains that "cruelty is the worst thing we do"). Put 
another way, without metaphysics the liberal's moral position cannot 
be sustained. 
Rorty's reply to the first critique is the assertion that, 
contrary to what was feared by "lots of people in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries," the decline of religious beliefs--which Is 
analogous to the loss of philosophical metaphysics--has not resulted 
in a radical deterioration in the health of liberal societies. In 
fact, he argues that the growing tendency to discount the possibility 
of "postmortem rewards" has strengthened many such societies. In 
place of future individual rewards, citizens of liberal democracies 
substitute "hopes for one's grandchildren," hopes that "life will 
eventually be freer, less cruel, more leisured, richer in goods and 
experiences ..." (85-86). This type of social hope, Rorty 
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maintains, is far more resilient and substantial than religious or 
other metaphysically-inspired hope. 
If you tell someone whose life is given meaning by this 
[non-metaphysical] hope that philosophers are waxing ironic 
over real essence, the objectivity of truth, and the 
existence of an ahistorical human nature, you are unlikely 
to arouse much interest, much less do any damage. The idea 
that liberal societies are bound together by philosophical 
beliefs seems to me ludicrous. What binds societies 
together are common vocabularies and common hopes. The 
vocabularies are typically parasitic on the hopes--in the 
sense that the principal function of the vocabularies is to 
tell stories about future outcomes which compensate for 
present sacrifices. (86) 
Pointing out that "once upon a time atheism, too, was the 
exclusive property of intellectuals," Rorty maintains that in the 
"ideal liberal society," nonintellectual citizens would pursue Deweyan 
"concrete alternatives and programs" rather than metaphysical quests 
for moral certainty. Just as today "most people" feel no need to 
answer the question, "Are you saved?", Rorty's ideal society would 
have no need to answer such questions as, "Why are you a liberal?" 
(87). This does not mean, however, that nonintellectual citizens 
would be ironists. Rorty "cannot imagine a culture which socialized 
its youth in such a way to make them continually dubious about their 
own process of socialization" (87). By definition, irony is both 
private and reactive. There is necessarily a contrast between the 
final vocabulary an individual inherits and the one which he/she 
creates for him/herself. It appears, then, that young persons would 
be socialized as "commonsenslcal nonmetaphysicians" in Rorty's ideal 
society. This means that they would be thoroughly aware of their own 
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contingency but would feel no doubts about It--a possibility which 
hinges on the prior removal of all metaphysical presuppositions from 
public llfe.^  ^
This brings Rorty to the second of the Habermaslan critiques, the 
charge that philosophical ironism cannot sustain liberal morality even 
on a personal level. Here again, Rorty's reply is reminiscent of his 
earlier essay. 
The idea that we all have an overriding obligation to 
diminish cruelty, to make human beings equal in respect to 
their liability to suffering, seems to take for granted that 
there is something within human beings which deserves 
respect and protection quite independently of the language 
they speak. (88) 
In other words, the liberal abhorrence for cruelty seems to depend on 
a universal and ahistorical human nature, something inviolable which 
gives us a reason not to be cruel to others. Ironism, on the other 
hand, rejects this justification for moral behavior, and even insists 
on a potentially cruel power over others--the "power of redescription" 
(89). 
The redescrlbing ironist, by threatening one's final 
vocabulary, and thus one's ability to make sense of oneself 
in one's own terms . . . suggests that one's self and one's 
world are futile, obsolete, powerless. Redescription often 
humiliates. (90) 
^^ The implication of Rorty's argument is that once metaphysical 
presuppositions disappeared from society, ironism (which is 
necessarily reactive) would become impossible. While Rorty does not 
pursue this issue, both ironism and metaphysics would be absent from 
his ideal society, and the philosophical gap between Intellectuals and 
nonintellectuals would cease to exist. A population of commonsensical 
liberals would Inhabit his Utopia. 
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BuC note, says Rorty, that redescription and humiliation are just as 
much a part of metaphysics as of ironism. In fact, the metaphysician 
claims to redescribe in the name of reason itself, rather than 
imagination, the one claim attributed to the ironist by Rorty. The 
important distinction is that the metaphysician insists--and usually 
convinces his/her audience--"that they are being educated . . . that 
the Truth was already in them and merely needed to be drawn out into 
the light" (90). This, in turn, suggests that the person being 
redescribed is being empowered, and when combined with the claim that 
his/her previous self-description was imposed by something oppressive 
within his/her culture, such empowerment means becoming allied with a 
power greater than culture, a power such as God or Universal Truth. 
The ironist, on the other hand, offers no such assurance. He/She 
cannot claim that the right redescription will free persons from 
oppressive situations. Thus Rorty concludes that the metaphysician's 
charge against ironism is not that it may humiliate, but rather that 
it cannot empower and shield an individual against humiliation, and 
does not claim to. In fact, it is the human vulnerability to 
humiliation, the sense of a commonly-shared danger, which is the only 
"morally-relevant definition of a person" and the very ground of 
solidarity for the ironist. 
To identify imaginatively with the humiliation and suffering of 
others and to desire the alleviation of such suffering are the moral 
virtues most closely associated with the liberal ironist. This does 
not mean that he/she knows a reason to care about suffering, but 
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rather that he/she hopes to notice when It occurs to someone with whom 
he/she does not share a final vocabulary. Furthermore, for the 
liberal ironist, the desire to prevent or alleviate suffering is not 
"essentially human." Instead, it is a response which "arose rather 
late in the history of humanity ... is still a rather local 
phenomenon . . . [and] is not associated with any power larger than 
that embodied in . . . concrete historical situation[s]" (93). 
These distinctions, Rorty maintains, are indications of why 
ironist philosophy is not a public philosophy; it offers no universal 
foundation for freedom and equality. On the other hand, ironism 
points to the ability of imaginative literature, defined here in the 
traditional narrow sense of "plays, poems, and especially novels," to 
.contribute to solidarity by nurturing sensitivity to cruelty. Whereas 
the metaphysician associates philosophical theory with social hope and 
literature with private perfection, the ironist reverses these 
connections. For the ironist, "solidarity has to be constructed out 
of little pieces, rather than found already waiting" in a universal 
reality (94). 
The ways in which imaginative literature nurtures sensitivity to 
cruelty--our own and other's--are developed concretely by Rorty in two 
chapters dealing with Vladimir Nabokov and George Orwell. While I 
will not describe his analysis in detail, it is important to note 
that, in both cases, he concentrates on the themes of "tendencies to 
cruelty Inherent in searches for autonomy" and the "tension between 
private irony and liberal hope" (144). Rorty's objective, to overcome 
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the dualism between the moral and the aesthetic, is a self-conscious 
attempt to emulate Ideas posed by Dewey In Art as Experience. For 
Instance, Rorty defines the "poeticized culture" of his liberal Utopia 
as one which would concur with Dewey's assertion that 
. . . Imagination Is the chief Instrument of the good . . . 
art Is more moral than moralities. For the latter either 
are, or tend to become, consecrations of the status quo. 
. , . The moral prophets of humanity have always been poets 
even though they spoke In free verse or by parable. (69 In 
Rorty) 
In his final chapter, "Solidarity," Rorty examines a theme which 
may well exist at the center of his philosophical enterprise, In that 
It Is related to this century's greatest unsolved mystery, the Nazi 
Holocaust. Why, he asks, did certain European gentiles--those In 
Denmark or Italy, for example--demonstrate greater solidarity with the 
Jewish victims of Nazism than did other European gentiles, those in 
Belgium, for example? Were Danes and Italians somehow more human and 
Belgians somehow less? Did the former two groups Identify with the 
plight of their Jewish neighbors because they (Danes and Italians) 
possessed a "component which Is essential to a full-fledged human 
being" while most Belgians lacked their component? Does this explain 
why Danes and Italians manifested a greater sense of moral concern and 
obligation than did Belgians? 
By now, of course, it is obvious that Rorty finds this 
"explanation" completely unsatisfactory. Although he recognizes the 
inclination to seek metaphysical reasons for historical upheavals, he 
urges resistance against this Inclination. Rorty proposes that Danes 
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and Italians responded in moral fashion to the Nazi persecution of 
Jews for contingent historical reasons rather than for the meta­
physical ones suggested by the question in the preceding paragraph. 
In other words, Danes and Italians responded as they did not because 
they perceived an abstract moral obligation to all human beings, but 
because they shared with their Jewish nei^ bors a common parochial 
identity based largely on "fellowship-inspiring descriptions" present 
in their final vocabularies. Furthermore, Rorty speculates that 
"detailed historicosociological explanations" exist for the absence of 
such "fellowship-inspiring descriptions" in the final vocabularies of 
most Belgians. (He does not, however, elaborate on this speculation.) 
Rorty's intention, then, is to discount the notion that human 
solidarity is the abstract identification with "humanity as such." 
Such identification, he claims, is "a philosopher's invention, an 
awkward attempt to secularize the idea of becoming one with God" 
(198). Insofar as solidarity exists, it does so as a result of 
imaginative identification with the suffering of others, which in turn 
is dependent upon historically contingent final vocabularies, 
poetically-created conceptions of "us." 
This does not mean, Rorty hastens to add, that he underestimates 
the value of extending "our sense of 'we' to people whom we have 
previously thought of as 'they'" (192). But this value itself, he 
argues, is a historically contingent one, an outgrowth of "the.moral 
and political vocabularies" typical of secular Western democracies. 
The desire for greater solidarity, then, needs to be disassociated 
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only from its "philosophical presuppositions," not from Its concrete 
ethical merit. Thus, in Rorty's scheme, moral progress Is "Indeed in 
the direction of greater human solidarity" (192). However, he 
reiterates that it is an awareness of the human vulnerability to pain 
and humiliation that provides the possibility for solidarity, an 
awareness nurtured by the "detailed descriptions of particular 
varieties of pain and humiliation" available in Imaginative 
literature. Such descriptions, "rather than philosophical or 
religious treatises [are] the modern intellectual's principal 
contributions to moral progress" (192). 
It is the liberal ironist who perceives both the ethical value of 
a reduction of human cruelty (a public good) and the radical 
contingency of that ethical value (a private awareness). 
Distinguishing between the two "makes it possible to distinguish 
public from private questions . . . the domain of the liberal from the 
domain of the ironist" (198). While the two perceptions are indeed 
separate. It is altogether possible--and from Rorty's perspective, 
desirable--for them to merge in a single person, the postmodern 
Intellectual. 
3.7. Richard Rorty; Rebel or Metamorphosed Neoconservatlve? 
(A Comparison with Camus) 
Unlike most of the other thinkers discussed in this study, 
Richard Rorty does not employ a rhetoric of crisis in regard to 
humanities education or liberal democracy. True to his depiction of 
the liberal ironist, Rorty appears never to take himself quite 
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seriously. Whatever passion or sense of urgency may be his are 
generally veiled behind a demeanor of relaxed candor, self-assured 
charm, and urbane wit. His style Is polished, his Ideas humane, and 
his tone sophisticated. I find his work highly readable and 
Intrlgulngly persuasive. It Is also a remarkable affirmation of 
liberalism, particularly In the context of the 1980s, a decade In 
which the "L-word" has become a political epithet of derision and 
ridicule. One suspects that chief among Rorty's projects Is that of 
helping the political left revise Its script and find Its tongue In an 
era dominated by a conservative discourse of "values" which has 
pushed--or pulled--our entire political scene to far right stage. As 
columnist Ellen Goodman laments, 
. . . there Is no unified, over-arching description of the 
modem liberal view: a value-system which Is egalitarian, 
anti-war, comfortably pluralistic, and aware of the 
responsibilities members of a community and world have to 
each other. (Des Moines Register Editorial Section; June 
16, 1989) 
In Rorty's terms, Goodman Is seeking a liberal "final vocabulary," a 
new self-description which Is adequate to contemporary social and 
political challenges. Quoting from the recent work of University of 
Texas scholar, Kathleen Jamleson, who analyzes political rhetoric, 
Goodman echoes the frustration of liberals with North American 
politics In the 1980s, a decade In which moderates such as Walter 
Mondale and Michael Dukakis have been successfully depicted as 
dangerously left of mainstream and "out of touch" with "American 
values." .Furthermore, it is Important to recall that the conservative 
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discourse of crisis discussed earlier in this study is part of the 
same political rhetoric. The characterization of university 
humanities departments as hotbeds of ethical relativism and anti-
Americanism is of a piece with the conservative attempt to transform 
the "L-word" into an obscenity, Given this political context, Rorty's 
defense of "bourgeois liberalism" and the values of tolerance, free 
inquiry, and undistorted communication takes on particular 
significance. 
In many ways, Rorty's views and concerns resemble those of Albert 
Camus, who wrote against the backdrop of another decade when 
liberalism was under especially severe attack, the 1950s. Both men 
resist the rationalist tendency to universalize or absolutize. Both 
reject the consolation of transcendence, and discount philosophical 
humanism as a basis for ethics. In Camus's terms, both thinkers face 
the postmodern dilemma of grounding morality "when one does not 
believe either In God or in reason" (Essais 1427; quoted in Melancon 
35). Both stress the dialectical value of "between" when It comes to 
defining truth. This value, shared by other twentieth century 
thinkers such as Martin Buber and John Dewey, is apparent in Rorty's 
defense of truth as consensus, Camus's commitment to dialogue, and In 
both men's vision of solidarity as the most cherished social 
objective. Both identify human suffering as the sole bond among 
persons and point to artistic expression as the best way of ° 
sensitizing ourselves and others. Both Rorty and Camus thus confirm 
what Buber called the need to "imagine the real," to Imagine the 
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suffering of others so as to enter Into its reality, and thus to 
experience compassion in the deep, rich, root sense of the word. (One 
major difference, of course, is that Camus's Imagination extended to 
the writing of novels, whereas Rorty remains the literary critic.) 
This blurring of the distinction between the aesthetic and the 
moral is related to both Rorty's and Camus's resistance to what the 
former calls (large-P) Philosophy. Whereas the North American thinker 
has rankled many academic philosophers by suggesting that metaphysical 
language, too, is a "poetic achievement," Camus was discounted as a 
philosopher by those who characterized his "formulations" as "soft and 
insufficient" (H. Stuart Hughes 239) and his appeal to readers as 
emotional rather than Intellectual. While Rorty, not surprisingly, 
employs far more philosophical jargon than does Camus, Cornel West 
maintains that "Rorty's style leaves the reader always enlightened and 
exhilarated, yet also with the qulrlqr feeling that one has been 
seduced rather than persuaded ..." (American Evasion 197). On the 
other hand, Camus defined the novel as "philosophy put into Images" 
fLvrlcal and Critical 145). Both men, then, perceive a need to 
rethink the form and content of philosophical inquiry. 
Finally, both Rorty and Camus are critical of both Communist 
totalitarianism and Western greed and smugness, but neither engages In 
Ideologlekrltlk. Their refusal to participate in the radical project 
of exposing the structural defects of late capitalist institutions 
results in the final similarity to which I will point: the two men 
share a common ground when it comes to detractors. As in the case of 
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Camus, many of Rorty's harshest critics come from the political left. 
The projects of both men have been characterized as bourgeois, 
individualistic, and elitist; Camus's work was branded "reactionary" 
while Rorty's has been labeled "neoconservatlve." Such criticism 
dismays the North American thinker as much as it did the Frenchman. 
Rorty, for example, is "astonished and alarmed" to find himself 
"lumped" with neoconservatlves, and relieved that he "has gotten flak" 
from the right, also. "Had I not," he says, "I would have begun to 
fear that I had turned into a neoconservatlve in my sleep, like Gregor 
Samsa" ("Thugs; " Footnote 5, 575). Camus, unfortunately,- was less 
cavalier; his well publicized battle with Sartre and others of the 
more radical left resulted in a case of "writer's block" which lasted 
for the better part of a decade, easing only just before his death in 
1960 (Lottman 1, 601). 
In the next section of this study, I will examine the critiques 
of Richard Rorty Issued by those who stand on the same side of the 
political fence as does he, and yet find his polemics unconvincing, 
inadequate, or even pernicious. 
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4. "WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE THAT HAKES A DIFFERENCE HERE?" 
SOME RESPONSES TO RICHARD RORTY'S LIBERAL PRAGMATISM 
4.1. Introduction 
A major Issue addressed by both Rorty and Bloom Is the 
appropriate character of the relation between the self and society in 
a liberal democracy. From the Platonic Realist perspective of Bloom, 
humanities education should have as its end an awareness of and 
appreciation for human nature, and for the eternal and universal truth 
that connects all human beings, truth which determines the character 
of the best social arrangements. The student whose reason has been 
educated, primarily through an acquaintance with "the best that has 
been thought and said," to know human nature, is the citizen who is 
best prepared to assume his/her place within a democracy, which itself 
is grounded in a natural metaphysics. Stated crudely, then, Bloom 
believes 1) that human nature and universal, eternal truth exists, 2) 
that reason is capable of knowing such truth, and 3) that contemporary 
humanities education, in rejecting 1) and 2), has abandoned its task 
of preparing future citizens. Therefore, liberal democracy Itself is 
in grave peril. 
Rorty, on the other hand, maintains that there is no human nature 
and no such thing as timeless, universal truth. Liberal democracy has 
evolved largely by accident; no one planned to create liberal 
conscience and culture. This does not mean that democracy should not 
be maintained; it is the best social arrangement that we know, given 
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who and where we are now. But Its maintenance does not depend on 
grounding It in metaphysics, natural or otherwise. In fact, he argues 
that democracy needs no philosophical Justification at all. 
This, I believe. Is why Rorty articulates no rhetoric of crisis 
when it comes to the humanities. Since humanities education has no 
particular relation to democracy in his scheme, there is no normative 
concept of the humanities which needs to be defended, at least for 
social/political reasons. Rorty is thus altogether comfortable in 
bowing to the discretion of individual faculties, charging them only 
with the pedagogic task of nurturing the "romance" of learning. On 
the other hand, in his most recent book, Rorty points to a connection 
between imaginative literature and "social hope" and suggests that 
novels and poetry, not Philosophy, can contribute most meaningfully to 
solidarity. Here, then, is a limited claim for the value of 
humanities education to liberal democracy. But this affirmation of 
imaginative literature is of a piece with Rorty's complete rejection 
of any philosophically-authoritative tradition with which we might 
"recreate and redescribe ourselves and the world" (West, Evasion 203). 
Thus, while Rorty does not employ a rhetoric of crisis in relation to 
the humanities. Cornel West maintains that Rorty's work is itself "a 
symptom of the crisis" within the profession of academic philosophy 
(206-207). 
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4.2. Cornel West 
As portrayed by West, the crisis in philosophy, and indeed for 
all professional humanistic scholarship, must be situated within the 
context of a civilization which itself is in ruins. 
Possible nuclear holocaust hovers over us. Rampant racism, 
persistent patriarchy, extensive class Inequality, brutal 
state repression, subtle bureaucratic surveillance, and 
technological abuse of nature pervade capitalist, communist, 
and neocolonial countries. ("Politics" 259) 
While it might be assumed that such culturàl decay would command 
vigilant attention on the part of humanist intellectuals, particularly 
philosophers, such is not the case. West argues, for example, that 
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  p h i l o s o p h y ,  l a r g e l y  " i n  t h e  g r i p  o f  . . .  a  
debilitating ethos of academic professlonalization and specializa­
tion," remains unaffected by the cultural ruins which surround the 
academy. 
The most terrifying aspects of this [decay in North Atlantic 
civilization] fail to affect the discourses and practices of 
most American intellectuals--principally owing to unique 
geographical isolation, recent professional Insularity, and 
relative economic prosperity. ("Politics" 260) 
For West, this "refusal to acknowledge the urgency of the historical 
moment" is an "integral part of the crisis" which exists in 
contemporary humanistic scholarship fHermeneutlcs. "Introduction" 67). 
West also points to a "pervasive sense of demoralization" within 
academic philosophy, especially among younger faculty and graduate 
students. Many such individuals languish in the decline of the 
"Cartesian-Kantian picture of the self, world, and God," a decline 
that has left the "rich intellectual resources of the West ... in 
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disarray" ("Politics" 259). While adherents of traditional (or what 
Rorty calls "old-time") philosophy still wield much institutional 
power, they have not been able, in West's view, to revise and reform 
the "work of the giants" so as to breathe new life into the once vital 
humanistic tradition, which is now "vapid and sterile." Thus the 
discipline of philosophy lies "entrenched in a debased and 
debilitating isolation," detached from social and political concerns 
as well as from its own metaphysical traditions. 
A similar crisis characterizes contemporary theology and literary 
criticism, indeed all humanistic studies, because at its core "the 
current crisis takes the form of a crisis of language" (Hermeneutics. 
"Introduction" 67). This, West explains, is what distinguishes 
postmodern philosophical issues from those of modernity. Whereas 
modem intellectuals concentrated on self-consciousness, postmodern 
thinkers "reflect on the nature of the means [historical, linguistic] 
by which we self-consciously constitute ourselves ..." (67). This, 
in turn, calls into radical question the very possibility of "self-
constitution." In other words, the postmodern philosopher 
concentrates on the "radical finitude and sheer contingency of human 
existence" and on the historical and linguistic materials and 
practices which determine consciousness itself. This means, then, 
that the self-identity of postmodern humanist intellectuals is also 
thrown into radical question. Such individuals, whose endeavors were 
traditionally "wedded to the Cartesian-Kantian picture," now face 
their "fragile and tentative status" as cultural authorities insofar 
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as the "quest for certainty" has itself been exposed as a transient 
enterprise, one which is "trapped in ... a historical, textual, or 
intersubjective web from which there is no escape" ("Schleiermacher's" 
82) .  
In many ways. West describes in fairly esoteric language the very 
"crisis" perceived by conservative thinkers who deplore the isolation, 
self-doubt, and diminished authority of academic humanists, and who 
prescribe a return to traditional metaphysical philosophy as the only 
cure for the current malady. Importantly, however. West--along with 
Rorty--is unwilling to exchange his intellectual integrity for 
cultural authority grounded metaphysically. As a consequence, both of 
them are left with a common question, phrased by West as follows: 
Given the fact that philosophy [and humanistic scholarship 
in general] has been wedded to the Cartesian-Kantian picture 
and hence the quest for certainty, does a rejection of this 
picture and quest entail the end of . . . philosophy and a 
lapse into relativism and nihilism? (Hermeneutics. 
"Introduction" 68) 
Rorty's response to this question, discussed in the preceding 
chapter, is much more congenial to West than the conservative response 
discussed in Chapter One. However, West is far from an uncritical 
student of Rorty. West's approval of Rorty is on the 
"microinstitutional level," i.e., the level of the university, 
particularly the philosophy department. There, Rorty's "anti-
epistemological radicalism and belletristic anti-academicism are 
refreshing and welcome" potential antidotes for professional isolation 
and sterility (Evasion.207). But West argues that although Rorty 
137 
"leads philosophy to the complex world of politics and culture," he 
"confines his engagement to transformation in the academy and 
apologetics for the modern West" (207). Rorty thus "demythologizes" 
philosophy, only to "retreat into the philosophical arena as soon as 
pertinent sociopolitical issues are raised" (207). 
On the "macrosocietal level," the social-political-ethical level 
which is of primary interest to pragmatists, West challenges Rorty 
with the question, "[W]hat is the difference that makes a difference 
here?" (206). And West concludes that on this,level, Rorty's 
philosophical project simply makes no difference. 
Rorty's. neopragmatism only kicks the philosophic props from 
under liberal bourgeois capitalist societies; it requires no 
change in our cultural and political practices. (206) 
In effect, then, Rorty's project for a "post-philosophical culture" is 
"an ideological endeavor to promote the basic practices of liberal 
bourgeois capitalist societies," a project which "seems innocuous" 
because of Rorty's refusal to defend such societies on metaphysical 
grounds (206). But for West, Rorty's "ethnocentric post-humanism" and 
his "historicist sense" are too nonchalantly oblivious to "the 
realities of power" and the "decline of liberalism" (207). 
West's critique of Rorty centers on the impossibility of 
"historicizing" philosophy (which Rorty does) without "politicizing" 
it (which Rorty does not) (207). One cannot, West argues, 
"demythologize philosophy" without facing up to "the complex world of 
politics and culture." Rorty's refusal to acknowledge this aspect of 
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his work points to its ultimate barrenness, despite its "rich 
possibilities." 
To undermine the privileged philosophic notions of 
necessity, universality, rationality, objectivity, and 
transcendentality without acknowledging and accenting the 
oppressive deeds done under the ideological aegis of these 
notions is to write an Intellectual and homogeneous history, 
a history which fervently attacks eplstemologlcal privilege, 
but remains relatively silent about forms of political, 
economic, racial, and sexual privilege. (208) 
Rorty's redescription of the history of philosophy is a delight 
to those "postmodern avant gardlsts" with "sophisticated antl-
epistemologlcal and anti-metaphysical tastes," while It is the scourge 
of "mainstream realists and old-style humanists." Thus, In the 
academy, where a "narrow but noteworthy" battle rages for 
institutional authority, Rorty's loyalty is admirably apparent. 
However, Vest argues that Rorty's neopragmatlsm suffers from "two 
major shortcomings," both of which stem from its lack of "historical 
and sociological perspective" and contribute to its Inadequacy in 
relation to larger ethical and political issues. These shortcomings 
are Rorty's "distrust of theory" and his "preoccupation with transient 
vocabularies" (209). 
West critiques these shortcomings by pointing to a "common vulgar 
pragmatic fallacy" which stresses consequences at the expense of 
analyzing specific historical practices. This fallacy is what 
justifies "garden, variety" attacks on pragmatism for its "crude antl-
theoretlclsm." Vest maintains, however, that a "more refined 
pragmatism" Is possible, one that continues to resist "grand theories" 
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while attending equally to both consequences and specific practices 
throu^  an appeal to "provisional and revisable" social theories and 
critiques. The goal of this more sophisticated pragmatism is 
political action aimed at achieving "certain moral consequences" 
(209). Furthermore, this refined pragmatism includes a focus on the 
mechanisms of power, including its nondiscursive forms, "such as modes 
of production, state apparatuses, and bureaucratic institutions." 
Thus while language would still be critiqued insofar as it, too, 
entails the dynamics of power, such a critique would not be considered 
a self-limiting philosophical activity. 
"The time is now past," West argues, "for empty academic 
theoreticism, professional anti-theoreticism, and complacent 'radical' 
anti-professionalism" (210). This means that any philosophy with 
purely "microinstitutional" implications is ultimately unacceptable to 
West, who insists that the crisis of the humanities cannot be 
understood if it is not placed within the context of the crisis of 
North Atlantic civilization itself. West thus envisions a new form of 
pragmatism, one which moves beyond the walls of the university and 
into the broader social arena, where it acts as a "moral and political 
weapon" against those who "rule and dominate" and for those who are 
"disadvantaged, degraded, and dejected" (210). He calls this approach 
"prophetic pragmatism," and in the final chapter of this study, I will 
explore its character more fully. But first, I want to discuss 
several other critiques of Richard Rorty's liberal pragmatism. 
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4.3. Richard Bernstein 
In May of this year, following the publication of Contlnyenev. 
Irony, and solidarity. Rorty referred (in a Chronicle of Higher 
Education interview) to his next major project, a biography of John 
Dewey, and quipped, "[Dewey's] work is about as close as I get to a 
sacred text" (Winkler 8). But while Rorty has drawn heavily on Dewey 
in recent years, his fellow Dewey scholar, Richard Bernstein, argues 
that 
. . . the disparity between [Rorty's pragmatism] and Dewey's 
primary concerns is becoming greater and greater. . . . For 
despite occasional protests to the contrary, it begins to 
look as if Rorty's defense of liberalism is little more than 
an apologia for the status quo--the very type of liberalism 
that Dewey judged to be 'Irrelevant and doomed'. ("One Step 
Forward" 541) 
Bernstein's critique centers on Rorty's essay, "The Priority of 
Democracy to Philosophy," the mood of which he contrasts with Dewey's 
1935 Liberalism and Social Action. Dewey's claim, as quoted by 
Bernstein, was that "any liberalism which is not also radicalism Is 
Irrelevant and doomed" (in Bernstein 540). Furthermore, Dewey defined 
"radicalism" in the same text as a "perception of the need for radical 
change" in "the institutional scheme of things" (540). On the other 
hand, according to Bernstein, Rorty minimizes -
. . . the disparity between the 'ideals' of liberty and 
equality that liberals profess, and the actual state of 
affairs in so-called liberal societies. (552) 
In other words, Rorty appears to believe that liberalism is 
institutionally a fait accompli. Hence Bernstein's charge that 
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Rorty's liberalism is precisely the type that Dewey characterized as 
"Irrelevant and doomed." 
Rorty's claim that the only justification needed for liberalism 
is the consensus of our particular historical community is also 
problematic for Bernstein, who, in concurrence with Alasdair 
Maclntyre, maintains that vital traditions embbdy "continuities of 
conflict" (551). Rorty, however, tends to assume the existence of a 
historical consensus that is "solid, harmonious, and coherent" (551). 
In fact, Bernstein argues, Rorty substitutes a "historical myth of the 
given" for the "epistemological myth of the given" presupposed by 
"that old-time philosophy." 
It is in this context that Bernstein points to the need to 
"unpack" just what Rorty means by "we," as in "we liberals, we 
pragmatists, we inheritors of European civilization" (553-554). This 
unpacking reveals, Bernstein argues, "conflicting tendencies" in 
Rorty's thinking. On one hand, Rorty tends, as indicated above, to 
assume an "historical myth of the given," a contention-free Inherited 
value to which he appeals while rejecting any possibility or even any 
need to justify it philosophically. On the other hand, Rorty 
demonstrates existentialist tendencies by emphasizing "our capacity 
for making and self-creation" (554). In these instances, he suggests 
that "'we' are always free to make up what a tradition means for us"; 
thus he denies, at least implicitly, that tradition has any 
"determinate content" which constrains our interpretation. In this 
latter sense, Bernstein maintains that Rorty's constant references to 
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'we' . . . appear to be hollow--little more than a label for the 
projected 'me'" (554-555). 
Bernstein also critiques Rorty on grounds similar to those used 
by such thinkers as Jûrgen Habermas to critique Foucault and Lyotard. 
The key issue here is whether or not Rorty closes off all possibility 
of meaningful social criticism, and thus performs an essentially 
conservative function. Habermas was the first to suggest, explains 
Bernstein, 
. . . that the radical credentials of so-called postmodern 
and poststrueturalist thinkers might be questioned, and that 
there were parallels between postmodern discourse and young 
conservative counterenlIghtenment discourse. . . . (555) 
This argument is disturbing to Bernstein as it relates to Rorty's 
"defense" of "postmodern bourgeois liberalism," a rhetoric which 
shares much In common with that of neoconservatism. Bernstein 
supports this criticism by pointing to Rorty's tendency to "downplay 
the significance of imperialistic policies practiced by liberal 
democracies," his refusal to question "the relation between capitalism 
and liberal democracy" and his "virtually unqualified endorsement to 
[sic] 'really existing democracy' in Western capitalist societies" 
(Footnote 27, 563). 
These and other aspects of Rorty's philosophical project 
reinforce the contrast between Dewey and Rorty with which Bernstein 
begins his essay. In Dewey's terms, Rorty's liberalism is devoid of 
radicalism in that it perceives no "necessity of thorough-going 
changes in the set-up of institutions and corresponding activity to 
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bring the changes to pass" (in Bernstein 540). Again, in Dewey's 
terms, such liberalism is "irrelevant and doomed." 
By appealing to both Dewey and Habermas, Bernstein thus charges 
that Rorty offers "little more than an ideological apoloyia for an 
old-fashioned version of cold war llberallnm dressed up in fashionable 
'postmodern' discourse" (556). Ultimately, then, according to 
Bernstein, Rorty takes "one step forward, two steps backward" (556). 
4.4. Nancy Fraser 
As indicated above, Bernstein attempts to "unpack" just what 
Rorty means by "we." Not surprisingly, several of Rorty's critics 
perceive a similar necessity. Furthermore, and significantly, many of 
the voices raised in criticism of Rorty are those which have been 
traditionally suppressed, or otherwise omitted from, mainstream 
philosophical dialogue. Cornel West, for example, speaks out of the 
Afro-American experience, which he argues has "never" been "taken 
. . . seriously" by American philosophy fProphesv Deliverance 11). In 
addition, at least three feminist philosophers (Rebecca Comay, 1987; 
Dorothy Leland, 1988; Nancy Fraser, 1988) have offered critiques of 
Rorty. Both Comay and Leland characterize Rorty's notion of "we" and 
his related emphasis on conversation as devoid of any historical and 
social differentiation or any sensitivity to asymmetrical relations of 
power. In this way, they echo concerns expressed also by West and 
Bernstein. Fraser's analysis includes similar themes, but her 
theoretical framework is unique; therefore, I will pay special 
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attention to her essay, "Solidarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty 
between Romanticism and Technocracy" (Praxis International. October, 
1988). 
Fraser's thesis Is that Rorty's books and essays "are the site of 
a struggle between ... a Romantic impulse and a pragmatic Impulse" 
(258). Moreover, she argues that this struggle ends always In stale­
mate. Within its confines, Rorty "oscillates among three different 
views of the relationship between . . . poetry and politics," which 
entail three corresponding concepts of the "social role and political 
function of Intellectuals" (258). The first view. Fraser explains, 
sees Romanticism and pragmatism as "natural partners"; the second sees 
them as antithetical; the third separates them into distinct spheres, 
the private and public. 
The Rorty who articulates the first view, which Fraser calls the 
"Invisible Hand" concept, links poetry with community and suggests 
that once the quest for objectivity is abandoned, solidarity will 
naturally be created. This is the Rorty who celebrates the "aesthetic 
attitude" and the "romance" of learning. He believes that liberal 
tolerance develops out of "an awareness" of other people's 
"vocabularies" and that such awareness is primarily erotic or 
imaginative in character. Fraser calls this approach a "version of 
the old trickle-down argument: liberty in the art fosters equality in 
society" (261). 
The Rorty who represents the second view, labeled by Fraser as 
the "Sublimity or Decency?" approach, recognizes that the creative, 
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redescrlblng "Ironise" may humiliate others and thus, in the eyes of 
the liberal, be guilty of the worst of all possible acts: cruelty. 
"Rorty now discerns a 'selfish,' anti-social motive in Romanticism, 
one that represents the very antithesis of communal identification" 
(262). This Rorty fears the "dark side" of Nietzsche and proposes 
that Deweyan pragmatic liberalism is a necessary counterweight to 
Romanticism in the interest of democratic solidarity. Here, then, 
according to Fraser, Rorty "frames the issue as Romanticism versus 
pragmatism": for the former, "the social world exists for the sake of 
the poet," whereas for the latter, "the poet exists for the sake of 
the social world" (263). Furthermore, this approach indicates that 
Rorty, whose project is to rid philosophy of objectivism, struggles 
between two alternatives to it: the Romantic understanding of 
"philosophy as metaphor" and the pragmatic understanding of 
"philosophy as politics" (262). 
The Rorty who articulates the third view--the "Partition" 
position, as Fraser calls it--has "contrived a new formulation aimed 
at letting him have it both ways" (263). His solution is to separate 
Romanticism and pragmatism into two distinct spheres, the private and 
the public. Fraser argues that Rorty's project here is to "neutralize 
the nonliberal political implications of radical thought" by denying 
that "radical thought has any political implications" (264). This is 
accomplished by casting radical thought into the preserve of 
Romanticism, the sphere of self-discovery, sublimity, and irony, and 
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keeping this sphere isolated from public life, where pragmatic social 
hope and solidarity merge inevitably in liberalism. 
Fraser sees Rorty's "Partition" approach as "extremely 
interesting" and his "most sophisticated" position thus far, but she 
also identifies it as the most seriously flawed. This position 
"stands or falls," she argues, "with the possibility of drawing a 
sharp boundary between public or private life" (264). Moreover, it 
entails an image of certain humanist intellectuals as persons who must 
be thoroughly "domesticated, cut down to size, and made fit for 
private life" (264). In other words, any thinker who speaks a 
language non-conducive to the politics of liberalism is denied any 
social or political function. 
From the perspective of a "whole range of New Left social 
movements," Fraser argues, Rorty's "Partition" position is thoroughly 
unacceptable'. These movements, she explains, have shown that the 
private-public split so dear to classical liberalism is at best 
inadequate, and at worst, pernicious. 
Workers' movements . . . especially as clarified by Marxist 
theory, have taught us that the economic is political. 
Likewise, women's movements, as illuminated by feminist 
theory, have taught us that the domestic and the personal 
are political. Finally, a whole range of New Left social 
movements, as illuminated by Gramscian, Foucaultian, and, 
yes, even by Althusserian theory, have taught us that the 
cultural, the medical, the educational . . . that all this, 
too, is political. (264-265) 
Rorty's "Partition" position. Eraser maintains, requires that these 
insights be buried and that the last one hundred years of social 
history be forgotten. It does so by relegating radical theory to a 
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"preserve where strivings for transcendence are quarantined, rendered 
safe, because rendered sterile" (266). 
Fraser Identifies two Important social consequences of Rorty's 
"domestication" of radical theory. The first Is that "there can be no 
legitimate cultural politics," no genuinely political struggle for 
cultural authority. The second Is that the link between theory and 
practice Is destroyed. The upshot, then. Is that both culture and 
theory are "depolltlclzed." Meanwhile, Rorty's politics "assumes an 
overly communitarian and solidary character" (266). 
It Is Indeed paradoxical, Fraser points out, that a thinker who 
appeals so often to the values of community and conversation should 
develop an Increasingly monologlcal position In relation to politics. 
But such Is Indeed the case with Richard Rorty, There Is simply no 
place In his political scheme for those who speak something other than 
"the language of bourgeois liberalism." Rorty's "Partition" position 
thus "cuts out the ground for the possibility of democratic radical 
politics" (267). 
In contrast to Rorty's liberal pragmatism. Fraser argues for 
"democratic-soclallst-feminlst pragmatism" and formulates a "recipe" 
to further that political end. Her literary form is chosen, she 
remarks, with some deliberation. It "has a number of advantages, not 
least of which is a certain gender resonance" (Footnote 27, 271). 
Furthermore, the "recipe" form 
. . . suggests a nontechnocratic and more genuinely 
pragmatic view of the relation between theory and practice 
since cooks are expected to vary recipes in accordance with 
148 
trial and error, inspiration, and the conjunctural state of 
the larder. Finally, the recipe form has the advantage of 
positing the outcome as a concoction rather than a system. 
(271) 
Importantly, Fraser begins her recipe with "a sort of zero-degree 
pragmatism" which she calls a "useful" but not sufficient ingredient 
for her "concoction." Like Cornel Vest and Richard Bernstein, then, 
Fraser draws on the pragmatic tradition, but finds it necessary to 
modify and supplement it in the interest of creating a theoretically-
informed radical democratic politics. 
While I do not intend to examine the rest of Fraser's "recipe" 
ingredient by ingredient, it should be pointed out here that another 
major element in her "concoction" is the Gramscian concept of the 
intellectual as one who occupies a "specifiable location[s] in social 
space, rather than as [a] free-floating individual[s] who [is] beyond 
ideology" (270). This means, she explains, that intellectuals are to 
be understood as participants with "politically-useful occupational 
skills" in the struggle for cultural authority. 
4.5. Frank Lentrlcchla 
The latter "ingredient" in Fraser's "recipe" Is of particular 
Importance to literary critic Frank Lentrlcchla, who is also critical 
of Rorty, while agreeing with (as do many of Rorty's critics) his 
antl-foundatlonallsm. In his 1983 book. Criticism and Social Change. 
Lentrlcchla writes. 
With Richard Rorty, I am ready to set aside the classical 
claim of philosophy for representational adequacy. In its 
place, I am ready to urge (Rorty is not) a materialist view 
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that theory does Its representing with a purpose. This sort 
of theory seeks not to find the foundation and the 
conditions of truth, but to exercise power for the purpose 
of social change. It says that there Is no such thing as 
eternally 'true' theory. It says that theories are 
generated only In history--no theory comes from outside--for 
the purpose of generating more history In a certain way: 
generating the history we want. (12) 
Lentrlcchla's book, as well as his 1988 essay, "The 'Life' of a 
Humanist Intellectual," centers on the sense of historical/political 
purpose, or more accurately, the lack thereof, experienced by today's 
academic humanists. In the book, Lentrlcchla applauds Rorty's 
rejection of "some natural standpoint called 'reality?" that lends 
authority to the projects of humanist Intellectuals. But he is 
critical of Rorty's stark dualism: "either ... a multi-voiced, 
uncoordinated cultural conversation or a representative 'reality' that 
demands à single discourse and a single voice" (Criticism 16). 
Missing, from Rorty's analysis, writes Lentrlcchla, is "society." 
By injecting society into Rorty's scheme, one becomes aware that the 
"conversation of culture" is not and has never been as free as Rorty 
apparently believes or wishes. The authority which both propels and 
constrains this conversation is social. Thus, "you cannot jump into 
this conversation and do what you please" (16). Not only partici­
pation in the conversation but also the character of participation 
after admittance are subject to social authority. 
Lentrlcchla argues that while Rorty celebrates the "liberal 
personal needs" honored in traditional literary culture, he does not 
address the character of the society which represses those needs and 
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their fulfillment. But on the other hand, Lentricchia Interprets 
Rorty's "critical aestheticism" as a reaction to the repressive 
character "of a culture that must toe the line of a natural 
standpoint" (17). "[0]nly if [Rorty] first believe[d] that our old 
social being [was] at the root unsatisfying," writes Lentricchia, 
would he propose the fll^ t of individuals from the "normalizing" 
culture which helped to shape that old social being. In other words, 
it is for the sake of the social that Rorty proposes "edifying" or 
"therapeutic" philosophy over against "that old-time philosophy." But 
it is far from evident, Lentricchia maintains (along with Fraser), 
that the pleasures of creativity and Imagination contribute to a new 
and better social being. In fact, Lentricchia argues that Rorty's 
stress on the original and creative plays into the hands of late 
capitalism, an economic structure wherein "the Romantic yearning for . 
the new is . . . transformed into an energetic consumerism" (18). 
According to Lentricchia, then, Rorty perceives the 
"unsatisfying" character of our "old social being" and proposes, for 
the purpose of social change, a flight into a literary culture which 
once possessed a degree of critical power, as when individuals such as 
Wordsworth employed it against early industrial capitalism. But 
Rorty's desire for solidarity, however genuine, cannot be fulfilled by 
appealing to this form of literary culture now because late capitalism 
has appropriated Romantic literary values for its own perpetuation. 
The time is simply past, Lentricchia argues, for any "critical 
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rhetoric which isolates the aesthetic from our political and social 
lives" (19). 
Rorty's vision of culture, divorced as it is from political 
power, Is "the leisured vision of liberalism: the free pursuit of 
personal growth anchored in material security" (18). This vision, 
Lentrlcchla declares, has run its course as a device of critical/ 
Utopian rhetoric. And such rhetoric is vital for those academic 
humanists who would "make a contribution to the formation of a 
community different from the one we live in" (19). 
Lentrlcchla's purpose in Criticism and Social Change is to show 
that while "not all social power is literary power . . . all literary 
power is social power" (19). This marks his point of departure from 
Rorty, who, in the final analysis, does not alleviate and even 
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contributes to the moral and political "paralysis" which grips 
humanist intellectuals and which Lentrlcchla has deplored throughout 
this decade. I will return to his general critique In the final 
section of this chapter. 
4.6. Henry Giroux 
The themes articulated by Rorty's Left-wing critics--West, 
Bernstein, Fraser, and Lentrlcchla--are similar, despite the diversity 
of their approaches. Henry Giroux, another critic of Rorty, 
summarizes these themes nicely. 
In Rorty's perspective, the Intellectual is reduced to 
simply being a somewhat privileged member of the community 
in the service of conversation, a member without a politics, 
a sense of vision, or a conscience. What is most striking 
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about Horty's view of conversation and community is the 
idealized pluralism that it supports. Treated as simply 
conventions, rather than as social practices that take place 
within asymmetrical relations of power, the notion of 
conversation is imbued with a false equality that glides 
over the issue of how specific interests and power relations 
actually structure the material and ideological conditions 
in idiich conversations are actually structured. Who is in 
the conversation? Who controls the terms of the dialogue? 
Who is left out? What interests are sustained beyond the 
abstract virtue of Socratic dialogue? Whose stories are 
distorted or marginalized? Why are some parts of the 
conversation considered more important than others? How 
does one decide between competing visions of community life 
as they are embodied in different strands of the 
conversation? (Schooling 64) 
Giroux maintains that in ignoring these questions, Rorty "provides a 
version of postmodern philosophy that is "fundamentally anti-utoplan." 
[I]t ultimately ends up offering no ethical or political 
grounds on which either to challenge the human suffering and 
contradictions inherent in modern society or to exhibit the 
moral and political courage necessary to struggle for a 
society without exploitation. (64-65) . 
Giroux's charge that Rorty offers neither a "language of hope" 
nor "a language of critique" echoes themes developed by West, 
Bernstein, Fraser, and Lentricchia, all of whom fault Rorty for 
offering--in Bernstein's phrase--"little more than an apologia for the 
status quo" (541). What Giroux identifies as Rorty's "anti-
utopianism" is related, I believe, to the charge leveled by the other 
critics discussed here that Rorty strips radical intellectuals of any 
social and political function. 
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4.7. Rorty and Camus on Human Nature 
and Utopia: A Contrast 
In this context, It seems fair to assert the following: Rorty Is 
much more concerned with what "we" who live In First-World liberal 
democracies have to lose, than he Is with what "we" might hope to 
create In the future, and for that matter, the present. "Nothing." he 
declares, "Is more Important than the preservation of these liberal 
Institutions," referring to the free press, an Independent Judiciary, 
and the modern university ("Thugs" 567). By the same token, he Is 
apparently motivated more by a fear of those who envision and attempt 
to enforce totalizing or absolute Utopias (Platonlst/Reactlonarles, 
Marxists/Leninists, Christian "reconstructlonlsts," etc.) than he Is 
by moral outrage or despair over the way things are In the 
social/political present. Add to these two related factors Rorty's 
claims that liberal conscience and culture are the accidental products 
of various historical developments and that progress can be Identified 
only In retrospect, and the Judgments of his left-wing critics seem 
fair and reasonable. 
Basic to this Issue Is Rorty's characteristically postmodern 
"decenterlng of the subject," his thorough rejection of universal 
human nature. This orientation separates his philosophical project 
from those of both his conservative and radical critics. With no 
particular human Image to nurture and defend, Rorty vexes both old-
style humanists, who charge him with nihilism and relativism, and 
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modern progressive radicals, who accuse him of conservative 
apologetics and "antl-utoplanlsm." 
Two key questions emerge here: 1) Is It possible to maintain a 
theory of human nature that does not marginalize the "other" (I.e., 
anyone who deviates theoretically)7 And, 2) Do Utopian visions 
Inevitably result in authoritarian politics? In the remainder of this 
chapter I intend to support an affirmative answer to the first of 
these questions and a negative response to the second. In so doing, I 
will indicate my own misgivings about Rorty's postmodernist project. 
While I deplore the tactics of Allan Bloom arid others who employ 
a natural metaphysics to justify elitist social and political 
projects, I am not as prepared as Rorty to reject in toto the 
existence of any universally-human qualities. For example, I find 
very persuasive the arguments of Robert Jay Lifton and Ernest Becker, 
both of whom argue that the need to transcend death is compelling and 
universal and that this need mandates immortality striving, what 
Lifton calls the "urge to maintain an inner sense of continuous . 
symbolic relation, over space and time, with . . . life" (Life of the 
Self 31). The important idea here is that the need to create 
immortality symbols is compelling and universal but the content of the 
symbols is culturally particular. Moreover, even within the same 
culture or, Indeed, within the same individual, different immortality 
symbols co-exist or struggle for significance. As Lifton and Becker 
agree, immortality striving takes various symbolic forms, some quite 
simple, such as planting a tree, others quite complex, such as 
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formulating eschatological ideologies. Furthermore, and importantly, 
the content of the symbol influences or even determines human 
behavior. 
Paul Tillich makes a similar point regarding Utopian symbols. 
For Tillich, the "Utopian spirit" springs from a universal human 
desire for wholeness and unity. In this sense, "Utopia" is synonymous 
with absolute or perfect moral unity; but the content of the Utopian 
symbol, i.e., the character of the moral unity, varies according to 
particular Ideologies and, once again, influences or determines human 
behavior. I submit that this need for wholeness and unity points 
symbolically to a moral (social and political) standard. Despair over 
the way things are is an acknowledgement of moral failure, and any 
thinker who posits some sort of corrective, however minimal, to the 
way things are is manifesting what Tillich calls the "Utopian spirit." 
In other words, to conceive of something better in relation to human 
unity Is an inherently Utopian project. 
But Just as Lifton distinguishes between the universal need for 
immortality symbols and the particular content of the symbols 
themselves, Tillich suggests that there is an important difference 
between the "Utopian spirit" which springs from a universal human need 
for wholeness and unity, and absolutized Utopias. The former, as 
Tillich points out, seeks ever new possibilities for unity, while the 
latter are inevitably defended by fanaticism and terrorism. In this 
context, Tillich writes, "It is the spirit of Utopia that conquers 
Utopia" ("Critique" 309). 
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My understanding of Rorty Is that he does not make the 
distinction elucidated in the preceding paragraph and that this 
constitutes an Important shortcoming in his work. It is one thing to 
argue that human beings do not control the consequences of their 
Utopian Intentions and another to maintain that we are not naturally 
Intentional in our search for wholeness and unity. The former points 
to a certain intellectual humanity that I find attractive. The latter 
suggests that Rorty makes no distinction between human beings and 
computers. 
Here it may be helpful to reconsider Lentrlcchia's claim that 
"only if [Rorty] first believe[d] that our old social being Is at root 
unsatisfying," would he argue so strenuously for "edifying" or 
therapeutic philosophy. In light of this condition, Lentricchla 
maintains that Rorty's project does indeed have a Utopian character, 
but one that is "curiously truncated" In that Rorty had "difficulty 
telling us why anyone should want, that is need to be edified" 
(Criticism 17). 
In the context of my argument, Rorty manifests the "Utopian 
spirit" by perceiving something better than the way things are; but 
this spirit is "truncated" by his confusion of unintended social/ 
historical consequences with the naturally intentional character of 
human beings and by his corresponding refusal to endorse specific 
social/historical change. Thus, as Lentricchla points out, "society" 
is absent from Rorty's analysis. But if, as Tllllch maintains, 
Utopian visions spring from the natural human need for unity, then 
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Utopian discourse is necessarily social. In other words, the "Utopian 
spirit" is bound to be "truncated" if new possibilities for unity are 
not actively nurtured. In fact, it seems to me that any philosophy 
which discourages the human pursuit of ever new possibilities for 
unity Is, to use Dewey's phrase, "irrelevant and doomed." 
I agree, then, with Lentrlcchia that "deep down" Rorty's 
"edifying philosophy" is Utopian in spirit insofar as Rorty recognizes 
the "unsatisfying" character of "our old social being" and hopes that 
changing the way people think will make us, as individuals, more 
tolerant, less cruel. However, his fear of absolutized Utopias 
prevents him from going further and helps to explain why "society" is 
missing from his scheme. Moreover, Rorty denies the naturally human 
"Utopian spirit," even as he manifests it. This, in turn, points to 
the limitations of his social/political criticism. Apart from his 
critique of metaphysical philosophy, he identifies no Utopian symbols 
for wholeness and unity, symbols which have been institutionalized and 
absolutized in bourgeois liberal society and which his left-wing 
critics believe also exercise harmful influence on human behavior, 
such as capitalism, nationalism, and patriarchy. Instead, as part of 
Rorty's rejection of metaphysical philosophy, he simply.denies the 
natural human need to create Utopian symbols and, consequently, 
Intentlonallty as well. The key social and political issue here is 
whether or not kind and tolerant individuals, devoid of Utopian 
intentions and confined to existing liberal institutions, could create 
kinder and more Just social arrangements. Rorty believes that they 
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could. Those to the left of him, Including Lentrlcchia, think 
otherwise. 
In the opening chapter of Criticism and Social Change. 
Lentrlcchia points to the "polemical core" of his book by referring to 
a distinction made by John Dewey and picked up by Kenneth Burke. (The 
latter is a central figure in Lentrlcchia's study.) "The 
distinction," Lentrlcchia writes, "is between 'education as a function 
of society' and 'society as a function of education'" (1). 
In the end, that is a way of dividing the world between 
those who like it and those who do not. If you are at home 
in society, you will accept it, and you will want education ' 
to perform the function of preparing the minds of the young 
and the not-so-young to maintain society's principles and 
directives. ... If you hold such a theory of education, 
you are a conservative. Insofar as you think the order 
should be reversed, that society should be a function of 
education, you are a radical, or that strange, impossible 
Utopian, the radical in reverse gear we call a reactionary. 
(To complete the picture: liberals, in this scheme, are 
nervous conservatives governed by an irresistible impulse to 
tinker, though when the chips are down, they usually find a 
way to resist their need to mess with the machine.) The 
radical of either the progressive or the nostalgic type Is 
not at home in society; the radical feels alienated and 
dispossessed. As Burke puts it; "To say that 'society' 
should be a function of 'education' is to say, in effect, 
that the principles and directives of the prevailing society 
are radically askew . . . and that education must serve to 
remake it accordingly." (1-2) 
It is, I believe, quite clear where Allan Bloom fits into the 
Oewey-Burke-Lentrlcchia distinction. Bloom, the "nostalgic radical," 
is far from "at home" in society and believes so fully in "society as 
a function of education" that he foresees the end of democracy unless 
higher education is radically changed. 
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It is also clear where Rorty's left-wing critics (including 
Lentricchia himself) fit. Their shared insistence that academic 
humanists perform a particular social and political function, that 
such individuals need to break out of their "moral paralysis" and take 
sides in a society now characterized, as West maintains, by "racism . 
. ., patriarchy . . ., class inequality . . ., state repression . . . , 
and technological abuse of nature"--these are all indicative of their 
progressive radical persuasion. 
But where does Richard Rorty fit? Insofar as one perceives his 
crusade against foundational philosophy as "tinkering" while the 
social "machine" stays intact, Rorty is a "nervous conservative," a 
liberal. But on the other hand, his reluctance, which has increased 
in this decade, to specify a relationship between philosophy and 
democracy points to his corresponding resistance to the notion of 
"society as a function of education" and thus, in the Dewey-Burke-
Lentricchia scheme, to Rorty's conservatism. Thus, it may be argued 
that he epitomizes the North American academic--skeptical and often 
irreverent when it comes to intellectual traditions but essentially 
contented with a society in which one enjoys relative prestige and 
prosperity. While 1 celebrate his advocacy of "philosophy without 
mirrors," I am troubled by the way in which Rorty reflects the image 
of the academic humanist in contemporary society, and I am challenged 
by those who would shatter that image and reform the society which 
frames it. 
160 
Left unresolved In this critique of Rorty Is the basis on which 
Institutionalized Utopian symbols may be Judged as beneficial or 
harmful. Before proceeding to the next chapter of my study, I will 
discuss this issue briefly, by means of a further comparison between 
Rorty and Camus. 
In Chapter Three I compared Richard Rorty with Albert Camus and 
indicated that one of their several similarities is the harsh 
criticism directed at both from the political left. In an earlier 
study, I argued that this criticism was not altogether Justified In 
the case of Camus (Warehlme 72). It is more difficult, if not 
impossible, for me to defend Rorty in the same way. The reason for 
this difficulty is two-fold: 1) Camus, unlike Rorty, consistently 
maintained his belief in "something" within human nature which 
"rejects the order of things" (L'Homme révolté 641), and 2) again 
unlike Rorty, Camus continually affirmed, "against the abstractions of 
history, that which transcends all history, and which is flesh . . . 
(Essais 406) (emphasis added). In other words, Camus presents a view 
of human nature which integrates the "Utopian spirit" with the 
givenness of corporeality. 
Out of this understanding, Camus develops an ethical sensibility 
which I believe is "prophetic" in character. By this I mean that, 
like the Hebrew prophets, Camus Judges history and human action within 
it in the name of the "something" which transcends history. In the 
pre-critlcal culture of ancient Israel, this "something" was Yahweh, 
who symbolized that which is immortal and commands human loyalty. In 
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CamusIan terns, this "something" is the natural human refusal to be 
reduced to an object, the corresponding rejection of "the order of 
things," and the bodily reality which remains an eternal given. For 
Camus, as for the prophets, these aspects of human life are 
inseparable, so that--as one Camus scholar puts it--"what counts as a 
criterion of action and Judgment is what happens to the lives of men 
and women regarded as the flesh and blood beings which they are" 
(Pierce 127). From this it follows that "Justice has to do with what 
happens to people's bodies" (127). 
I maintain that Camus points to a theory of human nature which 
does not marginalize "the other" and which manifests the "Utopian 
spirit" while simultaneously guarding against absolutized Utopias. 
This not only represents an important departure from Rorty (and from 
Bloom, too, of course) but also provides a basis on which ideological, 
institutionalized Utopian symbols may be Judged as beneficial or 
harmful. This basis has two parts, both of them related to the ever-
present possibility of dehumanlzatlon. Simply stated, any 
institutionalized Utopian symbol (religious, economic, nationalistic, 
etc.) which corrupts the natural human desire for new possibilities 
for unity, and smothers the natural human tendency to "reject the 
order of things" in the interest of wholeness and unity. Is inevitably 
an institution which fosters at least selective bodily Injustice 
(insofar as "the other" is marginalized). It is thus to be condemned, 
according to Camus, whose loyalty is consistently with the victims of 
such institutions. 
162 
Significantly, neither Bloom (who insists on the reality of 
universal human nature) nor Rorty (who, with equal determination, 
rejects such reality) demonstrates moral outrage with institu­
tionalized dehumanization, defined in terms of the systematic 
corruption of the Utopian spirit and the inevitably accompanying 
selective bodily injustice. Those who have encountered this 
dehumanlzation (any marginalized "other") are rightfully suspicious of 
both Bloom's and Rorty's concepts of democracy. The key philosophical 
issue for such critics is not metaphysical (Is universal human nature 
a reality?) but ethical (Which approach to shared human existence--
e.g., abstract/metaphysical, material/historical, positivistlc/ 
scientific--contributes most fully to humane social arrangements?) 
The latter is a thoroughly pragmatic question but one which requires, 
. 
as West argues, some means of crltiqueing both social/historical 
practices arid their moral consequences. 
I believe that Camus, who explicitly rejects the role of 
philosopher, nonetheless presents the starting point for such critical 
analysis. By locating human value in an essentially bodily reality, 
Camus retains--if somewhat paradoxically--what is best in postmodern 
philosophy's hlstoriclsm, while also providing a quasi-metaphysical 
grounds for social and political critique. 
In the remainder of this study, I will develop this theme more 
fully, drawing primarily on the work of Cornel West and considering 
the implications of his "prophetic pragmatism" for democracy and 
education. 
163 
But the fact Is not that the Negro has no tradition but that 
there has as yet arrived no sensibility sufficiently 
profound and tough to make this tradition articulate. For a 
tradition expresses, after all, nothing more than the long 
and painful experience of a people; It comes out of the 
battle waged to maintain their Integrity or, to put It more 
simply, out of their struggle to survive. 
-- James Baldwin (In Prophesv Deliverance 1 66) 
Ideas--religious, moral, practical, aesthetic--must, as Max 
Weber, among others, never tired of Insisting, be carried by 
powerful social groups to have powerful social effects; 
someone must revere them, celebrate them, defend them, 
impose them. They have to be institutionalized in order to 
find not Just an intellectual existence in society, but, so 
to speak, a material one as well. 
-- Clifford Geertz (The Interpretation of Cultures 314) 
If the ruling and the oppressed elements in a population, if 
those who wish to maintain the status quo and those 
concerned to make changes, had, when they became articulate, 
the same philosophy, one might well be skeptical of its 
intellectual integrity. 
-- John Dewey (In Prophesy Deliverance 1 66) 
Western civilization gained rational science from ancient 
Greece, individualism from Reformation Protestantism, and 
the ethic of social justice from the Jewish prophets of the 
Biblical era. . . . If we believe that liberalism is worth 
saving and that its contributions to the world of politics, 
economics, and ethics are unique, then must save 
liberalism £csa Itself, by adding the political, economic, 
and ethical correctives necessary for its viability. 
-- Ronald Classman (Democracy and Equality 202-204) 
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5. PROPHETIC PRAGMATISM AND EDUCATION FOR CREATIVE DEMOCRACY 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will explore various works by Cornel West, who 
shares Camus's prophetic spirit, but attempts to support its ethical 
demands much more theoretically than Camus thought possible-. West's 
critique of Rorty was treated in the preceding chapter. Here, I 
intend to consider his writing in broader context, and to present his 
"prophetic pragmatism" as a challenging and hopeful alternative to the 
philosophical and political views analyzed thus far in my study. Once 
again, the notion of cultural authority will be a central theme. 
Like Camus, West draws explicitly on his own experience and 
acknowledges its shaping- influence on his philosophical and political 
orientation. Unlike Camus, West self-consciously draws upon the 
prophetic tradition for moral sustenance, develops Marxist-informed 
theories with which to critique Western culture, and advocates 
specific political practices aimed at particular social consequences. 
5.2. Cornel West: The Prophetic Tradition 
Central to West's perspective is his role as an Afro-American 
intellectual with radical political affinities. These affinities, he 
argues, are of a piece with "prophetic Christian thought," which is 
. . . guided by a profound conception of human nature and 
human history, a persuasive picture of what one is as a 
person, what one should hope for, and how one ought to act. 
(Prophesv 16) 
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Thus, West explains, his experience in the black prophetic church is a 
major source of his philosophical and political outlook. Importantly, 
the prophetic tradition keeps faith with "the capacity of human beings 
to transform their circumstances," engages in relentless social and 
self criticism, and projects "visions, analyses, and practices of 
social freedom" ("Prophetic Tradition" 38). 
Consistent with this understanding is West's perception of his 
philosophical project as "an exercise in critical self-inventory, as a 
historical, social, and existential situating of [his] work as an 
intellectual activist, and human being" (Evasion 7). Motivated, he 
confesses, by "disenchantment with intellectual life in America" and 
by "demoralization regarding the political and cultural state of the 
country," West understands his role of humanist intellectual as 
inherently ethical and political, and his objective as one of social 
transformation (7-8). 
In addition to prophetic Christianity, West draws upon both 
progressive Marxism and pragmatism to delineate the character and 
responsibilities of "Afro-American critical thought," a delineation 
which he sees as especially important in that "American philosophy has 
never taken the Afro-American experience seriously" fProohesv 11). 
All of these traditions, he is quick to point out, are vulnerable to 
vulgarization and distortion and, in fact, have been historically 
subjected to such on a grand scale. Nevertheless, he perceives each 
of the three as a vital contribution to "the last humane hope for 
humankind" in view of the profound "International and domestic crises 
166 
we now face" (Prophesy 96; Evasion 8). In the following section of 
this chapter, I will discuss West's analysis of these three 
philosophical traditions, their common ethical, cultural, and 
political concerns, and their implications for intellectual life in 
the interest of creative democracy. 
5.3. Prophesy Deliverance!: Sources and Tasks 
of Afro-American Critical Thought 
West's most thorough discussions of prophetic Christianity, 
progressive Marxism, and American pragmatism are contained in two 
books: Prophesy Deliverance 1 (1982) and The American Evasion of 
Philosophy (1989). In the former, he spells out the "sources and 
tasks of Afro-American critical thought" (15-24). Importantly, West 
identifies prophetic Christianity and pragmatism as the two dominant 
sources of such thought, while a "dialogical encounter" with 
progressive Marxist social analysis is named as a vital task. In the 
1989 book. West weaves the three traditions into a form of cultural 
critique which he calls "prophetic pragmatism." My discussion will 
draw from both of these publications, as well as from a few shorter 
pieces. 
As indicated above, the first dominant source of Afro-American 
critical thought identified by West is prophetic Christianity, at the 
core of which is the conviction that "every individual . . . should 
have the opportunity to fulfill his or her potentialities" (Prophesy 
16). A belief in the equal worth of all persons before a transcendent 
God contributes to a radical egalitarianism and to a staunch 
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commitment to the dignity of all persons. The prophetic concept of 
dignity, furthermore, Is Inseparable from a belief In the common human 
"ability to contradict what Is, to change . . . and to act In the 
light of that which Is not-yet" (17). Decision, commitment, 
engagement, and action are thus central values. However, this concept 
of human dignity Is held In dialectical tension with a notion of human 
depravity, defined by West as the "proclivity to cling to the moment, 
to refuse to transform and be transformed" (17). Thus, while "the 
furtherance of the uncertain quest for human freedom" Is a historical 
good, absolute perfection is an impossibility. 
According to West, the prophetic ideal of freedom is two-fold: 
existential and social. The former is that which sustains individuals 
through personal crises (death, despair) and empowers them for social 
freedom, the aim of prophetic collective practice. Related to both 
kinds of freedom is the concept of democracy, which is of a piece with 
the prophetic commitment to "the self-realization of human 
individuality within community" (18-19). Moreover, the meaning of 
democracy is linked with the notion of dignity, the potential for 
"human betterment." Thus, West explains, the prophetic dialectic of 
human nature and history makes democracy "necessary and possible," 
while the praxis of imperfect human beings makes it "desirable and 
realizable" (19). 
West maintains, then, that prophetic Afro-American Christian 
thought concentrates not only on "the existential anxiety, political 
oppression, economic exploitation, and social degradation of human 
168 
beings,"' but simultaneously on human possibility, the potential to 
transform "prevailing realities" and to create "that which is not-
yet." In this way, such thought is characterized by an awareness of 
the tragedy of human history but also by a dedication to "the struggle 
for freedom and the spirit of hope" (19-20). 
The second source of Afro-American critical thought named by West 
is American pragmatism, especially the work of John Dewey, who 
"recognized that philosophy is inextricably bound to culture, society, 
and history" (20). Critical interpretation of the past and critical 
scrutiny of earlier interpretations in the light of present experience 
are thus the central activities of pragmatism, while its objective is 
to solve "specific problems presently confronting the cultural way of 
life from which people come" (20). For pragmatlsts, the pursuit of 
knowledge is transformed from "a private affair" into a communal 
inquiry, and knowledge claims are secured by social practice rather 
than "the purely mental activity of an individual subject" (20-21). 
Furthermore, dlaloglcal interpretation of "prevailing communal 
practices" is directed toward transformation of "existing realities." 
Importantly, because no social norm, premise, or procedure is 
understood as the consequence of some objective order of things, 
pragmatism demythologizes "the myth of the given" (20-21). The 
process of communal dialogue is perennial, self-correcting, and guided 
not by "the quest for certainty" but rather by "moral convictions" and 
the "search for desirable and realizable historical possibilities" 
(21). 
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While West Is generally admiring of pragmatism, he also points to 
Its major shortcomings: 
. . . Its relative neglect of the self. Its refusal to take 
class struggle seriously, and Its veneration of scientific 
method and the practices of the scientific community. (21) 
In view of these shortcomings, pragmatism needs prophetic 
Christianity's emphasis on "the uniqueness of human personality." 
Furthermore, both pragmatism and prophetic Christianity require the 
additional awareness that is made possible by progressive (not 
orthodox or scientific) Marxist social analysis. This additional 
awareness is two-fold: "the centrality of the class struggle, and the 
political dimensions of knowledge" (21). 
Thus, a major task for Afro-American critical thought is to enter 
into dialogue with progressive Marxism. This dialogue begins with the 
recognition of a "fundamental similarity" shared by progressive -
Marxism, prophetic Christianity, and critically-modified pragmatism: 
. . . commitment to the negation of what is, and the 
transformation of prevailing realities in the light of the 
norms of individuality and democracy. (101) 
The major contribution of progressive Marxism to Afro-American 
critical thought is a theoretical means to critique late capitalist 
society, "the way in which the existing system of production and the 
social structure relate to black oppression and exploitation" (111). 
Such a theoretical framework is necessary, writes West, for "the 
emergence of any substantive political program or social vision" 
(111). 
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Without a Marxist-Informed theoretical approach, notions of 
racial liberation consist simply "of Including black people within the 
mainstream of liberal capitalist America." Such notions thus equate 
"liberation" with "middle-class status" rather than with tangible 
participation "in the decision-making processes that regulate 
[people's] lives" (112). These notions, then, are grossly Inadequate. 
For West, 
[d]emocratlc control over the institutions in the productive 
and political processes in order for them to satisfy human 
needs and protect personal liberties of the populace 
constitutes human liberation. (112) 
In other words, without a social theory which clarifies "what people 
must be liberated from," Afro-American critical thought cannot 
"present an idea of liberation with socioeconomic content" (111-112). 
And liberation without such content is not genuine liberation at all 
because It lacks any meaningful understanding of what constitutes 
power and powerlessness in American society. 
A middle-class salary, West contends, is not synonymous with 
social power. Rather, as Marxist social theory shows, 
[plower in modern industrial society consists of a group's 
participation in the decision-making processes of the major 
institutions that affect their destinies. . . . Only 
collective power over the major Institutions of society 
[institutions of production and production flow] constitutes 
genuine power on behalf of the people. (114) 
In liberal capitalist America, however, such institutions are largely 
controlled by 
. . . multinational corporations that monopolize production 
in the marketplace and prosper partially because of . . . 
public support in the form of government subsidies, free 
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technological equipment, lucrative contracts, and sometimes 
even direct transfer payments. (113) 
While racism intensifies the powerlessness of Afro-Americans, it 
does not, in and of itself, create such powerlessness. Indeed, the 
vast majority of American citizens share the same impotence in that 
[t]hey have no substantive control over their lives, little 
participation in the decision-making process of the major 
institutions that regulate their lives. (114-115) 
Despite his contention that Afro-American critical thought devoid 
of Marxist social theory is inadequate. West is far from an orthodox 
or vulgar Marxist, i.e., he does not believe that social oppression 
can be fully accounted for in the traditional terms of class analysis. 
Rather, he maintains that "cultural and religious attitudes, values, 
and sensibilities have a life and logic of their own" (116). Here, 
then, he appeals to the cultural analysis of Antonio Gramsci (whose 
work I discussed in the context of Stanley Aronowitz's critique of 
Bloom). 
West calls Gramsci "the most penetrating Marxist theorist of 
culture in this century" (118). For Gramsci, West explains, "class 
struggle is not simply the battle between . . . owners and producers 
in the work situation." Rather, 
[i]t also takes the form of cultural and religious conflicts 
over which attitudes, values, and beliefs will dominate the 
thought and behavior of people. (119) 
The subtlety of this conflict becomes apparent when one realizes that 
no society or state is sustained exclusively by force; rather, every 
society requires the legitimation that is formed in the cultural arena 
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where "everyday life is felt, outlooks formed, and self-images 
adopted" (119). The dominant cluster of these images, sensibilities 
and ideas "supports and sanctions the existing order," thus exercising 
what Gransci calls "hegemony" over other oppositional cultural 
attitudes, which exist subterraneously or marginally. A "hegemonic 
culture" thrives as long as it can perpetuate its own self-
legitimation. But such a culture begins to crumble when previously 
buried or peripheral attitudes and sensibilities capture the hearts 
and minds of greater numbers of people. 
5.4. Plato's Republic and Gramsci's 
Theory of Cultural Hegemony 
To illustrate Gramsci's theory more concretely, I will draw upon 
various examples. The first not only underscores Gramsci's cultural 
analysis but also indicates both its Platonic roots as well as its 
affinity with pragmatism. Recall if you will Book II of The Republic, 
in which Socrates and Adeimantus discuss the divine image which will 
be permitted in the education of the guardians. Unlike modern 
philosophers of religion, Plato's Socrates is not concerned with 
proving the existence of God. But he is quite sensitive to an issue 
that contemporary liberation theologians also stress in their 
literature, i.e., the divine image present within society and its 
effects on the attitudes and behaviors of persons. The young 
potential guardians must not, Socrates tells Adeimantus, "take into 
their souls opinions for the most part opposite to those we'll suppose 
they must have when they are grown up" (377b). For this reason, the 
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poetic Images of "what gods and heroes are like" must be consistent 
with models determined by the founders of the city. When Adeimantus 
asks what these appropriate models are, Socrates responds that "the 
god must surely always be described such as he is" (379a). To which, 
the almost ever-obliging Adeimantus simply replies, "Of course." 
What follows from this point might be described as both 
theological rationalism and propaganda formulation. The eternal and 
thoroughly good nature of the god[s] is determined, and the necessity 
of censoring any poetic representation which does not concur with this 
orthodoxy is agreed upon. Acceptable models of representation are 
developed. For example, when humans are punished by the god in a 
poet's tale, it must be because they (the humans) "needed punishment 
and ... in paying the penalty they were benefited by the god" 
(380b). The god, however, is not all-powerful but, rather, eternally 
capable only of good. For "the bad things, some other causes must be 
sought" (379a). Lastly, the god "will not lie, either in speech or 
deed" (382a). 
The pedagogical purpose of this divine image is to nurture within 
the guardians certain attitudes and behaviors. (Plato's Socrates is a 
pragmatist; his intent, at least at this particular moment, is not to 
provide metaphysical proofs but to create harmonious social order. He 
is interested in effects.) While Socrates is not explicit in this 
section about the content of the desired attitudes and behaviors, he 
does conclude that the aim Is to make the guardians "god-fearing and 
divine Insofar as a human being can possible be" (383c). While this 
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appears to be a noble end, Its implications are somewhat ambiguous, as 
I shall now attempt to Illustrate. 
The duty of the philosopher-king, chosen from among the ranks of 
the most god-like humans, the guardians, is to preserve the stability 
and security of the ideal city. For this end, he is extended a 
considerable degree of latitude--in fact, ultimately far more latitude 
than the god whose image has informed his attitudes and behaviors. 
For instance, while the god "is altogether simple and true in deed and 
speech and doesn.' t change or deceive others, " the philosopher king may 
lie and deceive as needed in the interest of an orderly state. 
And how is this contradictory action justified? How will the 
philosopher-king's fellow citizens be convinced that their ruler's 
most ungodly behavior is nonetheless good and Just? For this, 
Socrates must resort to myth-making, must persuade the citizens of the . 
republic that its social arrangement was created by the god. That the 
social arrangement of the city is the consequence of a metaphysical 
order is precisely the "lie" needed to maintain the authority of the 
philosopher-king. This lie is reinforced by the divine image which is 
to be allowed in the city, for it is the god who fashions the rulers 
(by mixing in gold at their birth), and the other lesser citizens (by 
mixing in iron, bronze, or silver). Since the god--"such as he is"--
can do only good, the resulting social order is good. 
The Republic shows how hegemony works. It illustrates Grams.ci's 
claim that "[e]very relationship of hegemony is necessarily an 
educational relationship" (Notebooks 350). Plato's Socrates knows 
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that once the status quo Is established, it must be protected, and 
Plato is quite willing to reveal the necessary cultural means. If a 
Just society is synonymous with an orderly, stable, and rigidly 
hierarchical society, such means are acceptable. But Plato, of 
course, was no democrat. 
5,5. Prophetic Discourse: A Language of Critique 
and a Language of Hope 
Consider now another divine image, that of the Hebrew prophets. 
Like the god-image sanctioned by Socrates, the god of the prophets is 
also good and Just. But these terms take on altogether different 
meanings in the prophetic tradition. For the prophets, Yahweh's 
goodness and Justice are characterized most fully by an ultimate 
compassion. In other words, Yahweh experiences what Abraham Joshua 
Heschel refers to as "divine pathos" in response to the suffering of 
human beings'. The prophet's god is not omnipotent, but often stands 
powerless in the face of human evil, an evil which is manifested in 
the absence of goodness and Justice, or--stated another way--in the 
human failure to experience and practice compassion. 
Human beings thus fall short of the prophetic image of goodness, 
which is symbolized in the image of Yahweh as a supremely 
compassionate god. Moreover, although Yahweh's compassion is for all 
of creation, it Is most fully described in relation to socially 
degraded persons--the poor, the afflicted, widows, orphans, strangers. 
Yahweh's perfect compassion thus sets the standard for Justice and 
entails the basis for social criticism. In other words, the society 
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of Israel is Judged by the prophets (in the name of Yahweh) as just or 
unjust depending on its sensitivity and response to human degradation, 
its compassion for the powerless. Furthermore, and importantly, 
compassion is described in relation to a material reality, the human 
need for food, clothing, shelter, which is inseparable from a central 
concern for human value and dignity. 
The specific demands of Yahweh are spelled out in Leviticus 25, 
which has to do with the material character of the Israelite society. 
Each person is to have the security of land and family. There shall 
be no slavery, and persons who meet misfortune are to be maintained by 
the community with gifts of food and interest-free loans. In no 
instance is human misfortune to be exploited for profit. Against this 
backdrop, the prophetic tradition was bom, for whenever Israelite 
society deviated from the norms presented in Leviticus 25, the 
prophet's voice was raised in protest. 
In addition to voicing Yahweh's moral demands, the prophets 
insist on his supreme value in relation to all that is human. No 
idea, person, or society stands above Yahweh, and to attempt to do so 
is to commit the worst of sins. All that is human is subordinate to 
Yahweh and only to Yahweh; all are equal in this relationship, and all 
are obligated by virtue of it. Therefore, when the kings of Israel 
begin to interpret their status as "messiah" and their nation's status 
as god's "chosen" in a way that positions human importance above 
Yahweh, disaster is imminent. When the rich "trample upon the needy 
. . . and buy the poor for silver" (Amos 8:4-6), the society has 
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failed Its moral obligation, and when "wise men" glory in their wisdom 
but fall to practice compassion, "what wisdom is there in them" 
(Jeremiah 8:9)7 
The prophets, it should be pointed out, want hegemonic status. 
They want to educate their society, to mold it in a certain way, by 
instilling particular attitudes and behaviors. But while there always 
exists a potential for prophetic justice, there is also something 
which always works against it (as Gomel West indicates). Thus the 
prophetic model itself reveals the impossibility of prophetic 
hegemony. Prophetic discourse remains perpetually a language of 
critique and a language of hope. 
5.6. A Prophetic Unmasking of Platonlst Hegemonic Culture: 
Martin Luther King's "Letter From Birmingham Jail" 
The character of and struggle for cultural hegemony (or 
authority) is also apparent in the civil rights movement. A poignant 
example is Martin Luther King's "Letter from Birmingham Jail." 
I have traveled the length and breadth of Alabama, 
Mississippi and all the other southern states. On 
sweltering summer days and crisp autumn mornings I have 
looked at the South's beautiful churches with their lofty 
spires pointing heavenward. I have beheld the impressive 
religious-education buildings. Over and over I have found 
myself asking: "What kind of people worship here? Who is 
their God? Where were their voices when the lips of 
Goveimor Barnett dripped with words of interposition and 
nullification? Where were they when Governor Wallace gave a 
clarion call for defiance and hatred? Where were their 
voices of support when bruised and weary Negro men and women 
decided to rise from the dark dungeons of complacency to the 
bright hills of creative protest? (90-91) 
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King ponders the attitudes and behaviors of persons who would have 
barred him or any other Black from entering the doors of their 
churches, Inside of which they worshipped a god that he did not know; 
the attitudes and behaviors of persons who donned white robes on 
Saturday nl^ t, and black choir robes on Sunday morning; the attitudes 
and behaviors of persons who claimed loyalty to the same gospel as he 
and yet refused "to set at liberty those who are oppressed" (Luke 
4:18). 
I submit that what King recognizes Is the power of Platonlst 
hegemony to mask sdclal/ethlcal contradictions. To Illustrate this 
point, I will draw upon Vest's "genealogy of racism" (Prophesy 
Deliverance t) which shows how the classical concepts of beauty and 
Enll^ tenment science together have exercised hegemony in the modern 
West, I.e., have merged to legitimate racism In an "enlightened" 
culture. 
5.7. West's Genealogy of Racism: 
A Confirmation of Gramscl's Theory 
"The notion that black people are human beings Is a relatively 
new discovery In the modern West," West declares. 
The Idea of black equality In beauty, culture, and 
intellectual capacity remains problematic and controversial 
within prestigious halls of learning and sophisticated 
intellectual circles. The Afro-American encounter with the 
modern world has been shaped first and foremost by the 
doctrine of white supremacy, which is embodied in 
institutional practices and enacted in everyday folkways 
under varying circumstances and evolving conditions. 
(Prophesy 47) 
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For West, the legitimation of racism in modern history proceeded out 
of the uniquely Western "quest for truth and knowledge" and the 
particular logic which characterized and guided this quest. 
Scientific research principles, Cartesian epistemology, and classical 
aesthetic ideals were fused in the quest, which produced distinctive 
forms of "rationality, scientificity, and objectivity" (47). These 
forms were highly successful in perpetuating their own legitimacy, and 
in simultaneously prohibiting "the . . . legitimacy of the idea of 
black equality in beauty, culture, and Intellectual capacity" (48). 
In other words. West maintains that "the structure of modern 
discourse," i.e., the "controlling metaphors, notions, categories, and 
norms" that have shaped (and continue to shape) Western conceptions of 
truth and knowledge, was determined by the self-legitimating claims of 
Enlightenment science and philosophy, together with the modern revival 
of the classical ideals of beauty, proportion, and moderation. 
The scientific revolution, West explains, "set the framework for 
the advent of modernity" by bringing together two ideas associated 
with research, namely, observation and evidence, and establishing them 
as the dominant paradigm of knowledge (50). These research principles 
and their related concepts such as hypothesis, inference, 
verification, etc., still undergird the authority of science. Francis 
Bacon and Rene Descartes, particularly the latter, contributed to this 
authority by providing a theoretical basis for its legitimacy. 
Descartes' project was to prove 
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. . . that the fruits of scientific research do not merely 
provide more useful ways for humans to cone with reality; 
such research also yields a true copy of reality. (51) 
Hence the link between modern science and Cartesian epistemology, a 
link which depended largely on and renewed the legitimacy of "Greek 
ocular metaphors" (such as "Mind as Mirror of Nature" and "Eye of the 
Mind"). 
To this fusion of science and philosophy West adds the modern 
recovery of classical antiquity, with what he calls its "normative 
gaze." By this he means "an ideal from which to order and compare 
observations" (53-54). Classical aesthetic norms and the scientific 
aims of observation, comparison, and measurement thus provided the 
synthesis upon which modern discourse developed. One of the first 
developments was a new authoritative discipline, natural history, 
which classified animal and human bodies according to visible 
characteristics. "These characteristics permit one to discern 
identity and difference, equality and inequality, beauty and ugliness 
. . ." (55). 
Borrowing from both Michel Foucault and Ashley Montagu, West 
argues that the "descriptive, representational, order-imposing alms of 
natural history" led to the very concept of race (55). Moreover, the 
"normative gaze" of the classical revival led to evaluation, and, 
thus, to an "implicit hierarchy" which ranked--on a scale presumed to 
be objective--the superior visage and character of white Europeans. 
Quoting from and summarizing the records of early naturalists 
Francois Bemler, Carolus Linnaeus, and Georges Louis Leclerc de 
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Buffon, West reveals their common tendency to view "Homo Europaeus" as 
the human norm. Buff on, for example, held that white was "the real 
and natural color of man" and that persons of other colors were 
"variations." He did allow, however, that "[t]he unfortunate negroes 
. . . possess the seeds of every human virtue" and thus classified 
them within the human species (in West, 57). The descriptions of 
Linnaeus are also telling. Europeans, for example, are "gentle, 
acute, and inventive"; Africans are "crafty, indolent, negligent" (in 
West, 56). Moreover, Linnaeus apparently thought it appropriate to 
include remarks concerning the physique of African women, but not of 
Europeans, Americans, or Asians. And in the 1750s, when he theorized 
about the "hybridization of species," he restricted such unions to 
black women and male apes (56). 
With the emergence of new disciplines connected with anthropology 
(phrenology and physiognomy), the European value-laden character of 
"scientific" observations became even more apparent. The Dutch 
anatomist, Fieter Camper, argued that "a beautiful face, beautiful 
body, beautiful nature, beautiful character, and beautiful soul were 
inseparable" (58). Associated with this claim was his chief 
"discovery," the "facial angle," which among Europeans averaged 97 
degrees (relative to the ideal 100 degrees of ancient Greek 
sculpture), and which measured between 60 and 70 degrees for blacks, 
closer to the angle of apes and dogs (58). Even Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach, who explicitly opposed hierarchical racial ranking, 
praised the "symmetrical face" as the most beautiful "because it 
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approximated the 'divine' works of Greek art . . . specifically the 
proper anatomical proportions found In Greek sculpture" (57). 
West Indicates that many major thinkers of the Enlightenment 
(Including Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Kant, and Jefferson) 
. . . not merely held racist views, [but] also uncritically 
--during this age of criticism--believed that the authority 
for these views rested in the domain of naturalists, 
anthropologists, physiognomists, and phrenologists. (61) 
Voltaire, for example, announced that 
. . . the Negro race is a species of men as different from 
ours as the breed of spaniels is from that of greyhounds. 
. . . [tjheir understanding ... is greatly Inferior. They 
are not capable of any great application or association of 
ideas. . . . (61-62) 
Meanwhile, Hume judged "the negroes, and in general all the other 
species of men" to be "naturally Inferior to the whites," a claim he 
supported by pointing out that all civilization is the achievement of 
those with white complexion (62). 
Kant, following Hume, maintained that the difference between 
blacks and whites "appears to be as great in regard to mental 
capacities as in color," and wrote in a letter to an acquaintance who 
had reported to him the advice of a black person: 
It may be that there was something in this which perhaps 
deserved to be considered; but in short, this fellow was 
quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he 
said was stupid, (in West, 63) 
Finally, Jefferson determined that he could 
[n]ever . , . find that a black had uttered a thought above 
the level of plain narration; never see even an elementary 
trait of painting or sculpture, (in West, 62) 
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From his "genealogy of modern racism," West concludes that 
. . . the everyday life of black people is shaped not simply 
by the exploitative (oligopolistic) capitalist system of 
production, but also by cultural attitudes and sensi­
bilities. . . . (65) 
Although West does not specify a connection between his "genealogy" 
and Gramsci's notion of cultural hegemony, I believe that the former's 
inquiry is a poignant confirmation of the latter's theory. The 
cultural authority of science, Cartesian epistemology, and 
neoclassical aesthetic norms determined the character of the ideas and 
values of Enlightenment intellectuals and masked social/ethical 
contradictions which seem blatantly obvious in retrospect. 
Furthermore, as West points out, the "concrete effects" of the 
"structure of modern discourse" 
. continue to haunt the modem West: on the 
nondiscursive level, in ghetto streets, and on the 
discursive level, in methodological assumptions in the 
disciplines of the humanities. (48) 
5.8. Cultural Hegemony and Humanities Education 
If I understand him correctly, West alludes here to the profes-
sionalization and specialization of the modern humanities, which 
reflects the hegemony of scientific research principles, and to the 
ethnocentrism of the canon, which reflects the hegemony of white male 
European values and interests. This in turn points to the special 
problems encountered by Afro-American (and by inference, by anyone 
other than white male) humanist intellectuals who might challenge 
institutional norms. Furthermore, his argument points to the 
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seemingly Insurmountable hurdles faced by anv oppositional or 
"counter•hegemonic" intellectual (white males included) whose 
objective is social criticism and transformation. On one hand, the 
postmodern emphasis on the contingency of language, which forms the 
basis of West's genealogy of racism, is itself a double-edged sword, 
in that it renders suspect the possibility of meaningful cultural 
critique. On the other hand, an entrenched structure of discrete 
academic disciplines precludes the necessary cooperative engagement of 
those who might challenge the cultural authority which supports 
various social practices, traditions, and structures. 
This apparent deadlock, this crisis which affects not only the 
academy but, in West's estimation, the quality of human life 
throu^ out Western society, is related at its core to the possibility 
-or lack thereof--of human agency, both individual and collective, 
i.e., the human capacity to envision new forms of democratic 
solidarity, to critique forces which obstruct that end, and to work 
with both determination and humility for social transformation. The 
crucial and unavoidable question for many humanist intellectuals is 
whether or not the academy provides a setting which fosters (or even 
permits) the search for new possibilities and the effectual criticism 
of forces which thwart those possibilities. 
West himself has addressed this issue throughout the 1980s, not 
only in his books, but also in such radical nonacademic journals as 
Christianity and Crisis and Zeta Magazine. While his inquiry is most 
often directed specifically toward the intellectual and political 
185 
crisis of Black America, he consistently argues that this crisis 
differs in intensity, but not in kind, from that facing the country as 
a whole. The need for genuine prophetic consciousness thus transcends 
race. For whites, blacks and other nonwhites alike, 
[w]ithout a vibrant tradition of resistance for new 
generations, there can be no collective and critical 
consciousness--only professional conscientiousness. Without 
a vital community with precious ethical and religious 
ideals, there can be nor moral commitment--only personal 
accomplishment. Without a credible sense of political 
struggle, there can be no courageous engagement--only 
cautious adjustment. ("The Crisis . . .", Zeta 23) 
The current decay in Intellectual and political life, West believes, ' 
is more marked in the case of black humanist intellectuals than in 
that of whites, but the processes which characterize this decay are 
the same : 
. . . the professlonalization and specialization of 
knowledge, the bureaucratization of the academy, the 
proliferation of arcane Jargon in the various disciplines, 
and the marginalization of humanistic studies. (24) 
Applying to Black America an argument similar to Russell Jacoby's 
in The Last Intellectual. West laments: 
For DuBois, the glorious life of the mind was a highly 
disciplined way of life and an Intensely demanding way of 
struggle that facilitated transit between his study and the 
streets; whereas present-day Black scholars tend to be more 
academicians, narrowly confined to specialized disciplines 
with little sense of the broader life of the mind and hardly 
any engagement with battles in the streets. (24) 
Meanwhile, "the plight of the wretched of the earth deteriorates" 
(25). 
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5.9. What, Then, Is To Be Done? Prophetic Pragmatism, 
Traditions of Resistance, and Democracy 
Most recently, West has advocated a form of cultural criticism 
which he calls "prophetic orapnatism" (Evasion 211 ff.). Like Rorty, 
West returns to the pragmatic tradition, which is still, he argues, 
"the most influential stream in American thought" (212). But unlike 
Rorty, West envisions an explicitly political mode of criticism aimed 
at "promoting . . . creative democracy by means of critical 
intelligence and social action" (212). 
For West, the "American evasion of philosophy" is a healthy 
rejection of Cartesian and Kantian eplstemology, a rejection which 
began with Emerson, and is apparent in the works of such diverse 
thinkers as C. Wright Mills, Reinhold Niebuhr, and W. E. B. DuBols, as 
well as Dewey, Pierce, and James. This rejection. West maintains, 
constituted "an assertion of the primacy of power-laden people's 
opinion fdoxa) over value-free philosopher's knowledge (eolsteme)" 
(212). 
Thus, North American intellectuals have at their disposal a 
philosophical tradition with rich political substance. This tradition 
does not require the elimination of professional elites, but it holds 
them accountable in a way in which they are not when "human potential 
and participation are suppressed in the name of . . . truth and 
knowledge" (212-213). This accountability points to the concept of 
democracy advocated by Benjamin Barber (and John Dewey before him), a 
form of "human relations" (Strong Democracy xii). Moreover, it points 
187 
to the need for "oppositional consciousness," which in turn requires 
the sustenance of traditions of resistance and struggle. Without such 
oppositional consciousness, the notion of accountability is empty. 
Here it is appropriate to contrast West with such thinkers as 
Bennett and Bloom, who would also like to hold academic humanists 
accountable in the interest of democracy. West shows that holding 
academic humanists accountable to reproduce platonist hegemonic 
culture lends itself not to democracy, but to a mind controlling 
blindness to the* social/ethical contradictions within that culture. 
Genuine democracy depends on dissent, which depends on oppositional 
consciousness, which depends on a sustained tradition of resistance, 
which depends on live "counter-hegemonic" communities. If the 
academic humanities are not--even cannot be--such communities under 
existing social, and political conditions, then they are decidedly 
anti-democratic. This, of course, points to the crisis of conscience 
experienced by academic humanists who are devoted to the value claims 
of the life of the mind, to the preciousness of the individual person, 
and to humane and just socioeconomic arrangements--a crisis aggravated 
by the fact that advanced industrial society offers few outlets for 
intellectual life, especially of the humanist variety, apart from the 
academy. 
The implications of West's work for humanist intellectuals are 
many, but they spring from one central imperative, that of situating 
humanities education within political context. This means recognizing 
the humanities as a cultural battleground, a site of political 
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struggle. Ironically, those who acknowledge this struggle are those 
who are most likely to be barred from participating In It. Thus, the 
battle seems to be won by those who deny Its existence. Furthermore, 
the structure and values of the modem university constantly threaten 
to co-opt even those politically-aware Individuals who gain access to 
the field. Such persons, as West argues, often end up "espousing 
rhetorics of oppositional politics of little seriousness and 
Integrity" while "thriving on a self-serving careerlsm" (Evasion 7). 
In view of this threat, West maintains that the self-consciously 
political prophetic humanist must turn for existential sustenance to 
organizations and associations outside of the academy. He/She must 
attempt to facilitate "alliances and coalitions across racial, gender, 
class, and religious lines" for the purpose of contributing to a 
"culture of creative democracy in which the plight of the wretched of 
the earth is alleviated" (235). 
West, it should be noted, is not at all optimistic about the 
chances for his project's success. As a member of an elite corps of 
ivy-league intellectuals (now at Princeton), he is nonetheless beset 
by "disenchantment" and "demoralization." His own existential 
nourishment flows, he acknowledges, from black prophetic Christianity. 
That tradition "holds at bay the sheer absurdity of life, without 
erasing or eliding the tragedy of life." Without such an enabling 
tradition, he writes, one risks "actual insanity" (233). 
For those who are not sustained by such a tradition, the state of 
contemporary culture is even more demoralizing. This in itself 
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underscores the Importance of West's message--the vital need for 
humanist Intellectuals to recover and transmit traditions of 
resistance and hope. As Rorty would be quick to point out, there Is 
still adequate space within the academy for this activity to take 
place, even If It must be done by relatively Isolated Individuals. 
And even thou^ , as West admits, such an endeavor may seem little more 
than "an Impotent moral gesture," nevertheless he adds, "In the heat 
of battle, we have no other choice but to fight" (8). 
West's work In this decade, along with that of others who share 
his ethical and political sensibilities, points to a few practical 
measures that "disenchanted" academic humanists may take, given the 
existing structure of the university. Recovering and transmitting 
traditions of resistance and hope plus uniting oneself with grass 
roots associations outside of the academy are two of these measures. 
They are first steps toward overcoming what Lentricchla refers to as 
the particular "moral paralysis" of humanist intellectuals ("The 
'Life' . . ."30). 
5.10. Education for Creative Democracy: 
A Possibility in Today's University? 
In the remainder of my study, I will consider one other practical 
measure for use within the existing academic structure, proposed by 
literary theorist Gerald Graff, as well as discuss the view, expressed 
most clearly in an essay by Henry Giroux et al., that meaningful 
prophetic action cannot occur in the university as it is presently 
structured. 
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In a 1988 essay entitled "Teach the Conflicts: An Alternative 
to Educational Fundamentalism," Gerald Graff develops themes suggested 
in his book Professing Literature, which is a history of the academic 
humanities in America. In the latter, Graff argues that the 
conservative notion of a cultural and educational consensus which 
existed until very recently is a historical myth. In his more recent 
essay, he points out that reviving Spencer's question, "What knowledge 
is of most worth?" is certainly a good thing to do, but he argues that 
this question is not--and seldom has been--one that lends itself to a 
consensual answer. In fact, based on his research for the above book, 
Graff maintains that 
[w]hen the university did enjoy a relative consensus on ends 
and values, this was only because it excluded or 
subordinated major segments of the population (Jews, 
nonwhites, women, and others). ("Conflicts" 102) 
This being the case, Graff advocates a careful distinction between 
consensus and coherence, or put another way, among various models of 
consensus. He asks, 
If the ideological conflicts in the humanities are unlikely 
to eventuate in a common content for education, why not try 
to make these conflicts themselves the basis for a more 
coherent study of culture? Why not look at ideological and 
methodological disagreement as a potential opportunity 
instead of a paralyzing condition to be cured? (105) 
In other words, Graff calls for an approach to the humanities which 
would "help students to see what is at stake in the professional and 
cultural conflicts that surround them" (106). This, in turn, requires 
a "more collective model of teaching and learning," a model aimed at 
helping students to "correlate and contextualIze" whatever material 
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they encounter (107). This model would entail abandoning the search 
for a contrived Ideological consensus, and Instead, "teaching the 
conflicts," as well as their history. 
Graff argues further that this more collective approach can take 
place within the existing academic structure. Whether or not he is 
correct, it seems to me that his ideas are worth considering. Put 
into action, they would serve the purpose of "making the pedagogical 
more political and the political more pedagogical," to use the 
Aronowitz and Glroux phrase (Education Under Siege 36). In other 
words, Graff's approach would raise the political consciousness of 
students by introducing them to the cultural/political conflicts 
inherent within the university, particularly the humanities. Thus, in 
addition to being a thoroughly democratic approach to teaching and 
learning, Graff's model contains the potential to nurture political 
participation on the part of students, both in the present and the 
future. 
While faculties made up of political conservatives, liberals, and 
radicals may never agree on "first principles," there is some 
indication in my study that Graff's collective model may generate at 
least a minimal degree of common positive response, in that two common 
criticisms of modem humanities education are those of specialization 
and fragmentation. These two characteristics, perhaps all might 
agree, are related to the commonly lamented loss of the Integrated 
self in contemporary culture. It may be, then, that even those 
individuals who are radically opposed--for whatever reasons--to a 
192 
fully developed collective model (e.g., Interdisciplinary from start 
to finish) may still concur on the benefits of an introductory course 
and a capstone seminar In which the "conflicts" could be anticipated, 
debated, and "contextuallzed." 
Lastly, such an approach, even If Implemented only In a minimal 
way, would foster political self-consciousness and self-crltlclsm 
among faculty members. It would encourage the on-going development of 
one's own philosophy of education, and a philosophical dialogue with 
political content. This, in Itself, would be worthwhile. 
Suggestions similar to Graff's have come in this decade from John 
Trlmbur ("To Reclaim a Legacy . . ."), Henry Giroux et al. ("The Need 
for Cultural Studies"), Michael Ryan ("Deconstructlon and Radical 
Teaching"), Susan Jeffords ("Present Rhetoric and Future Opportunities 
. . ."), and Stanley Aronowitz ("The New Conservative Discourse"). 
Furthermore, the venerable culture critic, Raymond Williams, has 
advocated in this decade a "collaborative" approach to "cultural 
studies" which would nurture "conscious diversity" (in Jeffords 106). 
Certainly this is a partial list, but one which Indicates a passionate 
"oppositional" concern with the content and character of humanities 
education in the university. 
These thinkers share with Cornel West a progressive and pragmatic 
orientation. They have abandoned "the quest for certainty" and they 
recognize the inherently political nature not only of education, but 
of all culture. Thus, from their perspective, the charges of 
"relativism" and "politlcizatlon" leveled by conservatives are 
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themselves masks for a particular political stance, the nervous 
rumblings of a hegemonic culture which foresees Its own collapse. 
Moreover, Rorty's liberal pragmatism appears finally as an apology for 
the status quo, thereby serving a politically conservative function, 
however much his antl-foundatlonallsm Irreparably damages hegemonic 
underpinnings. A major distinction between Rorty and progressive 
pragmatlsts Is that the latter not only hlstorlclze philosophy, they 
also refuse to depolltlclze history, as Rorty ultimately does. 
Many of the thinkers listed above advocate structural changes in 
the academy and so go beyond Graff's suggestion for "teaching the 
conflicts" within the existing institution. In fact, it is fairly 
common for progressive pragmatlsts with prophetic ethical 
sensibilities to harbor grave doubts as to whether any real change can 
be effected within the present structure. In other words, such 
thinkers often suffer Foucauldlan moments. Henry Giroux et al. put it 
this way: 
Michael Foucault has shown that discipline as a particular 
strategy of social control and domination began at the end 
of the classical age and came into dominance in the modern 
period. Though Foucault is not directly concerned with 
academic disciplines, much of his analysis applies to these 
enterprises. . . . To be part of a discipline means to ask 
certain questions, to use a particular set of terms, and to 
study a relatively narrow set of things. . . . Foucault's 
work [helps] us to see how these limitations, this 
discipline, are enforced by institutions through various 
rewards and punishments. . . . The ultimate punishment is 
exclusion. . . . The situation is similarly severe for the 
new Ph.D. for whom the price of admission into the academy 
is . . . conformity with dominant academic discourses. 
("The Need for Cultural Studies" 146-147) 
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Glroux, West, and other prophetic pragmatlsts seek not only to 
encourage Interdisciplinary work for the purpose of "concerted 
cultural critique" (although this in Itself is a vital goal) but, In 
effect, to "de-disclplinlze" the academy by 
. . . lay[ing] bare the historically specific Interests that 
structure . . . academic disciplines, the relations among 
them, and the manner In which the form and content of the 
disciplines reproduce and legitimate the dominant culture. 
(156) 
The problem, of course, is that "counter-disciplinary" cultural 
studies "cannot be housed in universities as they are presently 
structured" (155). Hence the need for "counter-institutions," 
alliances among "oppositional groups" for the purpose of "radical 
social change" (155-156). Glroux et al. argue further that not only 
will "disciplinary structures" remain Intact for an unforeseen period 
of time, but that it would be "a mistake to locate cultural studies 
within them." On the other hand, however, it is Important to work for 
concessions from the administrators of such structures, as a matter of 
tactics. The vital imperative is not to be "resigned to the role that 
universities assign us" (156). 
Thus Graff's proposal has definite merit even from the 
perspective of those prophetic pragmatlsts who doubt the possibility 
of effecting significant change from within existing academic 
structures. This means that the prophetic pragmatlst must, at least 
as a stopgap measure, struggle "to retain enough . . . strength to 
. . . do a little justice in the terms of the great injustice" (Warren 
184). Significantly, there are still traditions of resistance and 
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hope--such as the prophetic tradition--to nurture such a paradoxical, 
poignant, and problematic undertaking. Furthermore, these traditions 
are much more likely to be recovered and transmitted in the humanities 
than in any other area of the modem university. 
For prophetic pragmatists, who recognize the hegemonic authority 
exercised by the academy, the logic of domination which characterizes 
many of the practices carried out in the name of truth and democracy, 
and who yet continue to work within the institution, the future may 
well be one of frustration and despair. Yet, many such individuals 
have adopted Gramsci's maxim (borrowed from Romain Rolland): 
"Pessimism of the intelligence, optimism of the will" (Prison 
Notebooks 175). In other words, neither moral resignation nor 
academic escapism is an acceptable option in the long run. The 
thoroughly human stakes are simply too high. Therefore, it seems fair 
to speculate that the passion-filled controversy surrounding the 
character and content of the academic humanities will not diminish in 
the twilight of the twentieth century. 
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The book Is published. Its statements are well-documented. 
Its conclusions are attacked, discussed, at last accepted. 
It gets reviewed and praised, sold In stores, talked about 
among intelligent people for a while, held in respect by 
many, discussed again in certain places, and adopted finally 
as a standard text for certain areas of study. It does not 
make a oarceptlbla difference in the life of anybody, not 
when it is first reprinted, not when it is chosen as a 
college text, not when it is finally adopted into a special, 
neat and clean compartment of contemporary culture labeled 
as "important comment on a major social issue." 
-- Jonathan Kozol (The Night is Dark 376) 
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6. AFTERWORD 
Jonathan Kozol's perceptive description of our cultural tendency 
to "consume" and "neutralize" texts dealing with controversial social 
issues underscores the sense of futility and frustration which 
characterizes an intellectual endeavor such as the one Just completed. 
What good is a study which tries to draw out the sociopolitical 
content of various contemporary responses to a question posed over a 
century ago ("What knowledge is of most worth?")? As Kozol's argument 
suggests, if this study were published and by some almost unimaginable 
combination of luck and media persuasion were widely-read, reviewed, 
and debated, would it make any concrete moral difference in the "life 
of anybody"? 
Several presuppositions are packed into these questions, but two 
are central and perhaps need to be explicitly acknowledged: 1) if 
knowledge makes no edifying difference in the moral lives of people, 
then that knowledge contributes to less worthy or even unworthy ends, 
and 2) the character of modern technocratic capitalist culture, even 
academic life itself, effectively hinders the capacity of knowledge to 
make any edifying difference in the moral lives of people. These two 
presuppositions point to my pragmatic and critical theoretical 
orientation and to my endorsement of the positions taken by such 
individuals as Gomel West, Stanley Aronowitz, and Frank Lentricchia, 
all of whom not only share these understandings but also critique the 
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cultural conditions which form the basis for the second one. These 
presuppositions complicate the attempt to answer the first question 
posed In the preceding paragraph. But having acknowledged them, I 
will now try to address that question. 
What good Is a study which tries to draw out the aoclooolltlGal 
content of various responses to Spencer's classic question? The fact 
that humanities educators share no common purpose In their work Is 
certainly no revolutionary discovery. The discourse of crisis 
surrounding the humanities In this decade has repeatedly addressed 
that lack of commonality. Yet, without exception, all of the scholars 
and educators analyzed In this study claim allegiance to (at least 
small-t) truth, justice, freedom--all values associated with the 
moral/political relations of persons within a democracy. Part of my 
endeavor, then, has been to show that such abstract terms mean nothing 
until they are fleshed out, embodied, made concrete. With this 
fleshing out, their moral and political content becomes apparent. I 
have tried to explicate this content for the purpose of Illustrating 
the vast differences which exist between those who. In Dewey's words, 
"wish to maintain the status quo" and those who are "concerned to make 
changes." Furthermore, as I hope this study has Illustrated, those In 
the latter group often disagree on what changes are desirable. 
When a comment is made among humanities educators suggesting the 
need to translate the abstract into the concrete, it is almost 
inevitably followed at some point by a testimony to the power of 
story. I agree with this assessment, and believe that it points to 
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the conflicts over such prior questions as "Whose story?" and "How are 
we to decide whose story?" These questions are political in 
character; they are answered in ways which correspond with the Deweyan 
distinction referred to above. For example, is it Just as (or perhaps 
even more) important that students be introduced to post-colonial 
literature (Achebe and Gordimer, for example) as to Tennyson and 
Kipling? Should introductory philosophy courses include a section on 
Latin American liberation philosophy? How vital is feminist 
hermeneutics to the study of biblical material? Whose understandings 
of truth, justice, and freedom deserve our fullest attention now--
those who have traditionally enjoyed a place at the center of 
humanities scholarship, or those who have been marginalized? Whose 
voices will be allowed to speak and whose will be denied? Whose 
knowledge is of most value? 
By now, I hope it is apparent that the philosophical and 
pedagogical disputes analyzed in this study carry significant 
political weight, even in the day-to-day decisions and activities of 
humanities educators. Imagine, if you will, a curriculum committee 
made up of Allan Bloom, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Rorty, Nancy Fraser, 
and Cornel West. Now, place before this committee the questions posed 
in the preceding paragraph. The starting point for my study was the 
assertion that each of these "committee members" works within the 
framework of a certain social/ethical/political vision, and that this 
vision determines each one's answers to these questions. 
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My argument lâ that knowledge does not exist except in embodied 
form; it dwells in the concrete lives of persons, who determine its 
worth in connection to their perception of what it is good for. My 
study has tried to illuminate the diversity of views endorsed by 
several contemporary scholars in order to translate the abstract 
phrase "education [good] for democracy" into its many concrete 
manifestations. In this way, the humanities crisis is unveiled as a 
cultural/political struggle over the images evoked by the phrase, "We, 
' the People." As John Trimbur puts it, "The normative meaning in 
question [in the humanities crisis] is the one that underlies Marlow's 
narrative in Lord Jim--what does it mean to one of us?" (113). 
Thus, the discourse of crisis is political discourse. To engage 
in it is to engage in political action, either to legitimate the 
status quo and to seal the boundaries of human experience and cultural 
authority, or--as in the case of West, for example--to challenge those 
boundaries and to reveal the inadequate, even detrimental character of 
hegemonic cultural authority in relation to the urgency of our 
historical situation. -In- sense, then, the nature of the 
humanities crisis is itself a matter of contention. The crisis as 
perceived by Bloom, for example, is quite different from the one 
described by West. Yet both of these culture critics engage in crisis 
discourse in the name of democracy. and the primary purpose of this 
study has been to elucidate what that term signifies, not only to West 
and Bloom, but to several other contemporary intellectuals who employ 
it to justify their normative conceptions of humanities education. 
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But this analysis does not speak to the question suggested by 
Kozol. Is it possible today for a study such as this one to make any 
real difference in the lives of persons? As indicated above, Kozol 
maintains that the character of modern culture renders innocuous any 
study dealing with controversial moral/social concerns. The ideology 
of consumption, he argues, mandates a perpetual cycle of discovery, 
interesting discussion, and inevitable obsolescence. But laying aside 
for a moment this discouraging (if all too true) assessment, my hope 
is that my study will contribute to the development of hermeneutical 
historical consciousness, by which I mean the capacity to interrogate 
cultural tradition in light of the crises and injustices of the 
present. This means, also, that Just as this study has been an 
exercise in self-criticism and cultural interrogation for me, it might 
inspire and inform a similar process on the part of readers. I 
understand the knowledge to be gained from such an endeavor as 
valuable insofar as it nurtures communication between and among 
persons and contributes to the critical social/ethical awareness vital 
for creative democratic relations. This, I maintain, is a not 
unworthy goal for humanities education in the late twentieth century. 
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